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ABSTRACT 
Time-limited dispatch (TLO) allows aircraft to dispatch with known faults present in 
the engine control systems. These systems govern the thrust control of engines and, in 
order for a TLO scheme to be certified, the failure rates to loss of thrust control (LOTC) 
must lie within or below prescribed bounds. The aim of the work presented in this thesis 
was to develop a tool that could be used to model the time-limited dispatch (TLO) of 
aircraft and compare this with currently recommended techniques for modelling TLO. 
Currently techniques for modelling TLO require the failure rates to LOTC from various 
dispatchable system configurations, i.e. system configurations where a number of faults 
are present. These rates determine how long the system may be dispatched with certain 
faults present and also a failure rate to LOTC can be computed for the whole system .. A 
number of approximations are used within the models, intended to make them simple to 
use. The concern is that these approximations might not accurately model the system 
behaviour and that the results obtained might as a consequence be unreliable. 
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) was identified as an analysis method that could deal 
with the intricacies and complexities involved in the application of TLD. Software, 
written in C++, allowed TLO to be modelled using MCS. Full use was made of the 
flexibility of MCS and many TLO maintenance scenarios were considered as the code 
was developed. The MCS code was written in such a way that all failure rates to LOTC, 
i.e. those representing the system LOTC and the dispatchable fault LOTC rates, would 
be produced as outputs. Results obtained using the developed software and the currently 
recommended techniques were compared. 
Finally, the MCS code was embedded within an optimisation procedure in order to 
demonstrate how such a tool could be used in the design process for a system. A simple 
genetic algorithm procedure was employed to carry out this optimisation process. 
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Chapter 1 : Time-Limited Dispatch 
1.1 Introduction to Reliability Assessment 
Nowadays there exist many complex systems that are required to operate within 
acceptable levels of safety. Examples of such systems are those used to maintain control 
in nuclear power stations and the systems used to control aircraft. Such systems must be 
demonstrated to meet certain levels of safety. The levels of safety demanded from a 
system can depend on a number of factors, such as the likely danger to human life or 
the likelihood of an environmental disaster caused by a system failure. It is important 
when designing any system that the reliability of that system is considered throughout 
the design process, in order for the system to achieve the required level of reliability in 
an economical manner. It is important not to progress many steps through the design 
and building of a system and then discover that the system will not meet the levels of 
safety required from it. 
There are a number of parameters that are useful in investigating system safety. These 
include availability, reliability and failure rates. In order to calculate any of these 
parameters for a system the reliability performance of the individual system 
components must be known. Techniques may then be employed that allow the 
assessment of system performance. The parameter that is used to express system 
performance depends on the nature of the system itself. 
When system failure can be tolerated and repair of the system is possible, an 
appropriate performance measure is availability. The availability of a system is defined 
as the fraction of time that the system is able to perform the function for which it is 
designed. The opposite of availability is unavailability. This is the quantity which is 
more commonly quoted as a performance measure. The definition of unavailability is 
the probability that a system does not work at a given time t. For a system component 
the unavailability is represented by q(t) and for a system the unavailability is 
represented by QSys(t). The system availability is given by Asys(t). The relationship 
between system unavailability and system availability is: 
1.1.1 
2 
For systems which carmot tolerate failure and must operate for specified periods of time 
without system failure occurring reliability provides the appropriate measure of system 
performance. Reliability is defined as the probability that a system will operate for a 
specified time I without a system failure occurring. System reliability is denoted by R(t) 
and system unreliability is denoted by F(I). The relationship between the two is as 
follows: 
R{I) = I - F{I). 1.1.2 
In the case of non-repairable systems, reliability and availability are equal. This is 
because, in such systems, if the system still works at time I and it has not been repaired, 
then it must have worked continuously since time 1=0. 
A further measure of component or system performance is the failure rate. This comes 
in two forms. The first of these, the conditional failure rate, denoted by h(I), also known 
as the hazard rate, is the probability that the system fails in the time interval [I, I+dl) 
given that it has not failed in the interval [0, I). The second failure rate is known as the 
unconditional failure intensity, which is defined as the probability of a system failing in 
the interval [I, I+dl) given that it was working at time I = 0. This is denoted for a 
component as w(t) and for a system as Wsr.s{I). The unconditional failure intensity can 
be used to calculate the expected number of failures over the time interval from to to I, 
by integration, from: 
1.1.3 
Here, W(lo, I,) represents the expected number of failures in (1o, I,). 
Many methods, such as fault tree analysis (FT A), Markov analysis or Monte Carlo 
simulation, can be used to evaluate the system safety parameters (all of these methods 
are described later in this thesis). Figure 1.1.1 gives a representation of the properties of 
these methods. As a general rule the complexity of models increase as one moves from 
FTA to Markov to MCS. The efficiency of the methods (in terms of processing power 
required and model construction) generally improves in the opposite direction to 
complexity. When modelling any system the most efficient method is selected whose 
complexity enables the system to be effectively modelled. Poor predictions of system 
3 
perfonnance will come from using inappropriate or poorly constructed models or 
inaccurate solution routines. 
Efficiency Compl_ex_ity..:......--i.~ 
FTA Markov MCS 
Figure 1.1.1. A representation of the characteristics of three 
modelling techniques. 
1.2 Background of Time-Limited Dispatch 
Time-limited dispatch was first seen after the introduction of Full Authority Digital 
Electronic Control (FADEC) to commercial transport aircraft. FADEC is an electronic 
engine control system that uses a digital computer to control the variables required to 
regulate engine thrust throughout the operating range from the beginning of fuel 
metering to fuel shutoff. When first introduced on the Boeing 757 FADEC systems 
replaced the previously-used hydromechanical control (HMC) systems. Indeed, it was 
the first time that HMC systems would be unavailable to pilots in the event of an 
electronic system failure [1]. FADEC systems utilise a dual channel control system (two 
essentially identical channels per engine) that brings with it a level of redundancy. 
Redundant elements or dual systems exist for all critical loops and functions within the 
system. At the point of their introduction, due to the relative youth of the technology, 
there were no existing safety analyses for FADEC systems. No relevant loss of thrust 
control (LOTC) reliability criteria existed. Thus, in order to attempt to establish the 
viability of aircraft dispatch, it was initially decided to follow existing methods, which 
involved considering the consequences of the next failure to the system [2]. However, 
the complexity of FADEC systems made this a difficult task. Due to this, together with 
the absence of existing safety analyses and experience of the use of FADEC systems, 
the dispatch criteria subsequently imposed led to a negative impact on delays and 
cancellations of aircraft [2]. This negative impact appeared to originate mainly from the 
fact that independent faults in more than one channel were leading to overly prohibitive 
4 
dispatch criteria [1]. In order to overcome the restrictions imposed by these dispatch 
criteria a fresh approach was required which would reduce the numbers of delays and 
cancellations to more acceptable levels and yet still assure the desired standard of 
system reliability. Due to the fact that F ADEC systems exhibited higher levels of 
reliability than established limits for HMC systems the opportunity arose to utilise 
redundancy within the system in order to allow for dispatch in the presence of faults. 
Systems are still required to meet the necessary airworthiness standards over the period 
of the degraded-redundancy dispatch [2]. In addition to substantially reducing the 
delays experienced by aircraft operators, the new approach also allows for the better 
planning and scheduling of maintenance operations. This new approach is known as 
time-limited dispatch (TLD). 
Although the application of TLD to areas other than F ADEC systems may be possible 
no guidelines currently exist for such uses. It is for this reason that the discussions in the 
following sections refer to F ADEC systems. 
1.3 Introduction to Time-Limited Dispatch (TLD) 
TLD is a method allowing the dispatch of aircraft for a limited time in the presence of 
one or more faults whilst assuring a certain level of system reliability. It takes 
advantage of any available redundancy within the system, thus reducing the number of 
delays and cancellations, as well as the magnitude of their effects. In addition to this 
TLD enables more efficient scheduling of maintenance activities than would be 
possible without its use. According to the significance of the faults present within the 
system the aircraft may be dispatched for differing lengths of time or dispatch 
intervals. The dispatch interval is the maximum time interval that is approved for 
dispatching aircraft with known faults before maintenance must be undertaken to 
remedy those faults. Dispatch intervals can fall into anyone of four categories (as 
defined by the F AA [2]), 
• Do Not Dispatch (DND), 
• Short Time Dispatch (STD), 
• Long Time Dispatch (L TD), 
• Manufacturer/Operator Defined Dispatch (MDD), 
5 
the names of which are reasonably self-explanatory. If applied, the DND category of 
dispatch means an aircraft may not be dispatched because of the faults present and 
corrective maintenance must be carried out immediately. The STD category of dispatch 
means the aircraft may be dispatched in the short-tenn with faults present in the system 
before suitable maintenance, while the LTD category pennits a longer possible period 
of dispatch before the appropriate repairs are implemented. The MDD category of 
dispatch is defined to be for faults that do not fall into any of the other three categories 
or do not affect the LOTC rate of the system [2]. It is possible that the faults mayor 
may not appear in the analysis for the LOTC rate but they will appear in the TLD 
analysis with a repair interval agreed between the engine and aircraft manufacturers. 
Faults causing the application of the DND criteria are those that leave the system 
particularly vulnerable to the occurrence of further individual faults, which explains the 
urgency of corrective maintenance. Faults demanding the application of the STD and 
LTD criteria will leave the system less susceptible to further faults, indeed the longer 
the dispatch time, the more secure the system must be in the event of an additional 
solitary fault. The F AA gives an upper limit for the computed LOTC rate of 100 events 
per million flight hours for dispatchable configurations of the system. Indeed, if the 
computed LOTC rates lie within certain intervals then the dispatch criteria applied to 
the system must fall into specific categories [2]. The intervals for each category are 
given in Table 1.3.1. 
Dispatch DND STD LTD Category 
LOTC rate, r r > lOO 75<r<\OO 0< r < 75 
Table 1.3.1. Computed LOTC rate for the different dispatch 
criteria (number of events per 106 flight hours). 
The dispatch interval allowed for each category of dispatch may vary according to the 
maturity of the system. The F AA prescribe upper limits for the dispatch intervals for 
'entry level' systems (see Table 1.3.2), which it defines as systems that have undergone 
less than 250,000 hours of operation in a particular installation or its equivalent [2]. 
Upon reaching maturity after this length of service these limits may be altered if 
6 
sufficient evidence is provided to support the changes, given that the F ADEC system 
performs according to the analysis upon which the TLD approval is based. 
Dispatch DND STD LTD Category 
Max. Dispatch 0 125 250 Interval 
Table 1.3.2. Maximum allowable dispatch intervals for TLD 
operations of 'entry level' systems (flight hours). 
Since the requirement that FADEC systems should exhibit levels of reliability equal to 
or better than that displayed by earlier HMC systems, the average LOTC rate due to 
FADEC systems should be less than or equal to 10 events per 106 flight hours [1],[2]. 
Note that this is an average LOTC rate and should not be confused with the maximum 
permitted LOTC rate of 100 events per 106 flight hours previously quoted for TLD 
operations ofFADEC systems. 
1.4 Incorporating TLD in Maintenance Operations 
Two maintenance strategies exist that allow the incorporation of the dispatch intervals 
associated with TLD, MEL maintenance and periodic inspection/repair (PIR) 
maintenance, which are described below. When implementing TLD it is possible to 
use either one of these strategies to address all faults from each dispatch category or 
some combination of the two strategies [2]. DND category faults must always be 
reported in the flight deck of the aircraft so that the aircraft is not dispatched with these 
faults. In order to ensure this DND faults are reported in the flight deck using essential 
equipment, i.e. equipment that is always available as an aircraft is dispatched. Thus the 
means of reporting the DND faults should always be available before dispatch. 
1.4.1 MEL Maintenance 
MEL maintenance is a time-since-fault repair strategy. The time of occurrence of a fault 
repaired using this strategy must be known and maintenance to rectify that fault must be 
implemented within the dispatch interval for the category of dispatch into which the 
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fault falls. Generally, the presence of the fault condition must be reported in the flight 
deck using essential equipment, as is the case with DND faults. The essential equipment 
must always be available to report the faults. MEL maintenance receives its name from 
the minimum equipment list (MEL). The minimum equipment list details the aircraft 
equipment that must be operable in order for the aircraft to be airworthy. Before a 
flight, if a fault is indicated, the flight crew check the MEL to see if the aircraft can be 
flown with that fault. The reason for the MEL giving its name to this maintenance 
strategy is that the flight crew must check the MEL if a fault is present in order to check 
that dispatch is allowed and the MEL provides the length of the allowable dispatch 
interval. 
MEL maintenance is principally used to repair faults that fall into the STD category, 
although this needn't be the case. The F AA states that this maintenance strategy isn't 
normally used to repair faults falling into categories of dispatch with intervals greater 
than 300 hours and also that it is an acceptable practice to "start the clock" at midnight 
on the day that the fault indication occurred [2]. 
Figure 1.4.1 contains a diagrammatic representation of the MEL maintenance strategy. 
If a fault occurs at time tf a dispatch interval is initiated, during which time the aircraft 
may be dispatched. This assumes knowledge of the time of occurrence of the fault. If 
the fault has not been repaired by time tr further dispatch of the aircraft is prohibited. 
dispatch interval ~, 
t 
Figure 1.4.1. Timeline illustrating MEL maintenance. 
1.4.2 Periodic Inspection/Repair Maintenance 
The periodic inspection/repair maintenance strategy (PIR), as its name suggests, 
involves checking the system for faults at regular intervals. It is usually used to carry 
out maintenance on faults that fall into the LTD category, but could also be used to 
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maintain STD category faults. In contrast to the MEL maintenance approach there is no 
requirement for flight deck indications of fault occurrences, since the exact time of 
occurrence of the faults need not be known. Instead faults discovered at the periodic 
system inspections must be repaired within a certain time which ensures that the 
average exposure of the system to a fault doesn't exceed the maximum allowed by its 
dispatch category [2]. The exposure time of the system is the amount of time the system 
is required to operate in the presence of faults, before the faults are repaired. 
When applying this maintenance strategy, because the time of occurrence of the fault is 
not known, it is assumed upon its discovery that the fault occurred halfway through the 
periodic inspection interval. This is the average time at which the fault will occur and is 
a reasonable assumption when the failure rate is constant with time. The inspection 
interval can be adjusted in order to satisfy this condition. If the failure rates of faults 
aren't constant the average exposure time should be adjusted accordingly [2]. 
There is, in practice, clearly going to be a maximum limit for the periodic inspection 
interval for each category of TLD. This will depend upon the length of the dispatch 
interval. Figure 1.4.2 gives an illustration of the PIR maintenance strategy and can be 
used to show how this maximum limit is derived. In and In+ 1 represent two consecutive 
system inspections. A fault, A, occurs at some time between the inspections, but the 
exact time is not known. When the fault is discovered during inspection In+l it is 
assumed that the fault occurred halfway between the two inspections at point M. If TLD 
is to be used the aircraft may be dispatched for a further time, td, after which repairs 
must be implemented. This time td will be equal to the dispatch interval minus half of 
the periodic inspection interval, the reason for this being that the dispatch interval is 
initiated at the assumed time of occurrence of the fault, i.e. at M. It would be possible to 
set the inspection interval such that Id equals zero in order to have the dispatch interval 
end as inspection In+l takes place. This gives a maximum size of the periodic inspection 
interval of twice the dispatch interval. In practice this would normally be undesirable . 
since this allows no flexibility within the maintenance programme as to when the repair 
is carried out. 
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Figure 1.4.2. Timeline illustrating PIR maintenance. 
- The above description of the PIR maintenance process is perhaps better illustrated using 
specific values for the periodic inspection interval and the dispatch interval. Consider a 
fault occurring at some point between two consecutive inspection intervals that carries 
with it a dispatch interval of 300 hours. If the fault is assumed to have occurred at the 
midpoint of the inspection interval the maximum length of the inspection interval will 
be 600 hours. However, if this is the case, there is no scope for dispatching the aircraft 
after the fault has been discovered. In such a situation it may be more prudent to set the 
inspection interval to be 500 hours, say, so that if the fault is assumed to have occurred 
at the midpoint of the interval the exposure to this fault will be 250 hours, thus giving 
an extra 50 hours in which the aircraft may be dispatched. This allows some leeway for 
the fault to be repaired at a more convenient time. 
The different approaches to maintenance taken in the MEL and PIR strategies mean that 
the maximum possible exposure time of a system to faults differs for each strategy 
despite the fact that the dispatch intervals are the same. If the maximum possible limit 
for the periodic inspection interval is twice the maximum possible dispatch interval, as 
described above, then a fault occurring immediately after an inspection will be present 
in the system until the next inspection for faults of that dispatch category. Table 1.4.1 
shows these maximum values for the STD and LTD dispatch categories for an 'entry 
level' system (defined in Table 1.3.2). 
Dispatch Category STD LTD 
Max. Allowable Dispatch Interval 125 250 
Max. Possible Exposure Time - MEL 125 250 
Max. Possible Exposure Time - PIR 250 500 
Table 1.4.1. Comparison of maximum allowable dispatch 
intervals and exposure times for MEL and PIR maintenance. 
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If the maintenance of more than one category of fault is to be addressed using a periodic 
inspection/repair maintenance strategy it is possible that during an inspection for faults 
of one dispatch category a fault related to another dispatch category could also be 
discovered. In situations such as this procedures are usually in place to acknowledge the 
fault at the current inspection but it is then addressed as though discovered at the next 
inspection for faults of its own dispatch category [2]. In order to illustrate this consider 
the timeline shown in Figure 1.4.3, on which the periodic inspections and faults relating 
to the STD fault category lie below the timeline and the periodic inspections and faults 
relating to the L TD fault category lie above the time line. 11 and h represent consecutive 
periodic inspections for faults covered by the STD category of dispatch, while lA and Is 
represent consecutive periodic inspections for faults covered by the LTD category of 
dispatch. Now assume that an STD fault, Fs, occurs at some time between hand h and 
an LTD fault, FL, occurs at some time between lA and Is. These faults will be 
discovered at h and Is respectively. However, when Fs is discovered at h the fault FL 
may also be discovered, despite the fact that the inspection isn't for faults in its 
category. Even if FL is discovered at this time there is no need for a dispatch interval to 
be initiated for it at this point. Its existence is acknowledged and it may be treated as 
usual when 'discovered' at Is. 
LTD-
h Fs 
STD-
I 
h 
Is 
I 
t 
Figure 1.4.3. PIR maintenance for STD and LTD faults. 
When the periodic inspection/repair maintenance strategy is implemented there exists 
the possibility to carry out all inspections and repairs at uniformly spaced intervals. This 
is achieved by setting the inspection/repair interval to be :v, of the length of the average 
exposure of the system to faults [2]. This situation is illustrated using the timeline in 
Figure 1.4.4, on which an inspection/repair process is shown with four consecutive 
inspections, I" ... ,l4' and the OCcurrence of two faults, A and B. As is customary. when A 
and B are discovered at h and h respectively, they are assumed to occur at the midpoint 
of the periodic inspection interval in which they occurred, that is at A' and B' . 
11 
I I 
h A A' 
average fault exposure time 
I 
h 
1,\ 
I 
I I 
B' B 13 
~. 
t 
Figure 1.4.4. PIR maintenance allowing uniformly spaced 
repairs. 
If the inspection interval is set according to the definition above, i.e. 7) of the average 
exposure time of the system to faults, the dispatch interval initiated upon the discovery 
of fault A will allow dispatch until inspection 13 due to the fact that the average exposure 
of the system to the fault will begin at A' and end at h Similarly, the discovery of fault 
B at 13 will result in the assumed time of occurrence of the fault being B' and dispatch 
will be permitted until the next periodic inspection, 14• Implementing periodic 
inspection/repair maintenance in this manner, with repairs set to occur at the time of 
inspections, could, for instance, allow relevant parts to be ordered for the repair of faults 
present at the current inspection in time for the next inspection. An interesting result of 
the implementation of this particular configuration of the inspections is that it would be 
theoretically possible for the system to always operate in the presence of faults and yet 
still meet all of the safety requirements asked of it. 
Note that, when implementing the periodic inspection/repair maintenance strategy, all 
faults pertaining to a certain category of TLD must be repaired at the same time if there 
is no indication of the exact timing of these faults. This would be the case in practice 
when implementing this maintenance strategy since in general the warning in the flight 
deck of the system faults will be a generic one which merely indicates the presence of 
such faults. 
1.5 The Occurrence ofFauIts 
There are a number of ways in which the occurrence of faults within the system can 
affect the application ofTLD to that system. Some of these are detailed below. 
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1.5.1 Multiple Faults 
Despite the high reliability of F ADEC systems the possibility exists for one or more 
faults to occur within the dispatch interval associated with another fault [2]. In 
situations such as these, when there are multiple faults within a system and a 
maintenance deadline is reached there will be a number of different possible repair 
options, in terms of the faults that must be cleared from the system. Whether DND, 
STD or L TD faults are present, or MEL or PIR maintenance is being implemented, it is 
important that the system is not dispatched with any fault for more than the allowed 
time for that fault. There are many possible scenarios to consider when implementing 
TLD when multiple faults arise. Advantage could be taken of the fact that not all faults 
will require immediate repair in order to allow maintenance to be conveniently 
scheduled or to wait until appropriate parts are available. Simple examples of multiple 
faults are illustrated below for MEL and PIR maintenance. 
1.5.1.1 Example - MEL Maintenance 
Consider the situation shown in Figure 1.5.1, which shows a timeline where A and B 
represent the occurrence of two faults that initiate dispatch intervals ending at tl and t2 
respectively. At the end of the dispatch interval relating to fault A this fault must be 
repaired, if this has not already happened. The repair of fault B may also be 
implemented at this time, thus clearing both faults from the system and returning it to a 
full-up configuration. However, assuming the exact time of occurrence of fault B is 
known then the aircraft may subsequently be dispatched further until time t2 when the 
dispatch interval for this fault ends. Fault B could then be repaired at t2 . 
• •• 
• • 
• 
• 
• •• 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • I I I I • 
A B tl t2 t 
Figure 1.5. I. Two faults and their dispatch intervals. 
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1.5.1.2 Example-PIRMaintenance 
If PIR maintenance is being implemented and multiple faults occur between two 
consecutive inspections then all of the faults will be repaired at the next maintenance 
deadline for faults of the relevant category. Another situation that may arise when 
multiple faults occur and PIR maintenance is being used is that one or more faults may 
occur in the time after an inspection but before the maintenance deadline initiated at that 
inspection. If this is the case the faults discovered at the inspection must be repaired as 
the deadline is reached. The faults occurring after the inspection could also be repaired 
at this time, if discovered, or they could be left to be 'discovered' at the next inspection 
at which point a maintenance deadline for their repair will be set. In order to illustrate 
this consider the timeline in Figure 1.5.2, which depicts such a scenario for two faults, A 
and B, which, when discovered at the following inspection, will be assumed to occur at 
A' and B' respectively. When fault A is discovered at inspection h the maximum 
average fault exposure time of the system leads to a maintenance deadline ending at tl. 
When this deadline is reached fault B may be discovered to have occurred in the time 
between the inspection and the deadline. If this is the case fault B could be repaired 
along with fault A at the deadline, or it could be allowed to remain in the system, then 
be 'discovered' at inspection h at which point the appropriate maintenance deadline 
would be set. Note that in the scenario described above it is assumed that the faults A 
and B fall in the same dispatch category. 
I 
average exposure time 
;/' ~ 
-, -, , , 
fd 
, 
td 
, 
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[i]~ ~I I ~ -A' I: B fl B' f2 f 
Figure 1.5.2. Two faults maintained using PIR, faIling 
between different pairs of inspections. 
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1.5.2 Combinations of Faults 
When using TLD in maintenance operations some faults may, if occurring in certain 
combinations, c,ause a reduction in the dispatch interval that is to be implemented. To 
illustrate this consider the example shown in Figure 1.5.3. In this example the 
occurrence of either fault A or fault B alone would initiate an L TD dispatch interval, the 
dispatch interval for A ending at t2 and the dispatch interval for B ending at t3. However, 
in combination, A and B cause the initiation of an STD dispatch interval ending at t1, 
which is implemented as soon as both faults are present. Upon reaching the 
maintenance deadline at the end of the shortened dispatch interval (in Figure 1.5.3 this 
would be at time t1) there are two maintenance options. The first of these is to repair 
both of the faults, thus leading to dispatch of the aircraft with no faults, and the second 
option is to repair only one of the faults, thus allowing the dispatch of the aircraft up to 
the point at which the maintenance deadline would occur for the remaining fault. In this 
way, in the example in Figure 1.5.3, once time t1 is reached repairs to the aircraft are 
necessary. If only fault A is repaired the aircraft may then be dispatched until such a 
time that the LTD dispatch interval ends for fault B, i.e. t3. Similarly, if only fault B is 
repaired the aircraft may be dispatched until the L TD dispatch interval for fault A ends, 
i.e. 12. 
LTD ., 
, 
, 
STD ' 
;=, ~-----I.'r' ._._._._._.{._._._», 
I , ,I 
I I I,
I I ,I 
, I I " 
j I I I I 
A B t1 t2 13 1 
Figure 1.5.3. A fault combination causing a reduction in the 
dispatch interval. 
The fact that combinations of faults may be addressed in this way again allows for 
greater flexibility and convenience when scheduling and implementing repairs. This 
situation could conceivably occur with a number of faults greater than two, with a 
number of faults leading to a reduction in the dispatch interval, but the process of 
repairing these faults could be generalised from that described above for two faults. Of 
course, this situation needn't only occur with STD and L TD dispatch intervals. A 
combination of faults may cause a DND criteria to be applied to the aircraft, so that it 
can't be dispatched until maintenance of some kind has been implemented. In such a 
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situation it may prove particularly useful to repair a small number of faults in order to 
allow dispatch of the aircraft, for example so that further maintenance could be carried 
out at a more suitable location or when parts are more readily available. 
1.5.3 Ordered Combinations Of Faults 
When faults work in combination to shorten the dispatch time it is possible that the 
faults may need to occur in a particular order for this to happen. For instance, consider 
again the example shown in Figure 1.5.3. Suppose that for the faults A and B to 
combine and shorten the dispatch time the mere presence of the faults was insufficient 
and that fault A must occur first and be followed by fault B, as was depicted in Figure 
1.5.3. If A is not followed by B their individual dispatch intervals are applied as usual. 
1.5.4 Safety Margins 
For 'entry level' systems a 2:1 safety margin is introduced by the FAA to dispatch 
intervals when implementing TLD [2]. This means that, in order to approve the dispatch 
times for an 'entry level' system, the predicted average LOTC rate for the system 
should be no greater than the level of 10 events per million flight hours, discussed in 
Section 1.3, for dispatch intervals that are twice the length of those to be used. In order 
to illustrate this point, consider a case where a F ADEC system was shown to meet the 
10 events per million flight hours requirement for an STD dispatch interval of 200 
hours. For an entry level system this means the allowed STD dispatch interval would 
initially be 100 hours. 
1.6 Characteristics of Modelling TLD 
TLD has a number of characteristics and features that must be accounted for in any 
process that is used to model it. These lead to a number of requirements of a TLD 
modelling tool: 
• The systems to which TLD is applied involve dependencies, e.g. operating 
procedures brought about by TLD bring dependencies, as do maintenance and 
repair operations. The modelling tool chosen for TLD must be able to handle 
dependencies. 
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• The systems to which TLD is applied are large, meaning that the tool used to 
model them must be able to deal effectively and accurately with large systems. 
• TLD brings with it flexibility in the maintenance options, e.g. MEL orPIR 
maintenance are possible and various ways of addressing faults at maintenance 
are possible. A good model should be able to deal with these different 
maintenance possibilities. 
• The dispatch criteria that are applied to a system must conform to regulations 
regarding the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the dispatchable 
configurations, as must the overall system LOTC rate. It must be possible to 
show that all requirements regarding the LOTC rates are met. 
1.7 Current Recommended Approaches for Modelling TLD 
There are currently two approaches recommended for modelling TLD [2], a time-
weighted average (TW A) approach and a reduced fault state Markov approach. The 
TW A approach is stated to be a fault tree based approach but the two models use 
similar data and are essentially variations on a similar approach. Conventional fault tree 
analysis is unsuitable for modelling TLD since it cannot deal with the dependencies 
introduced. Conventional Markov analysIs will be unsuitable because of a state space 
explosion that takes place because of the large system size. 
The recommended approaches do not appear wholly suitable for modelling TLD for a 
number of reasons: 
• The models are simplistic and as such could be incapable of capturing the 
detailed behaviour ofiarge, complex aircraft systems. 
• The models do not have the capacity to deal with the different possible 
maintenance and repair options available while implementing TLD. 
• The instantaneous LOTC rates are not calculated using the models and must be 
estimated and included in the models. If these rates are incorrectly approximated 
the combination of this with the potentially poor model structure could lead to 
inaccurate results. 
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1.8 Research Objectives 
It is proposed here that Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is well-suited to modelling 
TLD. It offers the capability to deal with complex systems, dependencies and different 
repair and maintenance strategies and produce accurate, auditable results. 
The objectives of this research are to: 
.• Develop a MCS methodology for modelling TLD that will encompass the 
different options available when modelling TLD, such as different maintenance 
and repair options and system information such as operating lifetime and flight 
lengths. 
• Develop the MCS methodology to give an integrated approach to setting 
dispatch criteria for a system and ensuring that all certification requirements are 
met. 
• Develop importance measures, using the MCS approach, for systems to which 
TLD is applied. 
• Compare the recommended approaches with the MCS approach and identifY 
and explain differences in the results. 
• Demonstrate how an integrated approach to modelling TLD could be 
incorporated at the design stage of a system and used to obtain more 
information about the system lifetime. 
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Chapter 2 : Fault Tree Analysis 
2.1 Background 
Developed by H. A. Watson in the early 1960's, fault tree analysis (FTA) is the most 
widely used tool in safety and reliability assessment [3]. After the introduction of 
computer-based analysis techniques the use of fault tree analysis became increasingly 
common [4]. Fault trees provide a method of visually representing the causes of a 
particular system failure mode in a structured and logical way. All causes of the system 
failure mode are described within the fault tree in terms of component failure modes 
and operator actionslhuman errors. Any weak points in the system may subsequently be 
identified, allowing the rectification of any potential problems. 
2.2 Fault Tree Construction 
The construction of fault trees begins by considering a particular system failure mode, 
known as the top event, and identifying the events that cause it. These events are then 
developed by determining their immediate, necessary and sufficient causes and the 
process continues until all component operating and failure modes, termed basic 
events, are encountered and included in the fault tree. These basic events must be 
independent. This process of fault tree construction· and subsequent analysis is 
discussed in detail in [4], [5] and [6]. A fault tree is concerned with only one system 
failure mode. For this reason the assessment of a system may require the construction of 
a number of fault trees. 
A fault tree diagram contains two basic elements, gates and events. Events are 
classified as either intermediate or basic. Intermediate events, which can be further 
developed in terms of other events, are represented in fault trees by rectangles. Basic 
events, which cannot be developed any further, are represented by circles. These 
symbols are shown in Table 2.2.1. Gates allow or inhibit the flow of logic through the 
fault tree and define the causal relationship between lower level events needed for the 
occurrence of a higher level event. The symbols used to represent these causal 
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relationships are shown in Table 2.2.2. The three main gate types used during the 
construction of a fault tree are the OR gate, the AND gate and the NOT gate. These 
allow the combination of events in exactly the same way as the Boolean operations of 
union, intersection and complementation respectively. Other common gate types are 
the priority AND gate, whose output will occur if all of the inputs occur in order from 
left to right and the kIn voting gate, for which the output occurs if at least k out of the n 
inputs occur. 
Event symbol Meaning of symbol 
0 Intermediate event further developed by a gate 
6 Basic event 
Table 2.2.1. Event symbols. 
Gate symbol Gate Name Causal Relation 
0 Output event occurs if AND gate all inputs occur simultaneously. 
G Output event occurs if at OR gate least one of the input events occurs. 
Z Output event occurs if NOT gate the input event does not occur. 
4 Output event occurs if at kIn voting gate least k of the n inputs 
n inputs occur. 
Q priority AND Output event occurs if the input events occur in gate order from left to right. 
Table 2.2.2. Common gate types and their symbols. 
In a coherent fault tree the constituent gates are restricted to only AND and OR gates, 
which means the system's failure modes are described purely in terms of component 
failures. A non-coherent fault tree will also contain, in addition to the gates present in 
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coherent fault trees, inverse gates such as NOT gates. This means that a non-coherent 
fault tree will have a system failure mode described not only by component failure 
modes, but also by working states. 
Analysis of a fault tree involves determining information about the system being 
analysed by utilising il1formation about probabilities of basic events within the fault 
tree. In this way system information is obtained through an analysis of component 
information. Two types of analysis may be performed on the fault tree, qualitative and 
quantitative, discussions of which follow in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
2.3 Qualitative Analysis 
2.3.1 Cut Sets and Implicants 
The aim of qualitative fault tree analysis is to identify the sets of basic events that, if 
they occur in combination, will bring about the occurrence of the top event, i.e. cause 
system failure. These sets of basic events are the cut sets of the fault tree. A cut set is 
defined as a group of basic events such that if they all occur then so does the top event. 
The fault tree analysis of industrial engineering systems can lead to large numbers of 
cut sets due to the complex nature and size of the system being analysed. However, it is 
not necessarily the case that all basic events within a cut set are required to fail in order 
to produce system failure. In order to illustrate this, consider a cut set of basic events 
{A, B, C}, which represent the failure within a system of components A, B and C. 
Because {A, B, C} forms a cut set, if all three components fail then the top event will 
occur and hence the system fails. However, if the failure of components A and B alone 
are capable of failing the system then the state of component C is irrelevant. Whether C 
is failed or not, the system will fail if both A and B fail. This leads to the concept of a 
minimal cut set, which is defined as a cut set such that if any basic event is removed 
from it the top event will no longer occur. 
The above definitions of a cut set and a minimal cut set apply only to coherent fault 
trees. In the case of non-coherent fault trees the combinations of component failed and 
working states that cause system failure are called implicants (the non-coherent 
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equivalent of cut sets) and the minimal sets of these implicants are called prime 
impIicants. 
In general, lower order minimal cut sets contribute more to system failure than higher 
order minimal cut sets because fewer components are required to fail in order for the 
system to fail. Because of this it is usual for greater effort to be directed towards 
eliminating lower order minimal cut sets than higher order minimal cut sets. In 
particular, first order minimal cut sets should be eliminated in preference to any others, 
since these represent system failure due to the failure of a single component. Fault trees 
of particular system failure modes are not unique. Two fault trees constructed using 
different methods are said to be logically equivalent if their minimal cut sets are 
identical. 
2.3.2 Obtaining Minimal Cut Sets 
Either of two methods can be used in order to extract the minimal cut sets from a fault 
tree. Both require the expansion of the fault tree's Boolean expression into a disjunctive 
normal form. These two methods are the top-down approach and the bottom-up 
approach [5]. The difference between the approaches, as the names suggest, is which 
end of the tree is used to initiate the expansion process. The top-down approach is 
described below. 
The initial step is to express the top event of the fault tree in terms of its inputs using 
Boolean algebra. Next, the laws of Boolean algebra, given in Table 2.3.1, are used to 
expand and simplify the expression, if this is possible. This process of expansion and 
simplification continues down the tree, substituting the Boolean expression for each 
gate in the tree until the full expansion contains only basic component failures. The top-
down approach gets its name from the fact that the process begins at the top of the fault 
tree and continues down through the fault tree. As its name suggests, the bottom-up 
approach involves starting at the bottom of the fault tree and working up to the top 
event. The same expansion and simplification techniques are applied. The product, '.', 
is used to represent AND gates in the logic equations and the sum, '+', is used to 
represent OR gates. 
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1. Commutative Laws A+B=B+A 
A.B=B.A 
2. Associative Laws (A+B)+C = A+(B+C) 
(A.B).C = A.(B.C) 
3. Distributive Laws A + (B.C) = (A +B).(A +C) 
A.(B+C)= (A.B)+(A.C) 
4. Identities A+O=A A.O=O 
A.1 =A A+l =1 
5. Idempotent Laws A+A=A 
A.A=A 
6. Absorption Laws A+A.B=A 
A.(A+B)= A 
7. Complementation -A=l-A (A) = A 
A.A=O 
8. De Morgan's Laws (A + B) =A.B 
--(A.B)=A +B 
Table 2.3.1. The laws of Boo lean algebra. 
2.3.2.1 Example 
The top-down approach for finding the minimal cut sets of a fault tree is now 
demonstrated on the fault tree shown in Figure 2.3.1. 
Using Boolean algebra to express the top event in terms of its inputs gives 
TOP=G1 +A+G2, 
which cannot be simplified in any way using the Boolean laws. Next the Boolean 
expressions for Gland G2 are substituted into this equation to give 
TOP = G3.B + A + C.G4, 
which again cannot be simplified. Similarly the Boolean expressions for G3 and G4 are 
substituted into the equation to give 
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TOP = CA + C).B + A + C.CA.B) 
which, after use of an associative law, a distributive law and the commutative laws, 
yields the following equation for the top event: 
TOP = A + A.B + B.C + B.CA 
Figure 2.3.1. Example fault tree. 
This expression gives the cut sets in their disjunctive normal form. Redundancies may 
then be removed using the absorption law. This gives 
TOP=A +B.C, 
which is the minimal disjunctive form of the logic equation, the terms of which are the 
minimal cut sets of the system. Thus there are two minimal cut sets for this system, one 
first order and one second order. These are {A} and {B, C} respectively. 
Finding the minimal cut sets of a larger fault tree produced from a more complex 
system can be a time consuming task. In practice algorithms exist which enable the 
calculation of minimal cut sets to be carried out on computer. An example of one of 
these algorithms is MOCUS [7), the mechanics of which are described in [4) and [5). 
D~spite the low complexity of the algorithms the process can be extremely time-
consuming. For this reason high order cut sets may be removed during the calculation 
process, in order that the number of computations required to determine the minimal cut 
sets is reduced. Approximations such as this will clearly lead to a reduction in the 
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accuracy of the final minimal cut sets obtained and this will subsequently have an effect 
on the results obtained from any ensuing quantitative analysis. 
2.4 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative analysis of the fault tree enables the calculation of a wide range of system 
parameters and performance measures, including the top event probability and 
frequency. These may be used alongside quantities such as the expected number of 
occurrences of the top event and event and cut set importance measures in order to gain 
a better knowledge and understanding of the system and how it could be improved. 
2.4.1 Top Event Probability 
The exact top event probability (Le. system unavailability) may be determined by using 
the minimal cut sets obtained during the qualitative analysis of the fault tree. The 
method implemented in order to do this is the inclusion-exclusion expansion [5]. This 
is a general method that gives the correct results irrespective of whether or not there is 
repetition of basic events within the fault tree. However, it will only ever give the 
correct results if the assumption of basic event independence is true. 
Consider a fault tree with Ne minimal cut sets Cb i = I, ... , Ne. The top event of this 
fault tree exists if at least one minimal cut set exists, Le. 
Ne 
=UC" 
2.4.1 
j=1 
and therefore the top event probability is given by 
2.4.2 
Expanding this gives 
2.4.3 
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where P( C,) is the probability that minimal cut set i exists. This expansion is the 
inclusion-exclusion expansion. This name derives from the fact that the terms within it 
are alternately added and subtracted. 
Due to the nature of the inclusion-exclusion expansion the calculation of the top event 
probability is an arduous task if a fault tree contains a large number of minimal cut sets, 
even with the aid of a' powerful computer. For this reason the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion is used to obtain upper and lower bounds for the system unavailability [5]. 
2.4.1.1 Upper and Lower Bounds for System Unavailability 
As can be seen from Equation 2.4.3, the odd-numbered terms from the expansion are 
always added, and the even-numbered terms are always subtracted, when calculating 
the system unavailability. Each term produces a numerically less significant 
contribution to the final result than the one that preceded it. These properties may be 
utilised to calculate upper and lower bounds for the system unavailability. Considering 
only the first two terms in the expansion the following inequality can be derived [5]: 
~ ~'-1 () ~ LP(CJ- LLP C,nC j ~ QSys(t) ~ LP(C,}, 
;=1 ;=2 j=i ;=1 2.4.4 
lower bound exact upper bound 
the left hand side of which contains the first two terms of the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion and the right hand side of which contains just the first term. The upper bound 
is known as the rare event approximation, QRE, due to the fact that it is accurate if 
component failures are rare. 
2.4.5 
2.4.1.2 Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
A more accurate approximation for the top event unavailability is the minimal cut set 
upper bound [5], which is derived below. Firstly, 
Also, 
P(system failure} = P(at least one minimal cut set occurs} 
= 1- P(no minimal cut set occurs} 
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2.4.6 
Ne 
P(no minimal cut set occurs) 2 IT P(min. cut set i doesn't occur) 2.4.7 
(equality occurs when no event appears in more than one minimal cut set). Substituting 
this equation into Equation 2.4.6 gives 
Ne 
P(system failure) ~ 1-IT P(min. cut set i doesn' t occur), 2.4.8 
j=1 
or 
2.4.9 . 
1=1 
the right hand side of which is the minimal cut set upper bound, QMCSU, which is 
hence given by 
Ne 
QMCSU = 1- IT[I-P(C,)1 
It can also be shown that 
exact 
;=1 
;=) 
min. cut set 
upper bound 
i::::l 
rare event 
approximation 
2.4.2 Minimal Cut Set Unconditional Failure Intensity 
2.4.10 
2.4.11 
The minimal cut set unconditional failure intensity, wc, (t), of a minimal cut set 
containing ni components is given by: 
", 
wc, (t)= I 
j=l 
jeC, 
", Wj{t)TIqk{t) , 2.4.12 
k=l 
k*J 
keel 
where ni is the number of components in minimal cut set i. It is defined as the 
probability that the minimal cut set will occur at time t per unit time [5]. Thus the 
probability that the minimal cut set occurs in time It, t + dt) is given by wc, (t}dt . 
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2.4.3 System Unconditional Failure Intensity 
The system unconditional failure intensity or top event frequency, wsr.s{t), of a 
system of n components is given by: 
2.4.13 
1=1 
and is defined as the probability that the top event occurs at t per unit time [5]. Thus the 
probability that the top event occurs in the interval [t, t + dt) is given by wsrs(t)dt. The 
first term in the summation, 
GJq{t)) = QSYS (Ii' q{t ))- QSys{Opq{t )), 2.4.14 
is the criticality function, where Qsrs(t) is the system unavailability and 
(I"q{t)) = (ql' ... ,q'_1 ,I, q'+I"·· q.), 
(O"q{t)) = {q" ... , q'_1 ,0, qHi'"·· qJ 
The criticality function gives the probability that the system will go from a working to a 
failed state due to the failure of component i, i.e. that the system is in a critical state for 
i. This is because, as can be seen from 2.4.14, the probability that the system fails with i 
working is subtracted from the probability that the system fails with i failed. 
2.4.3.1 Example 
Figure 2.4.1. A simple system fault tree. 
Consider the simple system fault tree shown in Figure 2.4.1, with three basic events, A, 
Band C, which have failure probabilities of qA, qB and qc and unconditional failure 
intensities WA, WB and Wc respectively. When finding the system unconditional failure 
intensity the first step is to calculate the probability that the system fails, Qsrs. This 
could be obtained by considering the structure function of the system and then using 
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pivotal decomposition or by using the inclusion-exclusion expansion, both of which 
yield the following: 
QSYS =qAqO +qAqC -qAqOqC' 
This can now be used together with 2.4.14 to find the criticality function for each 
component. For component A the criticality function will therefore be: 
G A = QsYA1A ,q)- QSYS (0 A ,q) 
= [qB +qc -qBqC]-[O] 
GA =qo +qc -qoqc' 
In a similar way the criticality functions for components Band C can be shown to be: 
Now from 2.4.13 the unconditional failure intensity will be given by: 
which, upon substitution of the criticality functions, GA, GB and Gc, becomes: 
WSYS = (qo +qc -qOqC}wA +qAwO +qAWC' 
2.4.3.2 Expected Number of System Failures . 
The expected number of system failures in the time interval to to tl, W(to, tl), is found by 
integrating the system unconditional failure intensity over the interval to to tl. 
I, 
W(to,t,)= J WSys(u)du. 2.4.15 
10 
2.4.3.3 Initiating and Enabling Events 
The previous calculation of the system failure intensity assumes that the order in which 
basic events occur in any minimal cut set is unimportant. However, in some cases, this 
assumption is wrong. This is especially true in the case of safety protection systems. For 
example, consider a hazardous event that has an associated protection system. If the 
protection system fails before the hazardous event then system failure will result. 
However, if the hazardous event occurs first, the protection system will come into 
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action and prevent system failure. This type of situation is modelled by considering 
failures as either initiating or enabling events [5]. In this case the protection system 
failure is the enabling event and the hazardous failure is the initiating event. An 
initiating event is one that perturbs system variables and places a demand on 
control/system variables to respond. An enabling event is an inactive control/protection 
system_that permits initiating events to cause the top event. 
To calculate the system unconditional failure intensity in the case when initiating and 
enabling events are present within the system consider 2.4.13. The enabling events put 
the system in a critical state for the initiating events, which will then fail and 
consequently fail the system. Thus the summation in 2.4.13 is taken over the initiating 
events only which means that, when considering initiating and enabling events, the 
system unconditional failure intensity is given by: 
2.4.16 
iniliator 
To illustrate the use of this failure, consider again the system shown in Figure 2.4.1. If B 
and C are enabling events and A is an initiating event the unconditional failure intensity 
ofthe system will be given by: 
WSYS=GAWA 
= (qo +qc -qoqc )wA • 
2.4.4 Importance Measures 
When analysing a system it is important to identify where the weak points of a system 
lie and where effort should be directed in any attempt to improve the performance of the 
, 
system. Importance measures provide a means to find the system weak points by 
ranking the system's components or cut sets according to the extent of their role in the 
failure of the system. Importance measures are of particular use during system design 
processes when it is possible to identify and attempt to rectify system weaknesses. 
Importance measures fall into either of two categories, deterministic or probabilistic. 
The probabilistic measures can be split into two groups, those which deal with system 
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unavailability assessment (top event probability) and those which deal with system 
unreliability assessment (expected number of top event occurrences). 
2.4.4.1 Deterministic Measures 
Deterministic measures give a measure of the importance of the component to the 
system without considering the component's probability of failure. One such 
deterministic measure is the structural measure of importance. 
Structural Measure of Importance 
The structural measure of importance for component i is 
I = number of critical system states for component i 
total number of states for the (n -I)remaining components' 2.4.17 
where a critical system state for component i is a state for the remaining n - 1 
components such that failure of component i causes the system to switch from a 
working to a failed state. 
2.4.4.2 Probabilistic Measuresfor System Unavailability 
Probabilistic measures are generally of more use than deterministic measures due to the 
fact that the component failure probabilities are taken into account. 
Birnbaum 's Measure of Importance 
This is also known as the criticality function, see 2.4.14, which is defined as the 
probability that the system is in a critical state for component i. Two expressions exist 
for the criticality function. The first of these is given in 2.4.14 and is: 
G,(q(t)) = QSYS (1" q(t ))- QsyAO"q(t )), 
where Qsrs(t) is the probability that the system fails and 
(I" q(t)) = (q, , ... , q,_"I, q,+, , ... q"), 
(O"q(t)) = (q" ... ,qH ,0, q,+" ... q"} 
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2.4.18 
The criticality function is thus the probability that the system fails with component i 
failed minus the probability that the system fails with component i working, and results 
in the probability that the system fails only if component i fails. 
The second expression for the criticality function is 
Gi(q(t)) = OQs~(q(t)), 
q, 2.4.19 
which is equal to the expression in 2.4. I 8 since QSYS is linear in each q;(t) and so: 
OQSy.(q(t)) QSYS (1" q(t ))- QSYS (O"q(t )) 
oq, 1-0 2.4.20 
The criticality function is used to define many other importance measures. 
Criticality Measure of Importance 
This calculates the probability that the system is in a critical state for component i and i 
has failed. It is given by 
I _ G, (q(t ))q, (t) 
,- QSYS (q(t)) 
Fussell- Vesely Measure of Importance 
2.4.21 
This importance measure calculates the probability that component i contributes to 
system failure by appearing in one or more of the minimal cut sets [5]. It is defined as 
the probability of the union of the minimal cut sets, k, containing i, given that the 
system has failed, i.e. 
I = PUkl"k Ck ) 
, QSYS (q(t)) . 2.4.22 
The rankings produced by this method relate closely to the rankings given by the 
criticaIity measure. 
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Fussell-Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
In the same way that the perfonuance measures discussed so far rank the component 
failures in tenus of their contribution to failure of the system, this measure ranks the 
importance of the minimal cut sets [5]. It is defined as the probability of occurrence of 
minimal cut set i given that the system has failed, 
2.4.23 
2.5 Summary of Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault trees are a clear and concise way of representing the failure logic of a system and 
methods exist to analyse the fault tree both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, 
there are two key drawbacks to the analysis of fault trees, both of which would impact 
on the potential fault tree analysis of the application of TLD to a system. The first of 
these drawbacks is the system size in the analysis of fault trees, since both quantitative 
and qualitative methods can require a substantial amount of computational time to 
complete as system size increases. This then introduces the need to use approximations, 
which, in turn lead to some loss of accuracy in the analysis. The second drawback in 
applying fault tree analysis to systems is the requirement that the basic events within the 
fault tree must be statistically independent. Amongst other things, when one considers a 
. system to which TLD is applied, aircraft operating procedures may introduce some 
dependencies. Maintenance and repair introduce more dependencies and, as such make 
fault tree analysis unsuitable. The next chapter discusses a technique that, unlike fault 
tree analysis, is capable of dealing with dependencies within a system. This technique is 
Markov analysis. 
33 
Chapter 3 : Markov Analysis of Systems 
3.1 Background 
The basic concepts of Markov Analysis were developed by the Russian mathematician, 
. A. A. Markov, in the early 20th century [9]. The approach may be applied to stochastic 
processes, i.e. systems that vary, discretely or continuously, in a random way with 
respect to time. These processes are known as Markov processes. Markov processes 
for which time varies discretely, rather than continuously, are known as Markov chains 
[9], [10] and will not be discussed in this chapter. Problems involving the reliability and 
availability of systems are generally discrete in space and continuous in time [11]. This 
, 
means that the systems (and their components) may exist in one of a number of discrete 
states, e.g. failed or working, and that transitions between these states may occur at any 
point in time. The basic requirements of the system that must be met in order to be able 
to apply the Markov technique [5] are: 
• Lack of memory in the system; future states of the system are independent 
of all previous system states except the immediately preceding one. 
• Stationary system; the system must behave in the same way irrespective of 
the current time, i.e. the probability of the system making the transition from 
one state to another is constant at all points in time. 
• Identifiable system states; there should be mutually exclusive discrete states 
that the system can assume, all of which can be identified. 
Due to these requirements the Markov approach is applicable to systems whose 
behaviour is modelled using exponential distributions characterised by constant failure 
and repair rates. If the system is not stationary, i.e. the transition probabilities are 
functions of time, then the system is known as non-Markovian [5]. 
Crucially, the technique of Markov . analysis does not require the condition of 
independence between component failures, which gives an advantage over a 
combinatorial technique such as fault tree analysis. 
34 
3.2 Construction of the Markov Model 
. . 
Markov models assume that the time taken for transitions between states is 
instantaneous and that an element of time, dt, is sufficiently small such that only one 
transition may occur in dt. The Markov model is then constructed as follows: 
• A list of all possible mutually exclusive system states is composed. 
• The transition rates between system states are determined. These are usually 
failure and repair rates of system components. 
• A state transition diagram is drawn. This takes the form of a directed graph 
within which each node represents one of the discrete system states and 
transition rates and directions are represented on arrows drawn on the edges 
between the states. 
3.2.1 Example - A Two-State Repairable Component 
Consider a repairable component that may exist in either one of two states - working or 
failed. The transition diagram for this component is shown in Figure 3.2.1. If the 
component is in the working state, 1, transition to the failed state, 2, occurs with 
constant rate A and if it is in state 2, transition to state 1 occurs with constant rate v. 
Therefore the probability of the component being in the failed state at t + dt given that it 
worked at t is Mt. Similarly, the probability of the component working at t + dt given 
that it was failed at t is vdt. The probability of remaining in state 1 is 1 - Mt, and the 
Failure 
A 
v 
Repair 
Figure 3.2.1. Transition diagram for a two-state repairable 
component. 
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probability of remaining in state 2 is I - vdt. As previously stated, dt is sufficiently 
small that only one transition may occur in the dt. Now define 
Pw(t) = probability that the component is working at time t, 3.2.1 
and 
Pit) = probability that the component is failed at time t, 3.2.2 
and consider the probability that the component exists in the failed state (Le. the 
_unavailability) of the component after time increment dt, 
[
the component works at time t and fails in dt 1 
PI(t+dt)=P OR 
the component is failed at time t and remains failed in dt 
= pJt )J.dt + PI (t )[1- vdt 1 
which, upon rearrangement, gives 
Now, in the limit as dt-tO, 
dt dt-'tO 
and substituting this into 3.2.4 gives 
dPI (t) P (t)A _ P (t)v 
dt w I' 
and, since P w(t) + Pit) = I, this becomes 
dP (t) 
I A -(A + v)PI(t), 
dt 
3.2.3 
3.2.4 
3.2.5 
3.2.6 
3.2.7 
which may be solved with the initial condition that the component is working, Le. 
PlO) = 0, to yield the unavailability, or the probability that the component is in a failed 
state at time t: 
P (t)=_A ___ A_e-(,\+v)I. 
I A+V A+V 
In a similar way it may be shown that 
dPw(t)=p ()v-P ()A dt I t w t , 
and since P w(t) + Pit) = I, this becomes 
dPw{t) V-{A+V)Pw{t), 
dt 
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3.2.8 
3.2.9 
3.2.10 
which is solved with the same initial condition, P w(O) = I, to give the availability, or the 
probability that the component is in a working state at time t, 
P (t)=_V ___ A_e-(,+v)t. 
W A+V A+V 3.2.1 1 
3.3 Matrix Representation of the Model 
- Consider a general system for which the Markov model will have n system states. If 
these are numbered from 1 to n then the first rn, numbered 1 to rn, represent the system 
working states and the states rn + 1 to n represent the system failed states. aij is defined 
as the transition rate from i to j, thus: 
P(system in state j at t + dt I system in state i at t) = audt. 3.3.1 
If Qi(t) denotes the system being in failed state i at time t the above scenarios can be 
represented as follows: 
Qi (t + dt) = P(no transition from state i after dt ) 
+ p( transition from state j to state i after dt ) 
= Qt(JI- t aljdt] + tQi(t)aJidt. 1 i>i j_i 
Rearranging this gives 
1'=1 j-' 
In the limit as dt~O equation 3.3.3 becomes 
n n 
j=1 
)# 
dQ,{t) 
dt LQj (t)a it - L Q, (t )aij. 
Let 
i=1 i=1 
I~i J*i 
n 
ail = -L a{.l' 
j=l 
J*i 
and substitute this into 3.3.4 to give 
dQ,(t) = ~ Q(t)a .dt dt L... J 1'. 
1:::' 
This may be written in matrix form as: 
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3.3.2 
3.3.3 
3.3.4 
3.3.5 . 
3.3.6 
where 
and 
Q=QA, 
Q = [QI {t ),Q2(t ), ... ,Q. (t)1 
Q = [QI (t),Q2(t), ... ,Q. (t)1 
l
aij, the transition rate from i to j, 
A = • 
aii = -Laij' 
j=1 
j# 
3.3.7 
3.3.8 
3.3.9 
The square matrix A is called the state transition matrix and may be directly obtained 
from the state transition diagram for the model. When it is constructed there are three 
rules that should be followed: 
• The dimension of matrix A is equal to the number of states in the system. 
• All ofthe rows should sum to zero. 
• Off-diagonal elements in row i, colunm j represent the rate of transition from 
state i to state j. 
The equations given in 3.3.7 are dependent, which means that before they can be solved 
further information is needed. This information comes from the fact that the probability 
of being in any of the system states must add up to 1, i.e . 
• IQ,(t)= I. 3.3.10 
;=1 
3.3.1 Example - State Transition Matrix for The Repairable Component 
Applying the above rules to the two-state repairable component depicted in Figure 3.2.1 
the state transition matrix is found to be: 
A=[-It It], 
y -y 3.3.11 
which means that: 
[pw(t) p/(t)] = [p)t) p/(t){ -ylt _Ity J. 3.3.12 
which is equivalent to equations 3.2.6 and 3.2.9. 
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3.4 Markov Model Solution 
It can be seen from the previous sections that a Markov model will produce a system of 
homogeneous linear ordinary differential equations where the system may be 
represented in matrix form as: 
Q=QA, 
._ Such systems of differential equations may be solved using a number of different 
methods, which may be either analytical or numerical. 
Once the probability of residing in each system state is known, finding the system 
availability, ACt), involves summing the probabilities of all the individual states 
representing the system being in a working state, i.e. 
3.4.1 
and the system unavailability, Q(t), involves summing the probabilities of all the 
individual states that represent the system being in a failed state, i.e. 
" Q{t)= LQ;{t} 3.4.2 
;=m+1 
3.4.1 Analytical Solution 
A number of analytical methods exist that may be used to find a solution to a set of 
ordinary differential equations. One such method uses Laplace transforms [5], [12], 
which are used to convert the system of differential equations into a system of algebraic 
equations. These algebraic equations may then be solved. Once the solution is found the 
inverse Laplace transform of it is taken in order to obtain the solution of the original 
system of differential equations. This procedure is outlined below. 
The system of differential equations may be written as: 
QT=ATQT, 3.4.3 
or 
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3.4.4 
Qn(t) Qn(t) 
If the Laplace transfonn of Qi is 
L [Q;{t)] = Q;, 3.4.5 
then the Laplace transfonn of Qi (t) is 
L lQI (t )j= sQ,' - QI(O), 3.4.6 
and the Laplace transfonn of equation 3.4.4 becomes: 
Q; Q)(O) Q; 
Q' 
s .2 
Q2(0) 
=A T Q; 3.4.7 
Q: Qn(O) Q: 
Then the Laplace transfonn of equation 3.3.10, 
3.4.8 
i=! 
is substituted into equation 3.4.7, allowing the solution of the equations and their 
subsequent inverse Laplace transfonnation. 
Another method that may be used to find the analytical solution involves detennining 
the eigenvalues of the state transition matrix A. However, if the system being modelled 
is very reliable the precision offered by this method of solution can be 
dissatisfactory [13]. 
3.4.2 Numerical Solution 
In addition to finding the solution of Markov models analytically it is also possible to 
solve the differential equations that describe the system numerically. Many techniques 
exist, such as Euler's method and its variations, predictor-corrector methods or Runge-
Kutta methods [14]. These methods are of particular use when one wishes to examine 
the transient behaviour of the system. Numerical methods of solution may also offer a 
greater flexibility than analytical methods. One situation where they offer an advantage 
is when periodic inspection is used to find component failures. These failures lie 
40 
dOl1llant within the system and are only revealed as the system is inspected. Numerical 
methods of solution are discussed in Chapter 7. A problem that may occur when 
numerically solving systems of differential equations such as these is that of stiffuess. 
When solving Markov models stiffuess can arise because of the difference in magnitude 
between the failure rates and the repair rates [5], [14], [15]. 
3.5 Steady-State Probabilities 
A process whose limiting probabilities are independent of its initial conditions is known 
as ergodic [5]. For this to be true it must be possible to reach every state in the system 
from every other state in the system. This need not be directly from one state to another, 
it could be that states are reached indirectly through other, intel1llediate, states. An 
ergodic Markov process, such as the one in the previous example of a two state 
component, will have non-zero limiting probabilities [5], [11]. 
3.5.1 Example - Repairable Component 
Consider again the previous example of a two-state repairable component depicted in 
Figure 3.2.1. The probability of this component being in the failed state was given in 
equation 3.2.8. By allowing time to become large in this equation, i.e. t-w:>, the limiting 
value for the unavailability becomes 
A 
Pf = It + v ' 3.5.1 
and in the same way, using equation 3.2.11, the limiting value for the availability 
becomes 
v Pw =--' It+v 3.5.2 
These steady-state values could have been obtained directly from the differential 
equations 3.2.6 and 3.2.9 by utilising the fact that at steady-state the rate of change of 
the probabilities will be zero, i.e. 
dPJt) 
dt 
_dP--,-f..:..,:(t) = O. 
dt 
Substituting 3.5.3 into 3.2.6 and 3.2.9 gives 
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3.5.3 
3.5.4 
and 
3.5.5 
which are, in fact, exactly the same equation. The fact that P w(t) + P /..t) = I is used in 
order to solve the system of equations and obtain the solutions 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 above. 
-3.5.2 Finding the Steady-State Solution of the Markov Model 
A system's limiting steady-state (or asymptotic) probabilities are determined by 
utilising the fact that the rate of change of the probabilities will be zero at the limit, i.e. 
Q =0, 3.5.6 
where 0 is the null vector. Substituting this into equation 3.3.7 yields the dependent set 
of simultaneous linear equations given by: 
QA=O. 3.5.7 
Because of the dependency of these equations 3.3.1 0 is again used in order to allow a 
solution to be found. A technique such as Gaussian elimination may be used to 
determine the exact solution of the system of equations [5], [14]. However, it can be 
shown [13] that the steady-state asymptotic probabilities may also be obtained from: 
a" a l ,n_1 0 
0 
aj, ) aJ,n-l I 
0 
Qi (00) = an,) an,n-I 
0 
I 3.5.8 all al,n_1 
a/,) a;,n_1 I 
an•1 an,n_1 I 
The numerator is the determinant of the state transition matrix, A, with the nlh column 
replaced by zeroes except in the ilh row, where unity is inserted. The denominator' is the 
r 
determinant of A with the last column entirely replaced by unity. Thus, using a similar 
method to that used when obtaining 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the steady-state availability is 
A(oo) = tQi(OO), 3.5.9 
j:J 
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and the steady-state unavailability is 
3.5.10 
;=m+l 
The system unavailability may also be obtained using 
a" al,n_l 0 
0 
am,1 am,n_1 0 
._--
am+I,1 am+I,n_1 I 
1 3.5.11 
Q(oo) = qn,l an,n_1 1 
1 all a"n_1 
an,1 an,n_1 I 
3.5.3 Example -Two-Component System 
Consider a system containing two components, A and B, which have failure rates itA and 
Aa respectively, and repair rates VA and Va respectively. The Markov model for this 
system is depicted in Figure 3.5.1. As can be seen from the diagram the system has a 
total of four possible states, categorised as follows; A and B work (state I), A is failed 
and B works (state 2), A works and B is failed (state 3) and A and B are both failed (state 
4). Using equation 3.3.9 the transition matrix A can be written as: 
-(AA +Aa) AA Aa 0 
VA -(VA +AB) 0 AB A= 
-(AA +VB) 
3.5.12 
VB 0 AA 
0 va vA -(VA +VB) 
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Figure 3.5.1. Two component Markov model. 
In order to find the steady-state probability of residing in each of the system states the 
determinant method, equation 3.5.8, may be used. Take, for example, state 3. The 
application of equation 3.5.8 leads to the following: 
-(AA +As) AA As 0 
VA -(VA +As) 0 0 
Vs 0 -(AA +Vs) I 
Q3(OO) = 0 Vs VA 0 
-(AA +As) AA As I ' 3.5.13 
vA -(VA +As) 0 I 
Vs 0 -(AA +Vs) I 
0 Vs VA I 
which is equivalent to 
Q3(OO) = -Asv.(AA +As +VA +VS) 
-(.1A +VAX.1B +VSX.1A +.1s +VA +VS) 
_ .1SVA 3.5.14 
- (AA +VAX.1S +vs)" 
In a similar way the steady-state probabilities for the other system states can be 
determined and thus the complete set of steady-state probabilities are: 
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3.5.15 
in states where the system is failed are added. For a two-component system that is in a 
series configuration the system will be in a failed state if A is failed, if B is failed or if 
both are failed. Therefore the steady-state probability of system failure is obtained by 
adding Qz, Q3 and Q4 and is: 
AAVB +ABVA +AAAB 
(AA +VAXAB +VB) . 
3.5.16 
If the system is in a parallel configuration the steady-state probability of system failure 
is again obtained by adding the probabilities of being in states where the system is 
failed. However, in this case the system will only fail if both components fail. Therefore 
the steady-state probability of system failure is given by Q4: 
3.6 Reduced Markov Models 
Perhaps the main drawback of using Markov methods to model system behaviour is the 
rapid explosion in the number of system states as the number of components in the 
system increases [5], [15]. For a general system with n components, each of which can 
exist in either one of two states, working or failed, the Markov model will have 2" 
system states. Clearly, as n becomes large, the differential equations produced during 
the formation of the model will become increasingly difficult to solve. For this reason it 
is to the modeller's advantage to reduce the number of states within the system, if at all 
possible. If identical components exist within the system it may be possible to perform 
reductions on the Markov model. 
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3.6.1 Example-Two Component System 
Consider again the two component system depicted in Figure 3.5.1. Let us assume that 
the two components, A and B, are arranged in a parallel configuration and that their 
failure and repair rates are identical. That is, assume A A = AB = A, and v A = VB = V • In 
the original example four system states were listed. However, the system can be 
satisfactorily described using three states, which are: 
1. 2 components work, 
2. 1 component works, 1 component is failed, 
3. Both components are failed. 
The reduced Markov diagram for this system is shown in Figure 3.6.1. The transition 
rate from state 1 to state 2 is determined by considering that either component A or 
component B can fail to take the system from the fully-functioning state (state 1) to the 
state where one component is failed and one component still works (state 2). Thus the 
transition rate will be the sum of the failure rates of these two components, i.e. 2..1.. In a 
similar way the transition rate from state 3 to state 2 is determined to be 2 v. The 
transitions from state 2 to state 3 and from state 2 to state 1 are respectively caused by 
the failure and repair of a single component. Thus they have transition rates A and v 
respectively. 
2,1 
v 2v 
Figure 3.6.1. Three-state Markov model for the two 
component system. 
The transition matrix, A, for this system may then be shown to be: 
[
-2,1 
A= v 
o 
2,1 
-(A +v) 
2v 
o 1 A . 
-2v 
3.6.1 
For this simple system the benefits of reducing the number of states in the Markov 
model are not very great, with only one state being removed from the full Markov 
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model. However, if the system is large this type of reduction may prove extremely 
useful in reducing the complexity and scale of the model. 
3.7 Reliability Modelling 
In systems such as those discussed thus far the processes involved were ergodic, i.e. 
every system state could be reached, either directly or indirectly from every other 
system state. In the case of systems that may suffer catastrophic failure, such as aircraft, 
the processes involved are not ergodic, since the system contains a state that, once 
entered, cannot be left until the system begins a new mission. These states are known as 
absorbing states [5]. In these non-ergodic systems the steady-state availability or 
unavailability will hold no real significance, since the steady-state availability will 
always be zero and the steady-state unavailability will always be unity. It is more 
appropriate to investigate the reliability of such systems. In order to represent a system 
reliabiiity model its Markov diagram is constructed by deleting from it any transitions 
that correspond to a change from a failed to a working state. As an example of this 
consider again the two component system depicted in Figure 3.5.1. The Markov 
diagram representing the reliability model for this system is shown in Figure 3.7.1. 
Figure 3.7.1. Reliability model for a two component system. 
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The equations for a reliability model are derived in a similar way to those for the 
ergodic processes described previously [5), [13). Consider a system that has a total of n 
states and, as before, number the states that represent the system working from 1 to m 
and the states that represent the system being failed from m + I to n. Since all of the 
failed states are absorbing the transitions representing changes from these states back to 
a working state will be zero, i.e. 
aij = 0 for j> m,j ~ m. 3.7.1 
Representing the probability of residing in state j at time I by Pi(t) allows a group of 
first order linear differential equations to be obtained, which are as follows: 
dp,{/) ~ ~ P{/}a ... 
dl L.. J " j=1 
The system of n differential equations may therefore be represented as: 
[A ,P2' .. . ,pJ = [p, ,P2,···, P,]A', 
where A' is the n x n transition rate matrix where: 
the transition rate from j to j, 
A'= aij=O, ifi >m,j ~m 
3.7.2 
3.7.3 
3.7.4 
The reduced transition rate matrix, A'm, is formed from the first m rows and 
columns of A'. Therefore 
3.7.5 
This system of equations may be solved given a set of initial conditions, 
p'{O),j = I, ... ,m. The system reliability, R(/), will be the sum of the probabilities of 
being in each of the m system working states, i.e. 
3.7.6 
1=1 
This may then be used to calculate the mean time to first failure (MTFF) of the system 
since: 
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00 
MTFF = f R{t}dt. 3.7.7 
o 
Equations 3.7.5, 3.7.6 and 3.7.7 can then be solved [13] tt:! give: 
0 ~{o} pJO 
I I all aIm 
MTFF=-I -I' 3.7.8 A' . m • 
1 amI a mm 
which includes the initial conditions of the system. This result means that the MTFF is 
dependent on the initial conditions, in contrast to the asymptotic availability of the 
system, c.f. 3.5.8. The asymptotic failure rate may be deduced from 3.7.8, see [13], and 
is given by: 
Asymptotic failure rate = 1 
MTFF 
3.7.9 
3.8 Summary 
Markov analysis provides a means of modelling systems for which dependencies exist 
due to maintenance and repair processes. This gives it the edge over fault tree analysis 
in terms of suitability for modelling the application ofTLD. However, Markov analysis 
has features that make it unsuitable for use in modelling TLD. The size of Markov 
models increases considerably for larger systems. This means that for large aircraft 
systems of the type to which TLD will be applied the size of the Markov model will 
become too large to be used. This would also be true, even if the methods of reducing 
the size of the Markov model, described earlier in this chapter, were applied. This alone 
makes Markov modelling impractical for TLD. In addition, the requirement that the 
system be stationary, i.e. that the probability of the system making the transition from 
one state to another is constant at all points in time, will not necessarily be true for all 
components in a system. For example, some components could have failure 
distributions governed by the Weibull distribution. 
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Chapter 4 : Monte Carlo Simulation of Systems 
4.1 Background 
In some cases conventional fault tree analysis or Markov Methods may not be a suitable 
- means to model a system. For example, components or subsystems may not be 
independent, meaning that fault tree analysis is an inappropriate choice of method, or 
the components' failure and repair rates may not be constant which will prevent the use 
of Markov methods [5]. The system may simply be too complex to solve using 
analytical methods. In situations such as these it is appropriate to simulate the system 
using Monte Carlo methods. 
In order to perfonn a Monte Carlo simulation of a system a computer model of the 
system is generated. This is based on a logical representation of the system under 
investigation. The model must contain a set of rules that governs the response of the 
system to events that can occur, such as component failures, component repairs or 
particular sequences of failures. The computer model then simulates the operation of the 
system for a suitable period of time, perhaps the length of a mission or the lifetime of 
the system. In order for the model to be a good representation of reality the events 
occurring must do so according to the same distributions as the corresponding events in 
the real system [16]. To accomplish this, whilst the simulation is in progress, random 
failures and repairs occur to the components in the system model, according to their 
failure and repair time distributions. Over the course of the simulation the time spent by 
the system in any of its states that are of interest is logged. Using this infonnation 
parameters such as the system reliability or availability can be obtained. Many 
simulations are perfonned so that the probability of any particular outcome of interest 
may be calculated. 
4.2 Uniform Random Numbers 
An essential element of a Monte Carlo simulation is the generation of random numbers. 
Some of the simplest ways to generate random numbers involve using the outcomes of 
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an experiment such as tossing a coin or rolling a die or using random number tables to 
read off and generate numbers [5]. These methods are only ever of any real value if 
carrying out the simulations by hand or demonstrating the Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques. However, in the simulation of real systems these methods are not generally 
appropriate. This is because of the potentially large number of random numbers 
required to simulate large systems and/or carry out many simulations [9]. For this 
reason the random numbers used in Monte Carlo simulation computer programs are 
generated by the computer. Note that the random numbers generated by a digital 
computer aren't necessarily random; they may also be pseudo-random. Pseudo-random 
numbers are generated using algorithms based on deterministic rules, such as recursion 
formulae, described below. These pseudo-random numbers have a uniform distribution 
and can be tested mathematically to prove the properties required of random numbers. 
Despite the fact they are not actually random, pseudo-random numbers are used 
because they can be obtained quickly [5]. 
4.2.1 Recursion Formulae 
The recursion formulae most commonly used in the generation of uniform distributions 
of pseudo-random numbers take the form 
4.2.1 
where a, band c are positive integers [5]. In order to use recursion formulae a number 
must be specified to begin the generation of the sequence of pseudo-random numbers. 
This number is known as the seed. If the seed specified at the start of the process is 
repeated the same number sequence will be produced. For this reason a, band c in 4.2.1 
are chosen such that a large sequence of numbers is produced before the sequence 
reproduces the seed value and repeats itself. 
4.3 Direct Simulation 
Simulation involves using statistical information about the components of the system in 
combination with its logic in order to investigate the system's behaviour. This 
combination of information changes variables within the model and hence describes the 
way that the system moves between distinct states [4], [5]. Most simulations are 
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programmed in such a way that they will move directly from one system state to 
another, e.g. after the failure of a component. This chronological ordering of events is 
one of the more difficult challenges when performing simulations of this type. 
It is possible, when carrying out Monte Carlo simulations, to model some systems in a 
time-independent way. A model such as this is useful in developing an understanding of 
some of the principles and techniques involved in using simulation. However, as was 
mentioned above, many models involve the advancement of simulation time from one 
system state to another. In these time-dependent cases the information to be obtained 
from the simulation may be something such as the time duration in certain states [11]. 
The following example demonstrates the use of Monte Carlo simulation on a time-
independent model of a two-component parallel system. Time-dependent cases 
involving the chronological movement of the system from one state to another are 
discussed later. 
4.3.i Example - Time-independent Model' 
A 
B 
Figure 4.3.1. Two component parallel system. 
Consider the two-component parallel system shown in Figure 4.3.1, which will fail if 
both component A and component B fail. Suppose that the system is to be simulated in 
order to predict its unavailability and A and B have failure probabilities of 0.1 and 0.2 
respectively. The simulation is implemented by generating a random number between 0 
and I for each component in the system. If the random number is less than the failure 
probability of the component then that component is assumed to fail. Conversely, if the 
random number exceeds the failure probability of the component then the component is 
assumed to remain in a working state. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.3.2. 
In order to run a single system simulation two random numbers are generated, one for 
each of the components. 
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For A Rand. No. = 0.728 > 0.1, component A works 
For B Rand. No. = 0.193 < 0.2, component B fails 
Therefore component A works and component B fails. After the application of the 
system logic it is found that the system works in this case. In order to obtain a measure 
for the system availability many such simulations will be needed. 
I--r+-------------I component fails 
1 
Rand. No. 
f--+-----..---------l component works 
1 
Rand. No. 
Figure 4.3.2. Direct sampling. 
The direct method of sampling described above is a reasonable tool in the simulation of 
systems whose probability of failure is relatively high. However, if the probability of 
system failure is low many simulations need to be performed in order to obtain 
statistically significant results [5]. In order to illustrate this consider a general system of 
k components. If that system had a probability of failure of 104 it would be expected to 
fail once for every 10000k random numbers generated (since the completion of n 
simulations of this system requires the generation of k x n random numbers). 
4.4 Using Probability Distributions to Generate Event Times 
A general method for obtaining event times from continuous probability distributions is 
to integrate the probability density function to give the cumulative distribution function, 
then to transpose this to give the time to failure/repair [5]. The process of the method is 
illustrated in Figure 4.4.1, where F(t) represents the cumulative probability distribution 
for either failure or repair times. Because F(t) has the same range and properties as a 
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unifonn [0,1] distribution of random numbers, a random number, X, is generated and 
equated to F(t). This then leads to the production of the random event time, T. 
This method is demonstrated below for both the exponential and Weibull distributions; 
however, it is not possible to use this method for the nonnal distribution so an 
alternative method is described. Note that it is assumed that the distributions represent 
failure time distributions, hence an expression for generating random time to failure is 
obtained. Clearly, this technique is not restricted to failure distributions - the same 
techniques also apply to repair distributions. 
F(t) 
I 
x ---------
04-----7-------------~ 
T t 
Figure 4.4.1. Generating an event time from the cumulative 
probability distribution. 
4.4.1 Exponential Distribution 
The failure density function for the exponential distribution with mean f.l is 
4.4.1 
from which random samples can be obtained by first integrating to give the cumulative 
failure distribution F(t): 
t 
F{t) = J f{u}du =I_e-t/ p • 4.4.2 
o 
F(t) will have the same range and properties as a distribution of random numbers 
between 0 and I. Thus, in order to take a random sample, a random number X is 
generated and equated to F(t) (0 ~ F(t) ~ I). This gives 
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X=l-e- t/p , 4.4.3 
which is rearranged to give 
t = ,uln(l-X} 4.4.4 
Since Xis uniform over [0,1] so is 1 -X and equation 4.4.4 may be simplified, yielding 
t=-,ulnX. 4.4.5 
Given this formula a random number X (0 :; X:; 1) can be used to obtain a random time 
to failure for a component with an exponential failure distribution. 
4.4.2 Weibull Distribution 
The failure density function for the Weibull distribution with parameters fJand 17 is 
4.4.6 
from which random samples are again obtained by first integrating to give the 
cumulative failure distribution F(t); 
4.4.7 
As was done in the case of the exponential distribution, a random number X is 
generated and equated to F(t) (0 :; F(t) :; I). From this we get: 
4.4.8 
which, upon generation of a random number X (0 :; X:; I) gives a random time to 
failure of a component :-vith a Weibull failure distribution. 
4.4.3 Normal Distribution 
The failure density function for the normal distribution with mean ,u and standard 
deviation 0" is 
4.4.9 
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This·cannot be integrated to give a fonnula for F(t) that can be transposed to give t in 
tenns of F(t). A method that may be used to obtain random samples from unifonnly 
distributed variables is the central limit theorem [5]. 
4.4.4 Central Limit Theorem 
Consider the n independent identically distributed random variables XI. X2, ... , Xn, 
which have mean fJ and variance d. Then if Sn = XI + X2 + ... + Xn, the random variable 
(Sn - nfJ)/(crJn) is asymptotically nonnally distributed with mean 0 and standard 
deviation I. Random numbers from the unifonn distribution U(O, 1) are independent and 
identically distributed. These may be used to fonn Sn. In reality when using the central 
limit theorem the choice of n will mean that the resulting Sn is only approximately 
nonnal. A choice of n = 2 yields a triangular distribution which is unsuitable. Choosing 
n = 3 gives a bell-shaped distribution, similar in appearance to a nonnal distribution. 
This means that in practice a choice of n ~ 3 is suitable and in fact n = 12 is a good 
choice from a mathematical point of view (since X; has fJ = 0.5 and d = 1112, hence Sn 
isN(6,1». 
Obtaining a random sample from the nonnal distribution will hence involve the 
generation of 12 random numbers XI. X2, ... , Xn from the unifonn distribution U(O,I). 
These are then added, giving 
12 
x=Lx,. 4.4.10 
;::1 
Now, by the central limit theorem X is nonnally distributed with mean 6 and standard 
deviation I and thus 
t = (X - 6)<:r+ fJ 4.4.11 
is nonnally distributed with mean fJ and standard deviation a. 
4.4.5 Example - Simulating a System 
Consider the simple system in Figure 4.4.2. Now suppose that the components A, B and 
C have failure and repair distributions as shown in Table 4.4.1. 
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B 
A 
C 
Figure 4.4.2. A simple system. 
C is initially on cold standby for B. This means C is only called into action when B fails 
and C can't fail when it is in standby. If B is repaired while C is working B is then in 
standby for C. If both components are repaired C is again put on standby for B. 
Component Failure Distribution Repair Distribution 
A exp(lOOO) N(IO,1.5) 
B exp(600) exp(1) 
C exp(500) exp(2.5) 
Table 4.4.1. Failure and repair distributions. 
Maintenance checks are carried out on the system after every 750hrs of system use. The 
checks involve finding failed components and repairing them. IOhrs are allocated for 
maintenance checks, any time longer than this is undesirable. Upon system failure 
repairs are carned out immediately to all failed components. It is required to know the 
percentage total downtime of the system in its first 2000hrs of use. The downtime 
doesn't include the IOhr periods allocated for maintenance. 
A typical simulation is shown in Table 4.5.1. Firstly, failure times are generated for A 
and B and the time of the first maintenance check is noted. The simulation then 
advances to the first event chronologically, which is a maintenance operation. As there 
haven't been any failures the next maintenance is scheduled, then the simulation 
advances to the next event, the failure of component B. This means a failure time must 
be generated for C before the simulation continues again, since C is on cold standby for 
B. The next event to be removed from the schedule is the failure of A, at which point the 
system fails and unscheduled maintenance must be carried out. Repair times are 
generated for the failed components, then a new failure time is generated for A. The 
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process of removing the next event chronologically from the schedule of events to 
happen continues until the simulation time is over. 
The total downtime of the system during the simulation is 8hrs. Therefore the total 
percentage downtime is given as 
8 
--xI00=0.32, 
2500 
4.4.12 
meaning the system is inoperable (outside the realms of scheduled maintenance) for 
0.32% of the time. 
The procedure carried out forms just one sample and in order to obtain a more accurate 
indicator of the expected system performance many more simulations should be 
implemented. As more simulations are carried out the results obtained are averaged and 
the data gathered will converge to the correct value. The results must be checked for 
convergence in order that a sufficient number of simulations can be carried out. This 
would be done in practice by monitoring the results obtained as more and more 
simulations are performed. Once the results after a number of successive simulations 
match to the required accuracy the simulation procedure can be brought to a halt. 
4.5 Results of Monte Carlo Simulations 
The previous example goes some way to demonstrate the power of Monte Carlo 
simulation when modelling system behaviour. It can be seen from Table 4.5.1 that 
detailed information about the behaviour of the system can be gleaned from what is, in 
effect a relatively simple method. For instance, it is not only the reliability or 
availability of the system that may be obtained. Other information, such as the number 
of times a component fails and whether the failure was revealed or not, or the 
availability or otherwise of maintenance personnel, could also be incorporated into the 
model and logged. In fact details of almost any other occurrence one would care to 
think of could be recorded for later analysis. The attaimnent of parameters such as these 
may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, using normal analytic methods. Indeed, 
the only real restrictions to the Monte Carlo simulation method are the computing 
power and time available and, of course, the imagination and skill of the programmer. 
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Simulation Event Computations 
Time (hrs) 
0.0 Simulation starts generate failure times for A and B: 
Rand. no. = 0.241 
A: 
If =-1000In(0.241)=1423.0 
Rand. no. = 0.129 
B: 
If = -600In(0.129) = 1228.8 
Maintenance at 750.0 
750.0 Maintenance No failures to repair 
Next maintenance at 1500.0 
1228.8 B fails generate failure time for C: 
Rand. no. = 0.511 
C: 
If = -500In(0.511)= 335.7 
Cwill fail at time 1228.8 + 335.7 = 1564.5 
1423.0 A fails generate repair times for A and B: 
SYSTEM fails A: 12 Rand. nos. 0.612 0.717 0.422 0.124 
Unscheduled 0.096 0.872 0.693 0.642 
maintenance 0.981 0.451 0.249 0.726 
using 4.4.1 0 and 4.4.11 I, = 6.8 
Rand. no. = 0.297 
B: 
I, =-lxln(0.297)=1.2 
TOTAL REPAIR TIME = 6.8 + 1.2 = 8.0 
generate new failure time for A: 
Rand. no. = 0.276 
A: 
If = -I 000 In(0.276)= 1287.4 
A will fail at time 1423.0 + 1287.4 = 2710.4 
1500.0 Maintenance No failures to repair 
Next maintenance at 2250.0 
1564.5 C fails generate failure time for B: 
Rand. no. = 0.425 
B: 
If = -600In(0.425) = 855.7 
B will fail at time 1564.5 + 855.7 = 2420.2 
2250.0 Maintenance The total simulation time exceeds 2000hrs, 
therefore the simulation ends 
Table 4.5.1. An example simulation. 
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Chapter 5 : Aerospace Recommended Practice Methods of 
Modelling TLD 
5.1 Introduction 
Before TLD can be safely applied to any real F ADEC system a reliability analysis must 
. be perfonned. This reliability analysis is used to ensure that the system will confonn 
with the appropriate certification requirements and safety regulations. TLD was 
introduced to utilise redundancy within the F ADEC systems and the relatively high 
reliability of their individual components in order to improve the efficiency of aircraft 
dispatch. In improving this efficiency the maintenance of the F ADEC systems could be 
planned in such a way that any delays and cancellations of aircraft, which would be 
undesirable for travellers, airports, operators and manufacturers alike, would be 
minimised. In order to achieve these objectives immediately after the certification of a 
system, as it comes into active service, the methods of analysis used to gain certification 
must be as accurate as possible. However, it is important that the model used to 
demonstrate system safety is at worst pessimistic and the levels of safety or reliability 
predicted by the model are underestimated. A good TLD analysis will demonstrate 
system safety, but it may also allow the setting of dispatch intervals in order to pennit 
as long a period of dispatch as possible. This would achieve a well-planned 
maintenance strategy whilst demonstrating confidence in the system reliability. In this 
way, the dispatchability ofthe FADEC system is the best it can be as the system comes 
into service. 
A general approach to the analysis of TLD is described in SAE ARP5107 [17], [18]. 
The reliability of the system is analysed in the full-up state and any allowed 
dispatchable fault configurations. In SAE ARP5107 two techniques of analysis are 
recommended. Faults included in the analyses are those that affect the LOTC rate of the 
system - if a fault does not affect the LOTC rate of the system it may be omitted from 
the analysis. The following sections outline the methods used in applying each of these 
approaches to a general system. 
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5.2 A General System Model 
Consider a system that has n dispatchable system configurations, numbered from 1 to n. 
Amongst these dispatchable configurations there will be a full-up dispatchable system 
state and a number of STD and L TD dispatchable system states. Let state i = I represent 
the full-up system configuration, states i = 2, .. . ,m represent the STD dispatchable . 
_ system states and states numbered i = m + I, ... ,n the LTD dispatchable system 
configurations. Two modelling techniques, time-weighted average and reduced fault 
state Markov methods are recommended by SAE ARP 5107 as being appropriate to 
assess TLD. These are discussed in the following sections. 
5.3 Time-Weighted Averages (TWA) Modelling 
This is a relatively simple method of calculating the overall system LOTC rate [I], [17], 
[18], which is obtained by adding the contributions from the following: 
1. the failure rates to LOTC of individual faults from the mechanical and 
hydromechanical portions of the FADEC system, 
2. the failure rates to LOTC of any unrevealed faults in the electrical and electronic 
portions of the FADEC system, 
3. a time-weighted average (TWA) of the failure rates to LOTC of the system from 
each of its dispatchable system configurations. 
Thus the TW A failure rate of a simple system, ATWA, is given by: 
5.3.1 
The first two terms, AHMC and AUR, represent the sum of the failure rates due to single 
mechanical and hydromechanical faults, and the sum of the failure rates due to 
unrevealed electrical and electronic faults respectively. Unrevealed faults are included 
in the analysis in this way because if they are all assumed to lead to LOTC events the 
subsequent TW A failure rate will be an overestimate with respect to these faults. The 
final three terms in equation 5.3.1 represent the TWA of the failure rate of the system 
from each of the dispatchable configurations. fFU represents the fraction of time that the 
system spends in the full-up system state. fSTD and fLTD represent the fractions of time 
spent in the STD and L TD dispatchable system states respectively. Effectively this is 
the probability that the system will reside in a particular dispatchable configuration. The 
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final elements of the TW A LOTC rate are the failure rates, AFU,L, ASTD,L and ALTD,L. The 
first of these, AFU,L, represents the average failure rate from the full-up system 
configuration to the LOTC state caused by failures in the redundant portions of the 
.FADEC in anyone flight. ASTD,L represents the average LOTC rate of the system when a 
second electronic or electrical fault occurs in addition to the STD fault that is already 
present when operating in an STD dispatch configuration. Similarly, ALTD,L represents 
the average LOTC rate of the system when a second electronic or electrical fault occurs 
in addition to the L TD fault that is present when operating in an L TD dispatch 
configuration. 
What now follow are definitions of the above quantities that may be used in the TWA 
failure rate given in equation 5.3.1. These are obtained from the original (1997) [17] 
and revised (2004) versions [18] ofSAE ARP5107. 
5.3.1 The Failure Rate Due to Hydromechanical Faults, AHMC 
In both the original SAE ARP51 07 document and the revised version this failure rate is 
approximated as the sum of the failure rates due to all mechanicallhydromechanical 
faults. 
5.3.2 The Failure Ratefor Unrevealed Faults, AUR 
The definition of this quantity is essentially unchanged from the original release of SAE 
ARP5107 [17] to its revision in 2004 [18]. It is stated to be generally expressed as being 
the product of some constant, say X, with the sum of the failure rates "of all 
electrical/electronic hardware associated with LOTC critical elements," i.e. 
AUR ~ X x {I A. of all electricaVelectronic hardware associated with LOTe critical elements} 5.3.2 
The definition of the constant X will be discussed later. However, the second quantity 
may be approximated by: 
5.3.3 
where ASTD is defined as the sum of the failure rates of the STD faults in both channels 
and ALTD is defined as the sum of the failure rates of the L TD faults in both channels, 
i.e. 
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ASTD = :t ..1." 
,,' 
Thus the expression for the unrevealed failure rate may be approximated by: 
n 
AUR =XxLA,. 
1:::::2 
5.3.4 
5.3.5 
The quantity X is rather more difficult to define. It is stated to be "a number generally 
between 0 and 0.05." It will differ according to the system being modelled and is an 
indication of the general trend that the unrevealed fault rate of a channel will lie 
somewhere between 0 and 5% of the total LOTe rate of that channel. Equation 5.3.5 is 
said to be a conservative estimate for the unrevealed fault rate since it assumes that the 
failure of any unrevealed fault in any given flight will lead to a LOTe event and this 
will most likely not be the case. 
5.3.3 Average Failure Rates to LOTC, ASTD.Lo ALTD.L 
If the TWA LOTe rate is to be calculated using equation 5.3.1 then the average failure 
rates to LOTe from the STD and L TD dispatchable system configurations are defined 
as follows: 
and 
fA'''',L 
, -""'"::'--/!"STD,L =- -A 
STD 
fAAL 
= ; .. 2 
f", 
;",,2 
t"AL 
= j"'m+l 
t", 
;=m+l 
where Ai,! is the failure rate to LOTe for the i'h dispatchable system configuration. 
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5.3.6 
5.3.7 
5.3.4 Fractions of Time Spent in Dispatchable States, tFU, tsw. trTD 
The definitions of the fractions of time spent in the STD and L TD dispatchable system 
states, tSTD and trTD, changed slightly from the original SAE ARP5 \07 to the revised 
version. However, in both cases, once these two quantities are known the fraction of 
time spent in the full-up dispatchable system configuration is calculated using the fact 
that the total of all these fractions must be unity, Le.: 
5.3.8 
Given that the dispatch interval for STD faults is given by TSTD and that the dispatch 
interval for LTD faults is given by TLTD, the fractions of time spent in the STD and LTD 
dispatchable system configurations are approximated by: 
5.3.9 
and 
5.3.10 
These approximations, given in equations 5.3.9 and 5.3.10, assume that the fractions of 
time are much less than I [17]. In [18] the fractions of time spent in the STD and LTD 
dispatchable system configurations are approximated by: 
5.3.11 
and 
5.3.12 
These latter approximations, given in equations 5.3.11 and 5.3.12, are similar to those 
given in equations 5.3.9 and 5.3.\0, but for the fact that the quantity on the RHS is 
multiplied by tFU. This change was made to the technique in order to better balance the 
actual portion oftime spent in the various system states [18]. It is stated in [18] that the 
first approximations, from [17], assume that the system is in the full-up state for all of 
the time, while the second ones, from [18], take into account that the system is in the 
full-up state for the fraction of time tFU, and, as such, are more accurate. This is 
demonstrated mathematically in Section 5.4. In the case of the revised method of 
finding the time fractions, there are 3 simultaneous equations to be solved for tSTD, tLTD 
and tFU, these being equations 5.3.8, 5.3.11 and 5.3.12. 
Thus there are two different possible values for each of tSTD, taD and tFU. These are 
listed below. The time fractions obtained from the original SAE ARP5107 document 
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will henceforth be known as the fractional coefficients and, as in the revised SAE 
ARP5107 document, the time fractions obtained from that document will be known as 
the balancedfractional coefficients. Thus the fractional coefficients are: 
tFU = I-tSTD -tLTD , 
ISTD ;;;: AsroTSTD' 
ILTD ;;;: ALTDTLTDJ 
and the balanced fractional coefficients are: 
5.3.5 LOTC Rate 
5.3.13 
5.3.14 
It is now possible, using the definitions and equations derived above, to calculate the 
TW A LOTC rate using both the fractional coefficients and the balanced fractional 
coefficients. These will now be referred to as ATWA/rac and ATWA,bal' Substituting equation 
5.3.13 into equation 5.3.1 yields: 
A,TWA./rac ;;;: AHMC + ,tUR + A..FU,L + (AsroASTD'L - AsroAFU,L )rSTD + (ItLTDA.LTD.L - ALTDAFU,L JrLro' 
Similarly, substituting equation 5.3.14 into equation 5.3.1 gives: 
5.3.6 Failure Rates to LOTC, A..L 
5.3.15 
5.3.16 
A method of calculating the failure rates to LOTC from the jth dispatchable system 
configuration is given in [I]. The process involves taking the failure probability (of 
LOTC) for the relevant system configurations and dividing this by a suitable time 
period, the average flight time is suggested, in order to obtain a probability per flight 
hour. This quantity is then equated to the failure rate to LOTC over the time period 
used. When the flight time is used the LOTC rate from dispatchable configuration i is 
calculated to be: 
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;( = Q"L 
I,L t 
ft, 
5.3.17 
where Qi,L is the failure probability (ofLOTC) for dispatchable system configuration i. ' 
5.3.7 The Failure Rate for Full-Up Electronics, AFU.L 
In [17], [18] the LOTC rate for full-up electronics, AFU,L, is approximated using a 
conservative upper bound, given by: 
5.3.18 
where ASTD and ALTD are as defined in equation 5.3.4. The constant Iftt represents the 
length of a flight in hours. This approximation is conservative since it assumes all faults 
in a channel result in the loss of that channel. In order to see where the approximation 
given in equation 5.3.18 comes from consider this conservative assumption in which all 
channel faults result in the loss of function of that channel. 
The occurrence of a LOTC event will thus require the occurrence, in a single flight, of 
two independent faults, one in each channel. Therefore the probability of a LOTC event 
occurring after a full-up dispatch, PFU,L, is given by: 
PFU •L = p( channel I fails AND channel 2 fails) 
:s; PCHANl PCHAN2' 
5.3.19 
where P CHANI and P CHANl are respectively the probabilities that channel 1 and channel 2 
fail in a flight given a full-up dispatch at the beginning of that flight. Note that the upper 
bound given above is analogous to the rare event approximation for the system 
unavailability detailed in Section 2.4.1.1. Now, using the method shown in Section 
5.3.6 to calculate a failure rate by dividing the failure probability by the average flight 
time, PCHAN! and P CHANl can be expressed as follows: 
PCHANl = ACHANlt fI" 
PCHAN2 = ACHAN2t fit' 
5.3.20 
where kHAN! and kHANl represent the failure rates of channel 1 and channel 2 in a 
flight given full-up dispatch. Substituting equations 5.3.20 into equation 5.3.19 yields 
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the following upper bound for the probability of a LOrC event in a flight after a full-up 
dispatch: 
5.3.21 
Again approximating a failure rate by a failure probability divided by a flight time for 
this equation 5.3.21 gives the following upper bound for the LOrC rate for full-up 
electronics: 
5.3.22 
Now consider again the conservative assumption that all dispatchable faults occurring 
within a channel result in the loss of that channel. The LOrC rate for the single channel 
given full-up dispatch can thus be estimated by half of the sum of the failure rates of all 
dispatchable faults in both channels, giving: 
n 
ACHANI = ACHAN2 = t L Ai' 5.3.23 
;::.2 
Equation 5.3.23 can now be substituted into equation 5.3.22 to yield equation 5.3.18, 
the upper bound used to approximate AFU,L. 
5.4 TW A Approach Using the Balanced Time Coefficients 
Consider equation 5.3.1, the original definition of the rWA failure rate. In order to 
obtain the rw A failure rate using the balanced time coefficients, ATWA,bal, equations 
5.3.6,5.3.7,5.3.11 and 5.3.12 are substituted into equation 5.3.1 to give: 
5.4.1 
Substitution of ASTD and ALTD from equation 5.3.4 gives: 
AwA,bal = itHMC + 2uR + I FUAFU,L + IFUTSTD fA.;A,.L + tFUTLTD tA-,A/,L' 5.4.2 
/_2 1-111+1 
Now define a quantity Tj which will represent the dispatch interval for each 
dispatchable system configuration i except the full-up state such that: 
{
TSTD ' ifi ~ 2, ... ,m, T~ 
I TLTDJ ifi=m+l, ... ,n. 
Substituting equation 5.4.3 into equation 5.4.2 leads to: 
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5.4.3 
'<""'.00' = AHMC + AvR + IroAFU.L + IFU "f.r.A,A,.L' 5.4.4 
j-2 
Defining the time fraction in dispatchable configuration i to be: 
t, = t FUT,A" 5.4.5 
means that equations 5.3.11 and 5.3.12 are satisfied. Remembering that state i = I 
represents the full-up dispatchable configuration equation 5.4.4 becomes: 
'<""'.00' = AHMC + AvR + f I,A,.L· 5.4.6 
j.1 
Upon examination it can be seen that this is equivalent to adding the failure rates due to 
mechanicallhydromechanical and unrevealed faults to the sum of the fractions of time 
dispatching in each of the i dispatchable configurations multiplied by the instantaneous 
LOTC rate from that dispatchable configuration. This is equivalent to the original 
definition given at the beginning of Section 5.3. A conclusion that may be drawn from 
this is that the balanced time coefficients given in [18] lead to a formula for the LOTC 
rate that will more accurately represent the original definition of the TW A LOTC rate 
than that given in [17]. Therefore we may reasonably assume that the balanced time 
coefficients are a better approximation of the time spent in each dispatchable system 
configuration than the original coefficients used in [17]. 
5.5 Reduced Fault State Markov Approaches 
As its name suggests, this modelling approach is based on a Markov analysis of the 
FADEC system. The difference from a conventional Markov approach lies in the 
reduced number of system states. In this approach only lower order fault states, 
commonly only first order fault states, are included in the model. When 'only first order 
fault states are included in the model this is known as a single fault state Markov model 
[17], [18]. These first order fault states would normally be only STD and LTD category 
fault states. DND fault states may be included but as a DND condition would normally 
be caused by a combination of system faults, these would, by definition, not be included 
in a single fault state Markov model. In [18] it is stated that single fault state models are 
acceptable when the repair rates for the single fault states are approximately 10 times 
( or more) greater than the maximum failure rate into or out of the single fault states. It is 
also stated that, for the models to achieve a good degree of accuracy (where the 
computed LOTC rate is within 5% of the true value), the repair rate for STD faults must 
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be at least 10 times greater than the maximum failure rate into or out of any STD state 
and a similar situation must hold true for the L TD repair and failure rates. This is said to 
justify the validity of a single fault state Markov model, since when repairs are so 
frequent the likelihood of multiple fault states leading to a LOTC event is minimal. The 
probability of a LOTC event in these circumstances is very low. 
For some systems the reduced state Markov model must include dual order fault states 
in addition to the single fault states. This could be the case if the repair rate and failure 
rates of any of the single fault states did not meet the criteria outlined above. 
A general feature of both single fault state and dual fault state Markov models that is 
unconventional when one considers the usual Markov modelling technique is that a 
transition rate is included on the system model in addition to the repair, failure and 
LOTC rates. This transition rate is an artificial simulated repair, added in order to allow 
the steady state solution for the LOTC rate to be calculated [18]. It leads directly from 
the final LOTC state back to the full-up system state. This transition rate means that the 
model no longer contains any absorbing states. This simulated repair rate will be 
discussed in more detail later in Section 5.5.2. 
What now follows is a description of a general single fault state Markov model, as 
described in [18]. 
5.5.1 Single Fault State Markov Approach 
Consider again the general system described in Section 5.2, and assume that all of the 
STD and LTD dispatchable system states, numbered 2, ... ,n, are single fault states. 
Since mechanicallhydromechanical faults and unrevealed faults may cause LOTC from 
any of the dispatchable system configurations a transition to the LOTC state from each 
of the states representing these dispatchable configurations is added to the model (as 
defined in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). This results in a model shown in Figure 5.5.1. 
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Figure 5.5.1. A single fault state Markov model. 
AH represents the sum of AHMC and AUR, the failure rates due. to the 
mechanicallhydromechanical and unrevealed failures respectively. it; is the failure rate 
into state i and Aj.L is the failure rate out of that state into the LOTC state. The repair 
rates, Vj, are defined as the reciprocal of the dispatch intervals for each fault state. Thus, 
if Tj represents the dispatch interval for state i the repair rate, 1';, is given by: 
1 
v1 =-· T, 5.5.1 
The artificial, simulated repair rate that is added to the model is given by the feedback 
transition, VFB, from the LOTC state (state n + I) to the full-up state (state 1). 
5.5.2 Calculating the LOTC Rate 
The Markov model shown in Figure 5.5.1 yields the transition rate matrix A, given by: 
-(AH+t Ai ) A, A, AH /., 
-(v, +A,.L +AH) v, 0 0 A,.L +AH 
·A= 0 0 5.5.2 
v, 0 0 -(v, +A,.L +AH) A,.L +AH 
V F8 0 0 -VFB 
All off-diagonal terms of A that are not members of the first or last row or column are 
equal to zero. This transition rate matrix leads to a system of n + I differential equations 
of the form: 
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Q=QA, 5.5.3 
where 
5.5.4 
with Qi being the probability of the system being in state i. When finding the steady 
state solution of this Markov model the derivatives of these probabilities is set to zero 
(at steady state the rates of change of the probabilities is zero), This results in the 
following system of dependent linear simultaneous equations: 
QA=O. 5.5.5 
In order to obtain an independent system of equations one of the equations is arbitrarily 
chosen to be replaced by the constraint equation: 
5.5.6 
If the equation that is replaced is chosen to be the first of the n + I equations then the 
system given in equation 5,5.5 becomes: 
QA=B. 5.5.7 
where 
A, A, AH 
-(v, +A"L +AH) 0 0 A"L +AH 
A= 0 0 5.5,8 
0 0 -(v, +A"L +AH) A"L +AH 
0 0 -VFB 
and 
B = [1.0 ..... 01 5.5.9 
The LOre rate of the system is found by considering the average failure rate into the 
LOre state, i.e. state n + I. and thus the single fault state Markov LOre rate. ASFS, is 
defined as: 
.< = Transition rate into state n + 1 
SFS 1- Probability of being in state n + 1 5.5.10 
which will be given by: 
5.5.11 
This LOre rate requires the solution of equation 5.5.7. However, as is noted in [18], it 
is possible to obtain an expression for ASFS that is independent of the state probabilities 
by considering all but the final simultaneous equation of the system given by equation 
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5.5.7. From the constraint equation, equation 5.5.6, one can obtain an expression for the 
denominator of IlSFS given by: 
1- Q,+I = :tQ;, 5.5.12 ;-, 
and from the simultaneous equations numbered 2 to n one can obtain expressions for Qj 
which is as follows: 
5.5.13 
Substituting equations 5.5.12 and 5.5.13 into equation 5.5.11 gives. the following 
expression for the single fault state Markov LOTe rate: 
5.5.14 
which, after substitution of equation 5.5.13 into the denominator and subsequent 
simplification yields: 
5.5.15 
This expression for the LOTe rate is now noted to be independent of the probabilities 
of residing in each of the system states but also, more importantly, the feedback rate, 
VFB. This would imply that the steady state LOTe rate of the system is independent of 
the value of the artificial feedback rate that is added to the model. As is stated in [18], 
this is despite the fact that the probabilities of lying in the various system states will 
depend on VFB. If this is not immediately obvious consider solving the system of 
simultaneous equations given in equation 5.5.7. The presence of VFB in the final column 
of equation 5.5.8 means that the solution will also depend on VFB. An explanation for 
why the LOTe rate of the system does not depend on the value of the feedback rate, 
VFB, is given in [18]. It is stated that the average LOTe rate "of a fleet of engine control 
systems is not affected by the length of time a control system is absent from the 
operational fleet following its failure." The feedback rate could be thought of as being 
representative of the fact that a LOTe event can occur for an engine and the engine 
would then be repaired or replaced at the end of the flight in which the LOTe event 
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occurred. This would be true for multi-engined aircraft where the feedback rate would 
represent the repair or replacement process. 
5.5.3 First Order Approximation to the LOTC Rate 
When calculating the LOTC rate of a system a common approach appears to be to set 
.. the length of the STD interval and then plot a graph of the predicted LOTe rate against 
a varying LTD interval [I], [17], [18]. This wiJI involve fixing the STD interval, Ti 
(i = 2, .. . ,m), and hence the repair rate, 11 (i = 2, .. . ,m), from the STD dispatchable fault 
states and then calculating the LOTe rate for different values of the L TD interval, T; 
(i = m + I, .. . ,n). It is stated in [18] that this could cause difficulty when using a 
spreadsheet to compute the LOTe rate as the summations in the numerator and 
denominator of equation 5.5.15 need to be recomputed for each value of the LTD 
interval for which the LOTe rate must be calculated. For this reason approximations are 
obtained for the summations involved in the numerator and denominator of equation 
5.5.15 that wiJI then negate the need to continually recalculate these summations over 
the required range ofLTD interval values. 
The first step in the approximation process is to substitute equation 5.5.1 into equation 
5.5.15 to give the single fault state Markov LOTe rate, ASFs, as a function of the 
dispatch intervals, T;, as follows: 
A + t( 7;A,(A'L + AH ) ) 
H '-2 1 + 7; (;',L + AH) 
Asps = ( ). 
1 + t 7;A, 
'_2 1 + 7; (A',L + AH ) 
5.5.16 
In order to obtain an approximation to the LOTe rate, Maclaurin series expansions of 
the summations in its numerator and denominator are computed, truncated and 
substituted into equation 5.5.16. Since Ai, Ai,L and AH, wiJI essentially be held constant as 
the dispatch intervals, Ti, are varied, the summations may be considered as functions of 
one variable, T;, as the Maclaurin series are calculated. Below are the derivations of 
both Maclaurin series, for the summations in the numerator and the denominator of 
equation 5.5.16. 
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A Maclaurin series is a Taylor series expansion of a function about 0 and as such takes 
the form: 
I{x) = i: £ d'I[O). 
,., k! dx 
LetJI(Ti) be the argument of the summation in the numerator of ASFS. Thus: 
f, (T ) = CAIT, 
I i 1 + er; , 
I,' (T,) 
I,"(T, ) 
where c is the constant given by: 
cA" 
(I +cT,)' , 
-2c' AI {I +cT, ) 
(I +cT,), 
5.5.17 
5.5.18 
C = A,.L + AH" 5.5.19 
Substituting equations 5.5.18 into 5.5.17 and truncating after terms of OCr) yields the 
expression: 
1,{T,)",cA.,T,-c'A,T,'. 5.5.20 
Similarly, if fi(T;) is the argument of the summation in the denominator of ASFS, the 
following equations are obtained: 
f (r.) = .1;1; 
, I 1 r. ' +C , 
t,' (r,) (I +~r,r ' 
" -2CA,{I+cr,) 
f, (r,) (I+cr,), 
5.5.21 
where c is as defined in equation 5.5.19. Substituting equations 5.5.21 into 5.5.17 and 
again disregarding terms of Ocr) and above gives: 
I, (T,) ''''''IT, -cA,T,'. 5.5.22 
Returning now to the definition of the single fault state Markov LOTe rate, ASFS, the 
expressions for the arguments of the numerator and denominator, given by equations 
5.5.20 and 5.5.22, may be substituted into equation 5.5.16 to obtain the first order 
approximation to the single fault state Markov equation, which will be called ASFS.J 
here. This is thus given by: 
5.5.23 
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This may not look any simpler at first glance than equation 5.5.16. However, by 
grouping all STD and LTD fault states one may obtain an expression for A,SFS,/ wherein 
the dispatch intervals TSTD and TLTD, defined in equation 5.4.3, are included in the 
expression as follows: 
where: 
bl = :t Ai (A/'L + AH )' , 
;_2 
b, = :t A/ (A/,L + AH )' , 
l-m+1 
Cl = fA;, /-, 
5.5.24 
5.5.25 
All of these summations are independent of the dispatch intervals, TSTD and T LTD, and 
this means that they need only be calculated once, allowing the LOTC for different 
dispatch intervals to be easily obtained. 
5.5.4 Simplified Approximations When Dispatch Intervals are Short 
Reasonable approximations to the, LOTC rate can be obtained in the case when dispatch 
intervals are short [18] (a value ofless than 1000 hours in a MEL maintenance model is 
quoted, which equates to repair rates greater than 0.001 repairs per hour). Considering 
equation 5.5.15, it is noted that the tenns representing the fafIure rates from the ith 
dispatchable configuration added to the failure rates due to unrevealed and mechanical! 
hydromechanical faults are usually less than 50x I 0-6 failures per hour. This then leads 
to the approximation that the repair rates are roughly 10 times greater than the 
aforementioned failure rates and equation 5.5.15 is simplified to give: 
5.5.26 
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Substituting equation 5.5.1 into equation 5.5.26 yields the following approximation for 
the single fault state LOTC rate: 
5.5.27 
/:2 
In fact, this expression can be obtained by truncating the Maclaurin series expansions of 
-_. the numerator and denominator of equation 5.5.16 after terms of O(7) rather than OCr). 
5.5.5 Dual Fault State Markov Approach 
For the single fault state Markov model to be valid it is required that the repair rates, Vi, 
of individual STD faults in the system must be 10 times or more greater than the failure 
rates into or out of the STD single fault states. A similar situation must hold for the 
LTD single fault states. If these criteria are not met, a dual fault state model is used in 
preference to a single fault state model. Another scenario that may require the use of a 
dual fault state model is if the presence of dual fault combinations brought about a 
reduction in the dispatch interval from say a L TD interval to a STD interval. A general 
dual fault state model is depicted in Figure 5.5.2. The model shown omits a large 
number of the states within it for clarity. Comparing this with Figure 5.5.1, the Markov 
model for the single fault state model, it can be seen that all of the single fault states are 
still present, and numbered from 2 up to n. The full-up system state and LOTC state are, 
as before, labelled I and n + I respectively. The dual fault states are represented by the 
states that are labelled with two indices. Thus, for example, state 2, 3 in the diagram is 
the state where both of the faults 2 and 3 are present. 
76 
state 1 
(Full-up) 
Figure 5.5.2. A general dual fault state Markov model. 
Figure 5.5.2 may be taken to infer that all combinations of dual faults should be 
included in the model. This is not intended to be the case. In reality, a reduced number 
of dual fault states may be included. It should also be noted that Figure 5.5.2 shows a 
maintenance approach wherein all faults are cleared from the system at maintenance 
times. Thus all repair rates, Vj and 11/ lead to the full-up system state, state I. Also note 
that the failure rates due to mechanicallhydromechanical faults have not been included 
on the diagram. This is purely in the interests of clarity, the diagram becomes more 
cluttered when these are included. However, these failure rates could easily be added to 
the system and they would lead from each of the dispatchable system states directly to 
the LOTe state, as was the case in the single fault state Markov model in Figure 5.5.1. 
Taking the general model depicted in Figure 5.5.2, it is possible to obtain a transition 
rate matrix for this system, which is given in Figure 5.5.3. The diagonal terms of the 
matrix contain a term Dj or D jj, which take the following values: 
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D,= 
t<, 
; .. 2 
, 
V, + L-<, +-<'.L 
;.2 
; .. le 
k =1, 
k=2, ... ,n, 
V •• y +-< •. y.L' k=(2,3~ ... ,(n-l,n) 
5.5.28 
x and y represent the single faults that occur together to cause a dual fault. The LOTC 
rate of the system obtained from the dual fault model is calculated as it was for the 
single fault state model, by considering the failure rate into state n + I, which is defined 
as: 
Transition rate into state n + 1 
5.5.29 1 - Probability of being in state n + 1 ' 
which will be given by: 
1- Qn+l 
n Q n n Q 
1 +" A ' + " " A I.} '~,L f:t i,L ~ f:t j=:'1 I,},L ~
5.5.30 
= I+:t Q, 
1-2 Q1 
where Qi; is the probability of being in the dual fault state involving single faults j and j. 
These quantities can be obtained from the transition rate matrix, from the columns 
representing the dual fault states, and are given by the general equation: 
-<,Q; + -<IQ, - D'.IQ,.) = 0, 
which is rearranged to give: 
5.5.31 
5.5.32 
Equation 5.5.32 can then be substituted into equation 5.5.30 to give a general dual fault 
state model LOTC rate. Since the dual fault state Markov model being considered is 
such a general one, it is difficult to continue with any meaningful analysis. The number 
of states in the model and subsequent analysis depends on the system being modelled. 
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matrix. Likewise, the 
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opposite give the number of 
transitions represented in a 
particular section of a 
column. 
Figure 5.5.3. The transition rate matrix for the general dual state Markov model shown in Figure 5.5.2. 
79 
5.6 Summary 
During the course of implementing the modelling techniques described in this chapter a 
number of approximations and assumptions are made. These are summarised below for 
each method. 
5.6.1 Approximations/Assumptions Involved in the TW A Approach 
• The failure rate due to mechanica1!hydromechanical faults, AHMC, is approximated 
by adding all of the failure rates of all individual mechanica1!hydromechanical 
faults. This would appear to be a reasonable assumption. 
• The failure rate for unrevealed faults, AUR, is approximated in a way that could 
prove to be prone to error (see equation 5.3.2). A constant, X, is used to represent 
the fact that the unrevealed fault rate of a channel generally lies between 0 and 5% . 
of the total LOTe rate of that channel. This constant could potentially be 
manipulated in order to try to demonstrate a more favourable LOTe rate of the 
system. It is difficult to prove the suitability of the value chosen for X. 
• The failure rate for full-up electronics, AFU,L, is approximated using a conservative 
upper bound. It is conservative since all channel faults when dispatching full-up are 
assumed to cause the loss of that channel. It is also conservative since during the 
calculation of the upper bound used the probability of both channels failing is 
approximated using the rare event approximation (see equation 5.3.19). Another 
point to note about this approximation is the fact that failure rates are approximated 
by dividing failure probabilities by the length of a flight in order to get the 
probability of failure per flight hour. This technique is also used when calculating 
the failure rates to LOTe from the itli dispatchable configuration, Ai,L. This has the 
potential to lead to problems. 
• The definitions of the average failure rates to LOTe from the STD and L TD 
dispatchable system configurations, ASTD,L and ALTD,L, are given in [17], [18] with 
little explanation as to why they take the values given. From Section 5.4, these 
definitions can be seen, when used in conjunction with the balanced fractional 
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coefficients, equation 5.3.15, to yield an expression for the TWA LOTC rate that 
contains a tenn representing the TW A of the failure rate to LOTC of the system 
from each of its dispatchable configurations. This would suggest that the definitions 
of the average failure rates to LOTC from the STD and L TD dispatchable system 
configurations are reasonable. 
5.6.2 Approximations/Assumptions Involved in the Single Fault State Markov Approach 
• Constructing a single fault state Markov model involves making a vast reduction in 
the number of states in the Markov model in comparison to a conventional Markov 
approach. This will lead to some reduction in the accuracy of any solutions obtained 
from the model. It is difficult to predict whether this reduction in states and the 
ensuing approximations taken will lead to a conservative solution or not. When so 
many states are removed from a Markov model it is possible that the Markov model 
might no longer represent the situation that is to be modelled. 
• The feedback repair transition, VFB, that is added to the model in order to provide a 
path from the final fully-failed system state back to the full-up state with no faults 
present at first appears unconventional, particularly when one considers the fact that 
the value of this rate is said to be unimportant. However, this rate is added to the 
model in order for the fleet-wide average LOTC rate to be obtained and thus the 
feedback rate can be thought of as taking the place of the maintenance required in 
replacing or repairing a F ADEC system after a LOTC event has occurred. 
• The single fault state Markov model described considers the case where all faults 
will be cleared from the system at maintenance. The model could be adapted to 
cover other maintenance strategies. However, this requires the construction of a new 
model and the work involved in doing this may not be a trivial matter. Also note that 
Markov models inherently model the MEL maintenance approach, and as such 
require the manipulation of the dispatch interval to find the maximum allowable 
inspection interval if PIR is to be used. 
• Approximations may be used in the single fault state Markov model, such as the one 
yielding the first order approximation to the single fault state Markov model 
(equation 5.5.24) or the approximation applied when dispatch intervals are short 
(equation 5.5.27). These approximations, when applied to a method that already 
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involves some substantial approximations, may bring further inaccuracies into the 
modelling process. 
5.6.3 Approximations IAssumptions Involved in the Dual Fault State Markov Approach 
, 
• The number of fault states is again reduced for this dual fault state model in 
comparison to the number of states that would be present in a conventional Markov 
model. Because of the increase in the number of system states one may expect 
greater accuracy from the model in relation to the single fault state model. However, 
a loss in accuracy of the model would still be expected, and it is unclear whether any 
solutions obtained would be conservative or not. 
• In' order to use a single fault state Markov model a certain requirement must be met. 
The requirement is for the repair rates of individual fault states to be at least 10 
times greater than the failure rates into or out of the single fault states. If this is not 
the case a dual fault state Markov model would be used. The value of 10 seems to 
be an arbitrary choice. It is unclear whether this requirement is a valid one. 
• An artificial feedback loop is added to the dual fault state model, as was the case 
with the single fault state model. This feedback rate can be thought of as being 
applied under the same assumptions that held for the single fault state Markov 
model. 
• As was the case with the single fault state Markov approach the dual fault state 
Markov model inherently models the MEL maintenance approach and requires the 
manipulation of the dispatch interval to find the maximum allowed inspection 
interval. 
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Chapter 6 : TLD Simulation Modelling Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
TLD is essentially a very simple process in which maintenance is perfonned on a 
system within a set period of time after a fault has occurred. However, given the 
complexity of modem aircraft systems the application and modelling of TLD is not 
necessarily a simple task. As discussed in 0 the dispatch intervals that are applied to the 
different fault categories must be such that the system LOTC rate doesn't exceed the 
level set in the certification regulations. In addition, there is a further requirement that 
the computed LOTC rate of the system from individual dispatchable system 
configurations must not exceed specified levels also set in the certification regulations. 
These levels vary for each of the different categories of dispatch. When one also begins 
to take into account, for example, the presence of multiple faults within the system at 
anyone time or the application of, say, MEL maintenance to STD faults and PIR 
maintenance to LTD faults, the modelling process can become more complex. Another 
item of potential importance is the ability to model different repair scenarios to show 
that they will, if applied, meet the certification requirements for given dispatch 
intervals. 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) lends itself very well to modelling the application of 
TLD to simple systems. Fault times can be added to a schedule, giving the 
chronological order in which the faults occur, with the system being checked after each 
fault to see if it has failed or if TLD criteria should be applied. MCS is sufficiently 
flexible to deal with the intricacies of TLD. For instance, a MCS can handle the 
occurrence of multiple faults within the system and the subsequent application of TLD 
and associated maintenance operations. The ordering of fault combinations can be 
accounted for, as can different repair strategies at maintenance. Perhaps the main 
advantage of a MCS code specifically designed to model TLD is the potential to model 
more than one system using the same code. This would be of particular use, for 
example, if a system design was changed at some point in time. If using an analytical 
technique to demonstrate certification compliance a totally new model must be 
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constructed for the system. If using MCS a single code could be used for any number of 
systems, the system structure being passed to the code, along with details about the 
dispatch intervals to be applied and the maintenance strategies to be used. Having in 
mind this idea of the potential functionality of a MCS, a number of characteristics that a 
MCS code for TLD should demonstrate can be outlined: 
1. the ability to model any system to which TLD is applied, 
2. handle different maintenance approaches and repair strategies, 
3. deal effectively with the potential importance of the order of occurrence of 
faults and, more generally, fault combinations, 
4. most importantly, demonstrate with some confidence whether or not a system 
will meet certification requirements. 
Software was written in order to model TLD using MCS.The above four points were 
the main ones taken into account when constructing the MCS code. The code is written 
in C++ in such a way that it is as general as possible, allowing a potential user to easily 
apply it to their system of interest. The limitations of the other approaches, such as the 
requirement of basic event independence of fault tree analysis and the state space 
explosion encountered in Markov analysis, are overcome by using the MCS modelling 
approach developed here. 
In this chapter important details of the TLD simulation modelling methodology and the 
computer code produced to perfonn the analysis are discussed. An overview of the TLD 
MCS code structure is given, more details of which can be found in Appendix 2. This is 
followed by the more important details of the TLD MCS code, beginning with a 
description of the schedules used within the code and continuing with a description of 
the method used to handle TLD criteria within the code. The method of propagating 
faults (and repairs) through the fault tree structure is described, along with how the 
different repair strategies at maintenance deadlines are handled and how opportunistic 
maintenance is perfonned. The method used to detennine the times of deadlines added 
to the schedule for differing maintenance approaches is described. Finally, the output 
available from the code is described. All of these details of the code have been 
developed as part of the work for this thesis and provide the backbone of the Monte 
Carlo simulation methodology used to model TLD. This methodology overcomes the 
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limitations of the other possible techniques, such as the requirement of basic event 
independence in fault tree analysis, the state space explosion encountered when using 
Markov models or the number of approximations and assumptions used in the 
recommended models. 
6.2 TLD MCS Code Outline 
When modelling a system using the TLD MCS code there are a number of inputs that 
must be supplied. Figure 6.2.1 shows a schematic of the inputs supplied to the TLD 
MCS code and the outputs that can be obtained from it. The inputs that describe the 
system are the fault tree structure that describes the LOTC of the system and the 
component data for this fault tree. The component data are the failure distributions and 
parameters for the basic events of the fault tree. In addition the dispatch criteria for the 
system must also be provided. All of these inputs are provided to the system in text 
files, examples of which are given in Appendix I and Appendix 5. The fault tree file 
contains a list of the gates in the tree followed by their inputs. The basic event failure 
data file contains a list of the basic events, each of which has an identifier for its 
distribution and the parameter for that distribution associated with that basic event. The 
dispatch criteria for the system are defined in another text file. These may be described 
in terms of basic events or, as perhaps might be more likely in a real system, in terms of 
intermediate events from the system fault tree or, if required, as some combination of 
basic and intermediate events. If the TLD criteria are to be specified in terms of 
intermediate events then the appropriate intermediate events are also supplied to the 
code in a text file. The final text file that may be specified is one which comes into 
force as maintenance takes place. This file contains a list of any TLD faults that will be 
repaired and will always involve other faults being cleared from the system. For 
example, it might be the case that when a certain part of a system is repaired other parts 
of that system will always be repaired at the same time, if failed. 
Given the system information described above the TLD code performs a Monte Carlo 
simulation procedure, producing the system LOTC rate for given values of dispatch 
intervals. The code can also produce the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC and can 
also be used to give importance measures for the basic events in the system fault tree 
and also the faults that are considered for the dispatch criteria. 
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Inputs: 
FT structure 
component data 
TLD criteria 
code options 
TLD 
MCS 
code 
Outputs: 
system LOTC rate 
inst. LOTC rates 
importance measUres 
Figure 6.2.1. Inputs and outputs of the TLD MCS code. 
6.3 TLD MCS Code Structure 
The TLD MCS code has a modular format. Along with relatively simple modules, such 
as one that is used to generate fault times, see Section 4.4, or one used to construct 
names for the files used for data output, there are a number of modules that form the 
core of the TLD MCS code. These cover the main TLD operations applied to the 
system and the handling of the relevant system data during the course of the 
simulations. These major modules are listed (in no particular order), along with basic 
descriptions of the functions that they perform, in Table 6.3.1. Along with these 
modules the TLD MCS code requires an input file, to be specified by the user before 
running the code. This data file contains options that allow certain features of the code 
to be 'turned on' or 'turned off according to the results and output required and also 
contains certain constants or variables that will be used by the code. An example of 
such a file is given in Appendix 1. 
The modules and options specified in the input data file are described in Appendix 2. 
Points of particular relevance to the simulation ofTLD are described in more detail than 
those considered to be not as important to modelling TLD. 
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Module/s 
main 
Function/s 
Main driver program. 
Called from main when dispatch criteria are to be set 
automatically within the code. 
dispatch_configuration Identifies the system dispatchable configurations, for which 
instantaneous LOTC rates must be calculated. 
initialisation 
control sims 
simulations 
schedule 
failure_update 
component Jepair 
repair_update 
LOTC i 
TLD check 
TLD _maintenance 
LOTC _convergence 
IAfl'_convergence 
Group of modules used to ready infonnation supplied by the 
user for use ina simulation of a system, e.g. steps through a 
range of STD intervals. 
Contains a group of modules used to initialise data at different 
points in the simulation process. 
Sets data according to user options (using vary _user_options) 
and calls simulations module. 
Implements a group of simulations to find the system LOTC 
rate for a certain set of user options (supplied by 
controtsims). 
Handles data regarding to fault ordering (for both faults that 
have yet to occur and faults that have already occurred). 
Upon fault occurrence, propagates faults through the system 
fault tree. 
Updates the relevant data as a fault is cleared from the system. 
Propagates repairs through the system fault tree. 
Amends data used to calculate the instantaneous LOTC rates 
from the dispatchable system configurations. 
Checks to see whether any TLD criteria must be applied after 
a fault occurrence. 
Decides the correct faults to be repaired at a TLD 
maintenance deadline. 
Check for convergence of the system LOTC rate, 
instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system 
configurations and importance measures. 
Table 6.3.1. Major modules of the TLD MCS code and 
outlines of their functions. 
6.4 Event Scheduling 
Schedules play a very important role in the TLD MCS code. It is important that the 
times of faults and maintenance deadlines are used by the code in a strict chronological 
order. In this way the simulations can move from one event occurrence (fault or 
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maintenance deadline) to the next, the system status being checked at the time of each 
event. As these event times are generated from the appropriate distributions (for fault 
times) or calculated (for maintenance deadlines) they are added to a schedule. From this 
schedule it must, at various times throughout the implementation of the TLD MCS 
code, be possible to identity the first event chronologically or to fmd the position of 
certain events within the schedule. 
There is a second use for a schedule within the TLD MCS code. A schedule with the 
same structure described above is used to keep track of the faults that are present within 
the system and the order in which they occurred. Thus, two schedule structures are 
used, the first records the order of the events that are still to occur, the second records 
the order of faults that have already occurred and are still present in the system. Both of 
these schedules use identical structures. The schedule that records the order of 
occurrence of faults that are present in the system is used when implementing some of 
the repair strategies to enable maintenance. The different repair strategies at 
maintenance are discussed in Sections 6.7 and 6.8. The remainder of this section 
describes the schedule as it is applied in the case where a record is kept of the events 
that are still to occur. Exactly the same principles are used in the case where a record is 
kept of the events that have already occurred. 
The schedule used in the TLD MCS code is constructed around two main array 
structures. One is an integer array that holds reference numbers of events that will occur 
at some point in the system's future, and the other an array that holds the time that these 
events are due to occur. For an illustration of how such arrays are represented consider 
Table 6.4.1. Entries with a dash signity empty elements of arrays. The left hand column 
represents the index of the array. There are a number of events that may occur, these 
being stored in the central colunm, and the times at which these events will occur, given 
in the right hand column. Upon examination of this particular schedule it can be seen 
that the event with identifier 6000 will occur first at a simulation time of 965.0, to be 
followed by event 2 at 1053.2, event I at 1210.4 and event 7003 at 1425.0. Note that 
these events are not in chronological order. Clearly, if the schedule could only hold five 
entries such as the one in Table 6.4.1 it would be no problem to search the table to 
determine the event order. However, if the schedule was an array of hundreds or 
thousands of events the task of finding the first event in the schedule time after time 
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Array Index Event Identifier Event Time 
0 2 1053.2 
1 
2 7003 1425.0 
3 1 1210.4 
4 6000 965.0 
5 
Table 6.4.1. A representation of schedule arrays. 
would become particularly draining on system resources. For this reason the schedule 
structure is extended to contain other information for each event, which refers to the 
position within the array of the next and previous events chronologically. This 
information is stored in two extra integer arrays. Thus, the schedule represented in 
Table 6.4.1 will take the form given in Table 6.4.2. This information now allows the 
addition of or removal of events and times from any position within the schedule and 
allows a record to be kept of the relative positions of all events in the schedule array. 
Array Index Event Identifier 
0 2 
1 
2 7003 
3 1 
4 6000 
5 
Event Time 
1053.2 
1425.0 
1210.4 
965.0 
Position of 
previous event 
4 
3 
o· 
Position of 
next event 
3 
2 
o 
Table 6.4.2. A schedule representation with reference to 
previous and next events. 
6.4.1 Removing the First Event From the Schedule 
In order to illustrate the use of a schedule within the code consider initially the task of 
removing the first event from a schedule, a procedure that is carried out many times 
during the implementation of simulations. Considering the example just discussed the 
first event is known to be stored at position4. Thus the event and its associated time are 
removed from position 4 in the appropriate arrays. In this way the occurring event 
would be 6000 and would occur at a time of 965.0. The simulation time would be 
advanced to 965.0 and the relevant procedures to be implemented for event 6000 would 
be carried out if a TLD MCS was being undertaken. As the event and time were 
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removed from the schedule the arrays storing the position of the next and previous 
events must be updated, along with the variable storing the position of the first event 
chronologically in the schedule. Since 0 is the position of the event that occurred after 
event 6000 this would now be the first event. At this point all elements of arrays at 
index 4 can be cleared. The new first event, 2, at position 0 now has no event previous 
to it (since it is the first event), hence the element of the previous element array at 
position 0 will be cleared. Thus the schedule arrays will now take the form given in 
Table 6.4.3. This procedure can be implemented repeatedly until the schedule is 
emptied. Note that the schedule being used to store events that are to occur should never 
be emptied, since there will always be faults or maintenance deadlines that will occur at 
some time in the future. However, the array used to store the order of faults that have 
occurred may be emptied completely, since there will be numerous times during the 
implementation of the code that there will be no faults present in the system. 
Array Index Event Identifier 
0 2 
1 
2 7003 
:3 1 
4 
5 
Event Time 
1053.2 
1425.0 
1210.4 
Position of 
previous event 
3 
0 
Position of 
next event 
3 
2 
Table 6.4.3. A representation of the schedule after the removal 
of event 6000. 
6.4.2 Adding an Event to the Schedule 
Adding an event to the schedule is a slightly more complex procedure than removing 
the first event from the schedule. The event and the time of its occurrence are added to a 
free element of the relevant arrays. In the TLD MCS code the first element that is 
checked for its availability is the last element that had an event removed from it. In 
order to do this a variable is used to store the array index of the previous event that was 
removed from the schedule. If the array elements at this position are not free for some 
reason the arrays are searched from that point, element by element, until a free position 
is found. If the end of the array is encountered while it is being searched the search 
restarts at the beginning of the array. Once free positions are found the event identifier 
and its time of occurrence are stored at that position in the relevant arrays. The position 
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of the event in the schedule arrays is also stored in the relevant array. The next step is to 
update the arrays containing the positions in the schedule of the next and previous 
events. This involves comparing the time of the event being added to the schedule to the 
times of the events that are already in the schedule. The search of the event times for 
comparison with the time of the added event begins with the time of the last event 
chronologically. If the added event occurs later than the final event it wi11 become the 
new last event chronologically. If not the time of the previous event to the last event is 
checked and if the added event occurs between these two events the position is known. 
This process continues until the position of the added event is known and then the 
arrays are updated. 
In order to i11ustrate the process of adding an event to the schedule consider that event 0 
is to be added to the schedule represented in Table 6.4.3 and that the time of its 
occurrence is 1373.7. The first task is to locate a free element. Considering that event 
6000 was just removed from position 4 the first element checked for its availability has 
index 4. It is discovered to be empty and the event and its time are added to position 4 
of the relevant arrays. Next the location of the event in the chronological ordering 
scheme must be found. As the time of the event is not greater than that of the last event 
chronologically (event 7003) the time of the previous event to that last event (event 1) is 
compared to the time of the added event. Event 0 is found to occur between these two 
events. Thus the data from the schedule is as given in Table 6.4.4. The first event 
chronologically wi11 sti11 be at position 0, the final event wi11 still be at position 2 of the 
array. Note that the position of the previous event to event 7003 has now been updated 
to 4 and the position of the next event to 3 has been updated to 4. At the same time the 
positions of the events occurring before and after the added event 0 are 3 and 2 
respectively. 
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Array Index Event Identifier Event Time Position of previous event 
Position of 
next event 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 1053.2 
7003 1425.0 
1 1210.4 
0 1373.7 
4 
0 
3 
3 
4 
2 
Table 6.4.4. A representation of the schedule after the addition 
of event O. 
6.4.3 Removing an Event From Any Position In the Schedule 
This procedure is carried out in much the same way as that which is used to remove the 
first event chronologically from the schedule. This is a simple process so long as the 
positions of previous and next events are updated accordingly. 
Suppose that event I is to be removed from the schedule, despite the fact that it is not 
the first eyent chronologically. This scenario can occur when faults are repaired. In 
order to do this the position of the event in the array is obtained from the relevant array 
that is used to store the positions of all the events in the schedule array. After 
identifying that it is in position 3 of the schedule arrays the entry for the event identifier 
and its time are cleared from the array and the arrays storing the positions of the next 
and previous events are updated. The schedule will now look like the representation in 
Table 6.4.5. Note that the position of the next event to the event that was previous to 
event 1, i.e. event 2 at position 0, is now updated to 4. Also, the previous event of event 
4 is now changed to event 2 which is entered in the schedule at position O. 
Array Index Event Identifier Event Time Position of previous event 
Position of 
next event 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 1053.2 
7003 1425.0 4 
0 1373.7 0 
Table 6.4.5. Representation of the schedule after the removal 
of event I. 
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4 
2 
6.4.4 Event Times Added to the Schedule 
There are two types of events that may be added to the schedules in the TLD MCS 
code. These are faults and maintenance deadlines. The schedule that records the events 
and times that are yet to occur within the system will, at various points, have faults and 
maintenance deadlines added to it. When this happens the time of the faults must be 
.. -. generated using the appropriate failure distributions, see Section 4.4, and the time of the 
maintenance deadlines must be calculated according to the maintenance procedures 
being implemented, see Section 6.S. The second type of schedule used within the code, 
that which records the faults and times at which they occurred, uses the times removed 
from the first schedule type. This means there is no generation or calculation of event 
times needed for the second type of schedule, only for the first. 
6.5 Handling System Dispatch Criteria 
When simulating the application of TLD to a system one must efficiently handle the 
dispatch criteria that will be applied to that system. These dispatch criteria will involve 
either an individual fault or some, perhaps ordered, combination of faults. To illustrate 
this consider an example where a fault A, occurring in isolation, initiates a LTD 
interval. The further occurrence of fault B after fault A may cause the allowable 
dispatch interval to be reduced to the STD category. For the moment ignore the 
occurrence of fault B alone or the occurrence of fault B followed by fault A. In this case 
the dispatch criteria would be defined as shown in Table 6.5.1. 
Dispatch Criteria Dispatch Category 
A LTD 
AB STD 
Table 6.5.1. Dispatch criteria for two faults, A and B. 
In order to include a representation of these dispatch criteria within the TLD MCS code 
one must first identify the important fault within the group of faults that causes the 
criteria to be applied. Consider how the TLD MCS code works, by removing faults and 
other events from a schedule in a chronological order. Consider also how these dispatch 
criteria are defined, in terms of an ordered group of faults. Following this thought 
process, one may reach the conclusion that the final fault of the group of faults causing 
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the implementation of certain dispatch criteria is the most important. In this way, the 
final fault of the group may be considered as a kind of initiating event for the group of 
faults that brings about the implementation of certain dispatch criteria. T4e preceding 
events could be thought of as being analogous to enabling events. Thus, it is reasonable 
to use these dispatch criteria within the code by checking, as a fault occurs, for other 
faults that preceded it to see if any dispatch criteria have been met. In this way the 
dispatch criteria for the two faults, A and B, given in Table 6.5.1 would be stored in the 
TLD MCS code under a reference to the final fault of the group of faults. The dispatch 
criteria shown in the table are stored referring to fault A (for the fault involving A 
alone) and fault B (for the dual fault condition). Therefore the dispatch criteria, as 
stored in the code, take the form given in Table 6.5.2. Note that the dash in the table 
signifies that when A is the final fault there .are no preceding faults required for the 
initiation of the LTD interval. Fault B must be preceded by fault A in order for the STD 
interval to be initiated. 
Final Fault 
(used as reference) 
Preceding . 
Faults Dispatch Category 
A 
B 
LTD 
A STD 
Table 6.5.2. A representation of dispatch criteria as used in the 
TLD MCS code 
In order to further illustrate this type of representation of the dispatch criteria consider a 
. second example for dispatch criteria, shown in Table 6.5.3. In this case there are three 
faults covered by these dispatch criteria, these being A, Band C. The occurrence of 
fault A or fault B in isolation initiates a LTD category. Further failures give rise to the 
application of STD and DND dispatch categories. 
Dispatch Criteria Dispatch Category 
A LTD 
AB STD 
ABC DND 
B LTD 
BA STD 
BC STD 
Table 6.5.3. Dispatch criteria for three faults, A, Band C. 
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Now consider the representation of these criteria that must be used in the TLD MCS 
code. Since the final event of the group that triggers the initiation of a dispatch interval 
is the one by which the group will be referenced there will be two criteria referenced by 
fault A, two by fault B and two by fault C. The representations used in the code will 
therefore be those given in Table 6.5.4. 
Final Fault Preceding Dispatch Category {used as reference} Faults 
A LTD 
B STD 
B A STD 
LTD 
C AB DND 
B STD 
Table 6.5.4. A representation of dispatch criteria as used in the 
TLD MCS code. 
The dispatch criteria supplied to the TLD MCS code must cover all combinations of 
faults that can occur within a system. This does not mean that a dispatch category must 
be applied to every possible combination of faults. There will be certain faults and 
combinations for which dispatch is forbidden (DND faults) and any higher order fault 
combinations that contain the lower order DND fault will automatically be DND 
themselves. As such the higher order faults just described need not be included in the 
dispatch criteria since, in all situations, the lower order DND fault will cause the 
implementation of the relevant DND maintenance deadline. In this way there comes a 
point when dealing with dispatch criteria, where all fault combinations of a certain order 
and above will be DND. As the dispatch criteria are input by the TLD MCS code this 
number is stored for later use when determining applicable dispatch categories and 
setting maintenance deadlines. 
6.6 Propagating Faults/Repairs Through the Fault Tree Structure 
The occurrence and subsequent repair of faults within the TLD MCS code is 
fundamental to its success in modelling TLD. As a fault occurs the failure_update 
module is called to update the status of the relevant gates and events within the system 
fault tree by propagating the original fault up through the fault tree. In a similar way, as 
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a fault is cleared from the system at maintenance deadlines the status of the relevant 
gates and events in the system are updated by propagating the repair up through the 
fault tree structure. This task is performed in the code using the repair_update module. 
Propagating faults or repairs up through the structure of a fault tree is a relatively simple 
task. The TLD MCS code first identifies the parent gates of the fault that has occurred 
or is being repaired. It then checks whether the status of the parent gate will change 
(working to failed or failed to working) due to the change in status of its input. Whether 
the status of the parent gate changes is dependent on the type of the gate and sometimes 
the status of its other inputs. If the status of the parent gate changes its own parent gates 
are then checked, to see if their status changes and this process continues until the status 
of no more parent gates will change (if, following a fault occurrence, one of the parent 
gates is the top event and it fails the system will clearly fail). Table 6.6.1 shows the 
requirements for a change in status of the parent gate following a fault occurrence (if 
the gate is to change status from working to failed) and the requirements for a change in 
status of the parent gate following a fault repair (if the gate is to change status from 
failed to working). Note that, because the failure of a NOT gate's input causes the 
'repair' of the NOT gate, the NOT gate identity is passed to the repair_update module 
from the failure_update module in order to propagate the logic up the fault tree. 
Similarly, when the NOT gate's input is repaired, the NOT gate fails and thus 
failure_update is called from repair_update in order to propagate the appropriate logic. 
Gate type 
OR 
After fault occurrence After fault repair 
1 input failed causes gate failure. All inputs working cause gate to 
work. 
AND All inputs failed cause gate 1 input working causes gate to 
kin voting 
failure. work. 
k inputs failed cause gate failure. n - k + 1 inputs working cause 
gate to work. 
priority AND All inputs failed in order cause 1 input working causes gate to 
NOT 
null 
gate failure. work. 
Input failure causes gate repair. 
Input failure causes gate failure. 
Input repair causes gate failure. 
Input repair causes gate repair. 
Table 6.6.1. The requirements for a change in status of the 
. parent gate when propagating faultslrepairs through the fault 
tree (used infailure_update, repair_update). 
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6.7 Implementing Maintenance Within the TLD MCS Code 
If, during the process of a simulation, a maintenance deadline is encountered in the 
schedule, repairs must take place to rectify certain faults within the system before 
further dispatch is allowed. The nature of the repairs to be carried out at maintenance 
deadlines during the course of a simulation determines which deadlines are added to the 
schedule after a fault occurrence. The addition of maintenance deadlines to the schedule 
is discussed in Section 6.S. 
If, upon reaching maintenance deadlines, there would always be only one fault present 
within the system, this would simply be cleared to allow further dispatch. However, 
since it is possible for more than one fault to exist within the system at maintenance 
deadlines it is necessary to have a repair strategy that will decide what faults must be 
repaired as a maintenance deadline is encountered. In an ideal world, one would 
probably require that all faults could be cleared from the system at the maintenance 
deadline, returning the system to a fully-up state and allowing subsequent indefinite 
dispatch of the aircraft. However, in reality, it may be the case that, despite the best 
planning of maintenance crews, replacement parts may not be available in time, or 
sufficient time is not available to implement all the repairs before the aircraft is due to 
enter service again. Provided that the faults that cannot be cleared from the system in 
time are not the ones that directly caused this maintenance deadline (and hence may 
remain in the system for some further period of time) the aircraft could be dispatched 
again and the final repairs effected at some later date. For this reason a number of repair . 
strategies at maintenance deadlines were included in the TLD MCS code. 
As mentioned earlier, in practice perhaps the most likely maintenance strategy would 
involve clearing all faults from the system at the first opportunity, the first maintenance 
deadline that arises. However, as was also briefly discussed, this may not happen for 
some reason, for instance an unavailability of replacement parts or lack of maintenance 
time. There 'will clearly be varying amounts of repairs that can be implemented at 
maintenance deadlines. Four different repair strategies at maintenance deadlines may be 
implemented in the TLD MCS code. Each of these strategies was devised to represent 
varying amounts of work as the maintenance procedure is carried out. This ranged from 
implementing the minimum amount of maintenance possible at a deadline that will still 
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allow further dispatch of the aircraft, to doing the maximum amount of work possible 
(basically clearing all faults from the system at maintenance deadlines). Which of the 
four repair strategies to use at maintenance deadlines is a choice specified in the input 
data. Each of these repair strategies is described in the following sections, with 
examples of the concepts involved, where appropriate. The repair strategies themselves 
are listed below: 
1. Repair the last fault of the group that caused the current maintenance deadline, 
2. Repair all faults in the group causing the current maintenance deadline, 
3. Repair all faults in the same category as the group causing the current deadline, 
4. Repair all faults present in the system. 
Also possible within the TLD MCS code is opportunistic maintenance, wherein repairs 
that would be carried out at future maintenance deadlines are carried out at the present 
maintenance deadline if they would occur within a specified length of time. This is 
described in Section 6.7.5. 
It is also possible within the TLD MCS code to associate certain fault tree events (basic 
or intermediate) with faults that appear in the dispatch criteria. This allows repairs to be 
carried out to relevant parts of the system as particular dispatchable faults are repaired. 
This is described in Section 6.7.6. 
6.7.1 Repair Strategy I-Repair the Last Fault of the Group Causing the Current 
Maintenance Deadline 
This repair strategy involves carrying out the least possible amount of work at a 
maintenance deadline in order to allow further dispatch of the system. For this reason it 
is probably the worst possible maintenance strategy that could be applied in practice. 
When maintenance deadlines are encountered during a simulation the final fault in the 
group that caused the deadline to be added to the schedule is repaired. In order to 
illustrate this repair process consider the occurrence of three faults, A, 8 and C, the 
dispatch criteria for which are shown in Table 6.7.1. 
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Dispatch Criteria Dispatch Category 
A LTD 
AB 
BC 
STD 
DND 
Table 6.7.1. The dispatch criteria for 3 faults, A, Band C. 
Considering the dispatch criteria given in Table 6.7.1, if the faults occur in the order A 
followed by B followed by C the situation could resemble that depicted in Figure 6.7.1. 
Fault A initiates a LTD interval ending at the maintenance deadline at t3. Fault B occurs 
and, in combination with fault A, initiates a STD interval ending at the maintenance 
deadline at t2. Fault C, as it occurs, acts in combination with B and initiates a DND 
maintenance deadline at tl. Note that it is assumed that the maintenance deadlines are' 
assumed to have been adjusted to occur between flights and that the DND deadline at tl 
is set at the end of the flight in which fault C occurs. 
LTD 
STD Ill, , 
, 
~ , , , 
, , 
, , , 
i I I i 
A B C tl t2 t 
Figure 6.7.1. The occurrence of A, Band C and the setting of 
maintenance deadlines. 
Now, when employing this repair strategy, repairs will be implemented at the deadlines 
tl, t2 and t3 in the following way. Upon reaching time tl the group of faults that caused 
the deadline is known to be BC. The last fault of the group is identified as fault C, 
which is repaired, and the system may be dispatched again until time t2. Faults A and B 
are still present within the system. At time t2 the group of faults causing the deadline is 
identified as AB and the last of these faults to occur, fault B, is repaired. This allows 
dispatch until time t3 with fault A still present within the system. At this point the group 
of faults causing the deadline consists of A alone. This is repaired and the system may 
now be dispatched indefinitely, until further faults occur. 
The situation described above for the three faults, A, Band C, was relatively simple to 
work through because of the MEL maintenance approach that was being employed for 
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an of the faults. A situation that could arise and complicate the process when using this 
repair strategy happens when the PIR maintenance approach is used. In this case more 
than one group of faults may bring about the initiation of a maintenance deadline. In 
this case the final fault of an the groups causing the deadline would be repaired in the 
TLD MCS code. In order to illustrate this consider a situation in which four faults, D, E, 
F and G, have the dispatch criteria shown in Table 6.7.2. 
Dispatch Criteria Dispatch Category 
DE LTD 
FG LTD 
Table 6.7.2. The dispatch criteria for 4 faults, D, E, F and G. 
Consider the case where these faults occur in the way depicted in Figure 6.7.2 and L TD 
category faults are maintained using the PIR maintenance approach. IfD, E, F and G an 
occur between consecutive inspections It and h then they will be discovered at 12 and 
assumed to have occurred at tm, giving a maintenance deadline at tl. As tl is reached, 
faults E and G will be cleared from the system, since this will involve repairing the last 
fault of each group associated with the deadline and will anow further dispatch of the 
system. Faults D and F will remain in the system, to be repaired at some other time that 
will be related to some other dispatch criteria that are applied to the system in addition 
to the criteria given in Table 6.7.2. 
LTD 
•• 
• 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
• I 
tl t 
I I I i I I I 
I1 D F tmGE h 
Figure 6.7.2. The occurrence ofD, E, F and G and the 
associated maintenance deadline. 
It is highly likely that this repair strategy would not be used in practice during the 
application of TLD to a real system. It is difficult to imagine a repair strategy that is 
worse than this one. However, it is included in the TLD MCS code in order to be able to 
analyse the system for a worst-case scenario. In the TLD MCS code, this will give the 
most pessimistic results for the system LOTC rate and instantaneous LOTC rates from 
the dispatchable system configurations. 
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6.7.2 Repair Strategy 2 - Repair All Faults in the Group Causing the Current 
Maintenance Deadline 
This repair strategy is, in reality, perhaps more likely to represent the minimum amount 
of work that would be employed at a maintenance deadline. As opposed to the previous 
strategy, in which the final fault of the group that initiated the maintenance deadline is 
repaired, the entire group of faults is cleared from the system. In order to illustrate this, 
consider the two examples given in the previous section, those of the three faults, A, B 
and C and the four faults, D, E, F and G. 
Consider first the case of the faults A, B and C, with dispatch criteria as shown in Table 
6.7.1 and that occur in the order shown in Figure 6.7.1. As the first deadline is reached, 
at tI, faults B and C are repaired, since this is the group of faults that caused the 
deadline. At this point, if this scenario occurred within the TLD MCS code, future 
maintenance deadlines would be checked to see if they should still be scheduled. Both 
deadlines must remain in the schedule at this point in order for all of the faults causing 
them to be repaired. At (2, the second deadline, the group of faults causing the deadline 
is AB. In this case fault B has already been repaired at the DND maintenance deadline, 
(I. Fault A is repaired now meaning the group of faults causing the deadline has been 
repaired and the system could then be dispatched until (3. At this maintenance deadline 
fault A would be repaired. However, at this point (i.e. at (2 after the maintenance has 
taken place) the future maintenance deadlines would be checked in the TLD MCS code 
and it would be seen that the fault causing the deadline, fault A, is no longer present and 
therefore the deadline would be removed from the schedule. See Section 6.8.8 for 
further information on removing future deadlines that are no longer necessary. 
In the second case that was discussed for repair strategy 1, with faults D, E, F and G, the 
dispatch criteria were given in Table 6.7.2 and the faults were assumed to have occurred 
as shown in Figure 6.7.2. If the maintenance strategy involves repairing all faults in the 
group that caused the initiation of the dispatch deadline all four faults will be repaired at 
(I, E being repaired along with D and F along with G. 
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6.7.3 Repair Strategy 3 - Repair All Faults in the Same Category as the Group Causing 
the Current Maintenance Deadline 
In this repair strategy, as repairs are carried out to the group of faults that caused the 
maintenance deadline to be initiated, other faults that are of the same TLD category are 
also cleared from the system. In this way, for example, as a maintenance operation 
initiated by a STD category fault was carried out, all STD faults would be cleared from 
the system. Any faults from other TLD categories would be left in the system until the 
appropriate maintenance deadlines were reached. 
In order to illustrate this maintenance strategy consider a case where faults A, Band C 
occur. The dispatch criteria involve A and B initiating a LTD interval and C initiating a 
STD interval. If both STD and L TD category faults are addressed using MEL 
maintenance then the situation depicted in Figure 6.7.3 could occur. As the first 
maintenance deadline was reached at t1 the fault that initiated it, A, would be repaired. 
At this point all other LID faults would be cleared from the system, in this case only 
fault B. Since fault C is a STD fault it would remain in the system at this time. As t2 is 
reached fault C would be cleared from the system: At t3 no further repairs need to be 
implemented, since B was repaired earlier. In the TLD MCS code the deadline at t3 
would have been removed from the schedule as soon as it became apparent that it 
would be redundant. This process is explained further in Section 6.8.8. 
LTD 
~, 
LTD ~, 
STD , , ~, 
, , , , , , , 
i I i i ~ 
A B C t1 t2 t3 t 
Figure 6.7.3. The occurrence of 3 faults, A, B, and C, and the 
associated maintenance deadlines. 
Repair strategy 3 differs from repair strategy 2, which, when employed in the TLD 
MCS code, involves all deadlines related to the fault that just occurred being added to 
the schedule. In repair strategy 3, if a STD maintenance deadline is already in the 
schedule and a fault occurs that initiates another STD maintenance deadline the second 
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deadline will not be added to the schedule, since it is known that one already exists 
within the schedule and all STD repairs will be conducted at the first schedule. 
When PIR maintenance is used to address a category of faults during this repair strategy 
the TLD MCS code repairs faults of that category that have yet to be 'discovered' at a 
periodic inspection, if any have occurred. This is in contrast to repair strategy 2, where 
only faults causing the deadline will be repaired. To illustrate this point, consider again 
-the example shown in Figure 6.7.2, the dispatch criteria for which are shown in Table 
6.7.2. When using repair strategy 2, if another LTD fault occurred in the time after 
inspection h and before t, it would be repaired after the next periodic inspection for 
LTD faults. However, when using repair strategy 3, if another LTD fault occurred in 
this manner it would be repaired at t" along with D, E, F and G. When the PIR 
maintenance approach is employed and repair strategy 2 and 3 are used, this is the only 
difference between the two strategies in the TLD MCS code. 
6.7.4 Repair Strategy 4 - Repair All Faults Present in the System 
This is the most self-explanatory of all of the repair strategies implemented in the TLD 
MCS code. It is perhaps the strategy that is most likely to be used during the application 
of TLD to a real system. As a maintenance deadline is reached all faults present in the 
system at that time are repaired. The system will be clear of faults and dispatched 
indefinitely until the next fault occurs. 
6.7.5 Opportunistic Maintenance 
There is a further maintenance option that may be specified in the input data to be 
carried out whilst simulating the application of TLD to a system - opportunistic 
maintenance. This is a reasonably simple concept wherein, upon the completion of 
scheduled repairs at a maintenance deadline, future scheduled maintenance times are 
checked and if these fall within a certain time of the current maintenance deadline then 
the maintenance scheduled to take place at the future maintenance deadlines will be 
completed also. Figure 6.7.4 shows a timeline on which are represented 3 scheduled 
maintenance deadlines, M" M2 and M3. Consider that maintenance is taking place at 
M,. If opportunistic maintenance is required then an opportunistic maintenance window 
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is specified. This is illustrated on the diagram .. If future scheduled maintenance 
deadlines fall within this window then the maintenance work required at them will be 
completed. Thus, in this example, because M2 lies within the opportunistic maintenance 
window after MI the repairs scheduled at M2 will also be implemented at M 1• However, 
because M3 lies outside the opportunistic maintenance window, the repairs that are to be 
carried out at M3 will remain to be completed at M3. As repairs at M2 are carried out at 
MI the scheduled maintenance at M2 is removed from the schedule. 
Opportunistic 
Maintenance Window 
'<E:---- ----.;., , , 
, , 
, , 
, , 
, , 
I ' t 
Figure 6.7.4. A demonstration of opportunistic maintenance at 
a maintenance deadline 
Note that in the case of repair strategy 4 above, wherein all faults are cleared from the 
system at maintenance deadlines, opportunistic maintenance will not be implemented. 
This is because all faults are cleared from the system at the current maintenance 
deadline meaning that no future maintenance deadlines need to be scheduled. 
If opportunistic maintenance is to be carried out in the TLD MCS code, a time (in 
hours) for the opportunistic maintenance window is specified. Certain limits for this 
value are applied within the TLD MCS code and the opportunistic maintenance window 
supplied is checked against these limits. The lower limit is the length of a single flight 
and the upper limit is arbitrarily chosen as the lowest value in the range of LTD interval 
values specified. 
6.7.6 Repairing Associated Faults in the Schedule 
One of the input data files supplied to the TLD MCS code is used to list faults that are 
'associated' with faults which are included in the dispatch criteria for the system. To 
illustrate how this would be used consider a system where faults A and B occur and 
each causes a STD interval to be initiated. As the appropriate maintenance deadlines for 
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A and B are reached, these faults must be cleared from the system. Now consider that, 
in this particular system, a fault C can also occur but that this fault does not appear 
explicitly in the dispatch criteria for the system so that when it occurs a dispatch 
interval is not initiated and maintenance specific to it is not scheduled. Consider also 
that, as fault A is cleared from the system, the maintenance crew also either check for 
the existence of fault C as a matter of routine, or that in repairing fault A, fault C is also 
repaired by the maintenance crew as part of the standard procedure of maintenance. In 
order for this situation to be modelled within the TLO MCS code, the user includes 
fault A in the text file that is used to hold the associated faults. Following A will then be 
listed all of the faults that will then be repaired along with it at maintenance, i.e. fault C. 
6.7.7 Maintenance When the System is Undispatchable 
The input data determines a fault order above which the system will become unfit for 
dispatch. Once the number ofTLO faults exceeds this number a ONO category fault is 
assumed to have occurred and when the associated maintenance deadline arises in the 
simulation code, at the end of the current flight, all faults are cleared from the system. 
The assumption is made here that if the system degrades to such an extent that the 
number ofTLO faults specified by the user is exceeded then the system will be returned 
to an 'as-new' state in a similar way to clearing all faults from the system in repair 
strategy 4. In the TLO MCS code this procedure is carried out by initialising the system 
in a similar manner to that used when initialising the system at the beginning of a 
simulation or after a system failure has occurred during a simulation. 
6.8 Adding Maintenance Deadlines to the Schedule in the TLD MCS Code 
During the course of a MCS there are many cases where a fault occurs in the system 
and that fault does not cause the system to fail. Every time this happens the TLO criteria 
relating to that fault should be checked after the fault has occurred to ascertain whether 
or not a maintenance deadline must be added to the schedule that is used to log the 
events that are still to occur. If a deadline must be added to the schedule the time of the 
deadline will depend on the maintenance approaches being used (MEL or PIR) for that 
category of deadline. The repair strategies that will be employed at maintenance 
deadlines will also affect how many deadlines relating to the particular fault that has 
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occurred should be added to the schedule. For this reason, the addition of maintenance 
deadlines to the schedule will be discussed for each of the maintenance strategies. 
Before this another important aspect of the TLD MCS code is discussed. Maintenance 
operations cannot occur during a period of time when the aircraft is flying - it must be 
on the ground. For this reason the flight time specified (see Section A2.2.2) must be 
taken into consideration when adding maintenance deadlines to the schedule. 
6.8.1 DND Maintenance Deadlines 
When DND maintenance deadlines need to be added to the schedule of events the flight 
time of the aircraft is taken into consideration. The deadline is added to the schedule 
with a time set to be at the end of the flight in which the initiating fault occurs. 
6.8.2 MEL Maintenance Deadlines 
In order to view how MEL maintenance deadlines are added to the schedule within the 
TLD MCS code consider a fault A that occurs within a system during a simulation. If 
the system dispatch criteria detail that fault A must be addressed using a MEL 
maintenance approach a scenario that arises could be similar to that depicted in Figure 
6.8.1. As the fault A occurs the appropriate dispatch interval is initiated and this 
dispatch interval ends at td, the time of the maintenance deadline. However, the deadline 
cannot be assumed to occur at this exact time. Also shown on the diagram are the times 
fjs and Ife. which respectively represent the times of the start and end of the flight in 
which td occurs. The time of the maintenance deadline, and hence the time that must be 
added to the schedule, must be shifted to one of these times. In the TLD MCS code the 
input data determines whether the maintenance deadline is to be shifted to the start, fjs, 
or the end of the flight, fre. Shifting the deadline to the end of the flight is pessimistic in 
view of calculating LOTC rates since the exposure to faults is increased slightly in 
relation to the dispatch interval. However, in [2] it is stated that the time of fault 
occurrence may be shifted to midnight on the day the fault occurred. This could be 
considered analogous to shifting td to tfe. 
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Figure 6.8.1. The occurrence of a fault A, addressed using 
MEL maintenance. 
6.8.3 PJR Maintenance Deadlines 
Consider now a fault B that occurs within a system during a simulation. In a similar 
manner to the situation that occurs in the general case of adding a maintenance deadline 
to the schedule when MEL maintenance is used, one must again consider the times at 
which flights begin and end before the deadline can be added. When PIR maintenance 
is used one could also consider the times of the periodic inspections for faults and 
whether these will fall between flights or mid-flight. This approach is not taken in the 
TLD MCS code. In order to visualise the approach used consider Figure 6.8.2. This 
shows a fault B that occurs and is to be addressed using a PIR maintenance approach. In 
order to be able to add a maintenance deadline at the correct time after fault B has 
occurred the first step is to find the time of the periodic inspection that is previous to it, 
I,. Since only maintenance deadlines are added to the schedule in the code and periodic 
inspections are not added, the times of the inspections are not adjusted to occur between 
flights. The assumption is made that the adjustment of the time of the dispatch interval 
to occur at the start or end of the flight in which it falls means that the adjustment of the 
time of the inspection is not required. 
I 
B 
disl2atch interval 
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Figure 6.8.2. The occurrence offault B, addressed using PIR 
maintenance. 
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Once the time of 11 has been calculated, the midpoint, Im, of the consecutive inspections, 
11 and /z, is calculated by adding half of the length of the inspection interval. The 
dispatch interval is then added from this midpoint giving the time of the maintenance 
deadline, Id. This maintenance deadline mayor may not occur between flights because 
there is no guarantee that the midpoint will occur between flights or that the dispatch 
interval is an integer number of flights. For this reason the maintenance deadline is 
shifted to either the start, Ifs, or the end of the flight, Ife, in which it occurs, if indeed it 
does occur mid-flight. Note that if the maintenance deadline is initially calculated to 
occur between flights (i.e. Id was equal to either Ifs or Ife), the shifting process used will 
leave Id at its calculated position, it will not be moved forwards or backwards one flight. 
This is also the case with the MEL maintenance approach. 
6.8.4 Repair Slralegy 1 
This repair strategy involves repairing, at a maintenance deadline, only the last fault of 
the group of faults that caused the deadline to occur. For this reason, after a fault occurs 
only the earliest-occurring maintenance deadline initiated by the fault will be added to 
the schedule. As this maintenance deadline arises the final fault in the group, i.e. the one 
that initiated the maintenance deadline can be cleared from the system. This is 
demonstrated below using a simple example. 
Consider a case where three faults A, Band C occur within a system during a 
simulation. The dispatch criteria for these faults are as given in Table 6.8.1. 
Dispatch Criteria Dispatch Category 
AC STD 
BC LTD 
Table 6.8.1. Dispatch criteria for 3 faults, A, Band C. 
Assume that the faults occur in the order A followed by B followed by C. If both STD 
and L TD faults are to be addressed using MEL maintenance the situation will appear 
something like that depicted in Figure 6.8.3. 
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Figure 6.8.3. The occurrence of 3 faults, A, Band C. 
In this case, as fault C occurs the two dispatch criteria that were given for the three 
faults are satisfied. This means that, due to the fact that repair strategy 1 is being 
applied, and that MEL maintenance is being used to address both STD andL TD faults, 
the STD maintenance deadline at time I1 must be added to the schedule. The LTD fault 
need not be added. As time I1 is reached in the TLD MCS code fault C will be cleared 
from the system, leaving A and B to be cleared as some other dispatch criteria, not 
noted here, will lead to maintenance deadlines at which they will be repaired. 
Next, consider again the case described above with the three. faults A, B and C 
occurring in exactly the same way. One may imagine that, whatever the maintenance 
approaches (MEL or PIR) being applied to STD and L TD faults, one would always add 
the STD deadline to the schedule since it is bound to arise before the L TD deadline. 
However, this is not always the case. This will be illustrated with a counterexample. 
Consider Figure 6.8.4, where the situation is depicted in which the faults A, Band C 
occur at exactly the same times as before. The difference from the previous example is 
the fact that LTD faults will now be addressed using PIR maintenance instead of MEL 
maintenance. Thus STD faults are addressed using MEL, L TD using' PIR. 
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Figure 6.8.4. The occurrence of 3 faults A, Band C. 
Again, as fault C occurs an STD or an L TD maintenance deadline could be added to the 
schedule of events to occur. In the situation depicted fault C occurs relatively close to 
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inspection h at which the fault combination BC would be discovered. Because of this 
and the inspection interval, when the midpoint Im is calculated and the L TD deadline 
applied (exactly the same length as in the previous example) it ends at 13 which is 
actually earlier than 11. Thus in this case the LTD deadline would be added to the 
schedule and not the STD deadline as before. Therefore when adding the maintenance 
deadlines for repair strategy I in the TLD MCS code the time at which the deadlines 
would occur is checked before any are added. Clearly, if a DND maintenance deadline 
is initiated by a fault group this will be added to the schedule regardless of the time of 
occurrence of the other categories. This is because it would be added at the end of the 
current flight and neither of the STD or LID deadlines could possibly occur before this. 
One final point must be made before moving on to the next repair strategy. The way 
that PIR faults are dealt with in the TLD MCS code is to list the faults that must be 
repaired at maintenance deadlines. This can be illustrated with an example. Consider 
two faults will occur within a system, fault D and fault E. Both of them initiate L TD 
maintenance deadlines and LTD faults will be addressed using PIR maintenance. The 
situation is depicted in Figure 6.8.5. 
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Figure 6.8.5. The occurrence of2 faults, D and E. 
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As fault D occurs its maintenance deadline is calculated to occur at I1 and is added to 
the schedule. Similarly, when E occurs its fault is calculated to occur at 11. In this case 
the maintenance deadline need not be added to the schedule since it is already there. 
What happens instead is that E is added to the list of faults that will be repaired at 11. 
This is relatively straightforward. However, there is a situation that can occur where E 
would not be repaired at the same time as D. Such a situation is depicted in Figure 
6.8.6. 
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Figure 6.8.6. The occurrence of2 faults, D and E. 
In this case fault E occurs after inspection h, the one at which D is discovered. It is 
possible that fault E might be repaired along with D at t" but it may be left in the 
system and treated as though discovered at the next inspection for L TD faults, to be 
repaired at the maintenance deadline that occurs after that inspection. When repair 
strategy I is applied in the code the second option is chosen, where fault E would be 
repaired at the later of the maintenance deadlines. For this reason fault E would be 
added to a second list, separate from the one that contains fault D. Note that if faults D 
and E as depicted above actually represented two groups of faults that caused the 
relevant maintenance deadlines to be added to the schedule, only the final fault of the 
group would be repaired at the deadlines. 
6.8.5 Repair Strategy 2 
In repair strategy 2 all faults in the group causing the current maintenance deadline are 
repaired. For this reason all maintenance deadlines related to a fault are added to the 
schedule of events to occur as the fault occurs. This differs from repair strategy I, 
where only the earliest of the deadlines would be added. Also recorded is the group or 
groups of faults that caused the maintenance deadline, rather than just the final fault in 
the group, as was the case in strategy I. This means that, as the maintenance deadline is 
encountered, the correct faults can be cleared from the system. 
To illustrate repair strategy 2 consider again the example given in Figure 6.8.3, where 
faults A, B and C cause a STD and a L TD maintenance deadline to be added to the 
schedule. Both categories of fault will be maintained using MEL maintenance. As fault 
C occurs both maintenance deadlines, tl and t2, are added to the schedule. Then, as tl is 
reached faults A and C are cleared from the system. At time t2 faults B and C would be 
cleared from the system. However, since C has already been repaired, only fault B 
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would be repaired at this point. Note that, in this situation, if both maintenance 
deadlines were not added to the schedule, only faults A and C would be repaired. This 
is the reason for adding all maintenance deadlines in repair strategy 2. 
In the case of PIR maintenance being applied for repair strategy 2, all maintenance 
deadlines will be added to the schedule as faults occur. The same consideration is taken 
of the periodic inspection at which faults will be discovered as was for repair strategy 1, 
which was illustrated by the examples shown in Figure 6.8.5 and Figure 6.8.6. Again, if 
a fault occurred between an inspection and that inspection's associated maintenance 
deadline it would not be repaired at that maintenance deadline, but instead at the next 
one for faults of that category. 
Note that this repair strategy is one of the strategies for which future scheduled 
maintenance deadlines must be checked after repairs have taken place at the current 
deadline. This process is described in Section 6.8.8. 
6.8.6 Repair Strategy 3 
This repair strategy involves repairing all faults in the same category as the fault/group 
of faults that caused the current maintenance deadline. It is very similar to repair 
strategy 2 but there are a few small differences. In this case as a fault occurs all of the 
deadlines of different maintenance approaches that are related to it are added to the 
schedule in much the same way as was the case for strategy 2. However, for strategy 3 
as further faults occur the groups of faults that meet dispatch criteria are added to the 
lists of faults to be repaired at maintenance deadlines that already exist in the schedule, 
if these deadlines are related to the correct category. In this way all faults in the same 
category that are present in the system at a maintenance deadline will be repaired at the 
first maintenance deadline that arises for faults of that category. In order to illustrate this 
consider Figure 6.8.7. 
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Figure 6.8.7. The occurrence of2 faults, F and G. 
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Two faults, F and G, occur in that order and the dispatch criteria for the system say that 
both faults will initiate STD intervals ending at tl and t2 respectively. When this 
situation arises in the code and repair strategy 3 is being employed the scenario will 
unfold as follows. Firstly fault F will occur. Assuming that the system was in a full-up 
state before this (i.e. no faults present) the STD interval is calculated and the STD 
maintenance deadline ending at tl is added to the schedule. When fault G occurs it is 
identified as a STD category fault and is added to the list of faults to be repaired at tl. 
The STD maintenance deadline is still added to the schedule at t2 despite the fact that it 
will not be required if STD faults are to be repaired at tl. This may seem illogical at first 
but if one considers that the first deadline may be removed if fault F was repaired at 
some other time before tl (perhaps if F acted in combination with another fault to 
produce a DND maintenance deadline) then the maintenance deadline at tl would be 
removed and G would be repaired at t2. If both faults were simply repaired at tl the 
maintenance deadline at t2 would be checked at tl to see if it is still a relevant 
maintenance deadline. Since fault G was no longer in the system the deadline at t2 
would be removed. 
The above situation represented MEL maintenance. For PIR maintenance a similar 
situation takes place. To see what happens here we can consider again Figure 6.8.5 and 
Figure 6.8.6. Both of these show a situation where two faults, D and E, occur and are 
addressed using the PIR maintenance approach. In the case of the first of these 
examples, Figure 6.8.5, as D occurs the maintenance deadline at tl is added to the 
schedule, and as E occurs it is added to the list of faults to be repaired at tl. This would 
remain the same for repair strategy 3. However, in the second example, Figure 6.8.6, as 
fault E occurs it is seen to appear after the periodic inspection that will discover fault D 
and is therefore added to a list of faults that will be repaired after the next periodic 
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inspection. In the case of repair strategy 3 fault E is added to the list of faults to be 
repaired at t1. In this way, both faults D and E will be repaired at t1. 
As for repair strategy 2, when repair strategy 3 is applied, future scheduled maintenance 
deadlines must be checked after repairs have taken place at the current maintenance 
deadline in order to verity that they are still relevant when one considers the faults that 
are present in the system after repairs. 
Repair strategy 3 is perhaps the most realistic of the three repair strategies so far. It is a 
strategy that could conceivably be attempted to be used on a real system. The first two 
strategies may be more likely to be applied occasionally, if spare parts are unavailable 
or maintenance is taking place at an inconvenient time or location. One might also 
expect that, because faults are likely to be rare in the systems being modelled, that 
results obtained when modelling repair strategy 3 might not differ greatly from those 
obtained using repair strategy 2. 
6.8.7 Repair Strategy 4 
Repair strategy 4 involves repairing all faults present in the system at maintenance 
deadlines. This is likely to be the repair strategy that is applied for the majority of the 
time in a real application of TLD. It is also the simplest method to apply in the TLD 
MCS code. As a fault occurs and certain dispatch criteria are met, the earliest occurring 
deadline is added to the schedule, as was the case with repair strategy I. Recall that, if 
PIR maintenance is used, the earliest occurring deadline may not necessarily be the 
STD deadline. If a DND dispatch criterion is met for that fault then it will always be the 
earliest occurring maintenance deadline. 
As further faults occur the same process takes place, where the earliest deadline is 
added to the schedule in the TLD MCS code. The faults are just added to a list of all 
faults present in the system so that they may be repaired at the first deadline to occur. 
As the first deadline is met all of the faults in the system are repaired. Then all other 
deadlines are removed from the schedule. 
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6.8.8 Handling Maintenance Deadlines 
Situations arise within the TLD MCS code where future maintenance deadlines must be 
removed from the schedule after maintenance has taken place at the current deadline. In 
order to illustrate this in a simple manner, consider Figure 6.8.8, which depicts the 
occurrence of two faults, A and B. Consider that the dispatch criteria stipulate that A is 
categorised as a LTD fault and that the dual fault AB is categorised as a STD fault. 
Thus maintenance deadlines ending at t2 and tl are scheduled to occur as shown. If one 
considers that repair strategy. 2 is being applied, in which all faults causing the 
maintenance deadline must be repaired, then, as time t2 is reached faults A and B must 
be cleared from the system before further dispatch is allowed. The maintenance 
deadline at tl will now be redundant when it occurs because fault A, which is due to be 
repaired as the deadline occurs, has already. been repaired at t2. Therefore the 
maintenance deadline at tl may be removed from the schedule after repairs have been 
implemented at tl. 
This process of removing maintenance deadlines would most likely occur in reality 
when applying TLD to a real system, since if there is no longer a need to carry out 
repairs at a maintenance operation at some point in the future then this maintenance 
operation is likely to be cancelled. 
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Figure 6.8.8. The occurrence of two faults, A and B. 
The process of checking future maintenance deadlines is only required to be 
implemented for repair strategies 2 and 3. Repair strategy I, where only the last of the 
group of faults causing the maintenance deadline to be scheduled is repaired, does not 
require future maintenance deadlines to be checked because when the deadlines are 
scheduled only one deadline is added to the schedule for every fault that occurs. When 
implementing repair strategy 4 all faults are cleared from the system at the maintenance 
deadlines. 
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Note also that even if it is not possible to remove a maintenance deadline from the 
schedule, it may be the case that certain repairs that were due to be carried out at the 
deadline no longer need to be performed. To illustrate this consider the example shown 
in Figure 6.8.9, where repair strategy 3 is being implemented at maintenance. Faults A 
and B, when occurring alone, are L TD faults. Therefore, when A occurs a L TD 
maintenance deadline is scheduled at 11. When B occurs it is also an L TD fault and will 
therefore be repaired along with A at /I, since all faults of the same category are to be 
repaired together. However, at this time a maintenance deadline is also added at /3. The 
dispatch criteria for the system also specify that the dual fault BC is a STD category 
fault combination. Therefore, as C occurs a STD maintenance deadline is scheduled at 
/2. As the maintenance deadline at /2 is encountered faults Band C, the combination 
causing the deadline to be scheduled, are cleared from the system and repairs are 
complete at this point. Now future maintenance deadlines must be checked to see if they 
need to be removed from the schedule. Two separate faults were due to be repaired at 
the deadline at /I, these being fault A and fault B, so these faults are checked to see if 
they still need to be addressed at /1. Clearly, since fault B has been repaired it no longer 
needs to be repaired so this fault is now removed from the list to be repaired at /1. 
However, since fault A is still present in the system the maintenance deadline cannot be 
removed because A must be repaired at 11. Next, the maintenance deadline at 13 is 
checked. This was caused by fault B, which has now been repaired and this means that 
the maintenance deadline at /3 can be removed from the schedule. This means that, after 
the repair of Band C at /2, the scheduled maintenance at /3 will no longer be needed and 
the maintenance deadline at /1 will only involve the repair of fault A. 
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Figure 6.8.9. The occurrence of 3 faults to be repaired using 
repair strategy 3. 
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6.9 TLD MCS Code Output 
MCS is a tool that has great potential if one wishes to model the effects of different 
maintenance approaches, maintenance strategies and fault combinations within a 
system. Another benefit of MCS when modelling TLD is the large amount of 
information that is potentially available both during the course of simulations and after 
they have completed. In implementing the TLD MCS code the main aim, as with any 
other form ofTLD analysis, is to find the LOTC rate of a system and demonstrate that it 
meets the levels of safety required from it. The system LOTC rate is therefore output 
from the MCS code. Also, because of the way that TLD is applied to a system, one 
must demonstrate that the dispatch categories and associated intervals that are applied 
are suitable for the dispatchable faults within the system. For this reason the 
instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system configurations may also be 
output by the TLD MCS code. The methods used to obtain both the ~ystem LOTC rate 
and the instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable configurations are outlined in 
the following sections. Also available are two separate types of importance measures, 
one of which gives a measure of the importance of basic events from the system fault 
tree and the other of which measures the importance of the dispatchable faults and fault 
combinations. 
Also described in the following sections are the ways in which the output from the TLD 
MCS code is formatted. This depends mainly on the options specified in the input data, 
for instance whether dispatch intervals or the operating life of the system are to be 
varied or whether the ordering of faults is considered important when calculating the 
instantaneous LOTC rates. Also possible is an option which results in a detailed list of 
events that occur within the modelled system during the course of a number of 
individual simulations. This will also be briefly described below. 
6.9.1 Results Obtained From the TLD MCS Code 
The results that are obtained from the TLD MCS code are LOTC rates, essentially 
failure rates, and importance measures, essentially probabilities. They will initially vary 
due to the random nature of Monte Carlo simulations, before settling down and 
converging to a specific value. The LOTC rates obtained are the system LOTC rate and 
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the instantaneous LOTC rates from dispatchable system configurations. How these and 
the importance measures are calculated is explained below. Also explained is how 
updated dispatch criteria are output from the code when the dispatch criteria are to be 
automatically set for the system. Note that when the code is used to automatically set 
dispatch criteria for a system the system LOTC rate, instantaneous LOTC rates from the 
dispatchable system configurations and the dispatch criteria used at each step of the 
iterative process are output. 
All results are output to the folder specified in the options data file. The TLD MCS code 
constructs filenames according to options specified input data file and adds a numerical 
identifier to the filename. A similar numerical identifier is added to the name of the file 
to which new dispatch criteria are output. These numerical identifiers allow the progress 
of simulations to be tracked, for instance when the dispatch criteria are automatically set 
by the code (see Chapter 9) and a number of sets of results are produced at each 
iteration. 
6.9.1.1 The System LOTe Rate 
This quantity is calculated by dividing the total number of failures in a period of 
simulation time by the length of that simulation time. Therefore, during the course of a 
group of simulations the code counts the number of system failures that occur and also 
the total operating life of the system throughout those simulations. 
In order to illustrate the process of calculating the system LOTC rate consider Table 
6.9. I. This shows the results of five consecutive simulations carried out on a system 
whose maximum operating life is 10000 hours. Thus, if the system does not fail during 
the course of one simulation the length of that simulation will be 10000 hours. Note 
how, after each simulation is complete, the total number of system failures up to that 
point is known, as is the total simulation time. One is added to the total number of 
system failures if the simulation just implemented failed. The total simulation time is 
obtained by adding the times taken for all of the simulations completed so far. The total 
system LOTC rate is calculated by dividing the total number of system failures by the 
total simulation time. 
liS 
. _---
Simulation System Length of Total Number Total Simulation Total LOTC 
Number Failed? Simulation of Failures Time rate 
1 No 10000.0 0 10000.0 0.0 
2 Once 10000.0 1 20000.0 5.00*10-5 
3 No 10000.0 1 30000.0 3.33*10-5 
4 No 10000.0 1 40000.0 2.50*10-5 
5 Once 10000.0 2 50000.0 4.00*10-5 
Table 6.9.1. Calculating the system LOTC rate . 
6.9.1.2 The Instantaneous LOTC Rates From Dispatchable System Configurations 
It is important to know the instantaneous LOTC rates from dispatchable system 
configurations when applying TLD to a system. These instantaneous LOTC rates must 
lie within certain ranges for dispatchable faults that are covered by certain TLD 
categories [2]. The calculation of these failure rates to LOTC from different system 
fault states is rather more complex than the calculation of the system LOTC rate but is 
essentially carried out in the same manner. 
In the case of the instantaneous LOTC rates from dispatchable system configurations 
the TLD MCS code keeps track of the total length of time for which the system is 
dispatched from each of the dispatchable configurations. The number of system failures 
that occur when dispatching from those system configurations must also be recorded in 
order to be able to calculate the instantaneous LOTC rates. 
The first step in calculating the total time spent dispatching from a certain dispatchable 
system configuration is to define what is actually meant by dispatching from a certain 
configuration. The definition used in the TLD MCS code is as follows. If a fault or fault 
combination is present within the system as the aircraft is dispatched then the aircraft is 
being dispatched from that dispatch configuration. To illustrate this point consider 
Figure 6.9.1, which shows a number of consecutive flights (flight I ends at.fi, flight 2 at 
fi, etc.) on a timeline and the occurrence within the system of three faults, A, Band C. 
The initial dispatch of the system, as indicated by FU, is fully-up and the system is 
returned to a fully-up state at 14, when a maintenance operation clears faults A, B and C 
from the system. 
119 
maintenance 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
t ~ I I I I I I I I 
fi A hB C fi 14 Is f6 t 
... ... 
FU FU 
Figure 6.9.1. An example to illustrate dispatchable system 
configurations. 
If one considers the configuration as the system is dispatched before each flight for this 
system the methods used in the TLD MCS code can be demonstrated. Initially the 
system is dispatched fully-up. At time fi the system is still in a fully-up state and so is 
dispatched for the next flight from the fully-up state. As fault A occurs the system 
switches from the fully-up state to the state where A has occurred. However, despite 
this, the system was stilI dispatched in the fully-up state at the start of the flight. For this 
reason the dispatch configuration remains as fully-up until the flight ends (or, of course, 
the system could fail due to further faults). Thus, as timeh is reached, the system has 
been dispatched for a time equal to two full flights in the fully-up state. 
At time h the system is dispatched from the configuration where fault A is present. 
Faults B and C occur in the next flight. The system does not fail in this flight and upon 
reachingfi the time spent dispatching from configuration A is updated to the length of 
one flight. At fi there are now three faults present in the system, A, Band C, which 
occurred in that order. As the system is dispatched at fi there are a number of fault 
combinations that are present. These are A, B, C, AB, AC, BC and ABC. The system is 
dispatched from these configurations at fi until the maintenance operations at time f4. 
Thus the times spent dispatching from these five configurations have been increased by 
the length of one flight at f4. The system is then returned to the fully-up state and the 
same process starts again. Thus, the system state at the start of a flight governs the 
dispatchable configuration for the rest of that flight. Similarly, when a system fails the 
dispatch configuration or dispatch configurations at the start of the flight are the ones 
for which the number of system failures will be increased. 
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The problem confronted when writing the TLD MCS code was how to find the times 
spent dispatching from the various dispatchable system configurations in an efficient 
manner. It is clearly not computationally efficient to check the system configuration at 
the start of every flight during a simulation. This would slow the code unnecessarily. 
Four points in the simulations were identified at which the times spent in the particular 
dispatchable configurations and the number of failures from those configurations could 
be updated: 
I. Before maintenance takes place at a deadline, 
2. After maintenance has taken place at a deadline, 
3. When the system maximum lifetime (as specified in the input data file) has been 
reached in an individual simulation, 
4. When the system fails during an individual simulation. 
Consider the example depicted in Figure 6.9.2. It shows a simple scenario for a short 
simulation of a system. The system begins in a fully-up state, a number of faults occur, 
maintenance is implemented, further faults occur and the simulation ends. If the 
instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system configurations are to be 
calculated then the second schedule used in the TLD MCS code (the one that stores the 
faults that have occurred) keeps track of the faults that have occurred and their ordering. 
Given the four points of the simulations at which times spent in each of the dispatchable 
system configurations is calculated, the first point at which these times will be updated 
is at time}4, when maintenance takes place. At this point there are three faults, A, Band 
C, present in the system. 
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Figure 6.9.2. A representation of a system simulation. 
121 
One needs to know whether the system was fully-up at any point in the time since the 
start of the period since the last maintenance event or start of the simulation. A flag is 
used within the TLD MCS code which identifies whether this was the case. In this case 
the system was fully-up at the start so the first task is to update the time spent in this 
state. If tFu represents the time spent in the fully-up system state then it will be updated 
at this time as follows: 
tFU =tFU +(/2 -tFU:START1 6.9.1 
where tFU:START is the time at which the fully-up dispatch configuration first started. The 
time ofJi is calculated in the TLD MCS code by shifting the time that fault A occurred 
to the end of the flight. Note that, in the general case, the first point shown on the 
timeline, when the fully-up dispatchable configuration begins, need not be the start of 
the simulation - it could be the last maintenance event when the system was returned to 
a fully-up state. 
After the fully-up time has been updated the time spent in the other dispatchable system 
configurations must also be updated. This is done using the schedule that records the 
order of occurrence of faults and the times at which they occurred. Starting with the first 
fault in this schedule, the faults are stepped through, building the appropriate system 
states and the times are updated accordingly. Thus, considering the ordered faults in the 
example under consideration, we get: 
tA =tA +([4 - 121 
tB =tB +([4 - fJ), 
tAB =tAB +([4 -h), 
tc =tc +([4 - 131 
tBC =tBC +([4 - h), 
tAC =tAC +([4 - h~ 
tABC =tABC +([4 - h} 
6.9.2 
Note that, for each of these dispatchable configuration times, the time 14 appears in all 
of the equations. This is because 14 represents the current simulation time. The other 
times that appear in the brackets, are Ji and./3, which represent the ends of the flights in 
which fault A and faults B and C occur, respectively. These times are calculated using 
the time of occurrence of the faults as stored in the schedule of faults that have 
occurred. If the ordering of the faults was deemed unimportant then, for example, we 
would have 
6.9.3 
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After the maintenance has taken place, fault C has been cleared from the system, 
leaving faults A and B present. Now the system configuration must be checked. If the 
configuration is now fully-up (which it is not) the flag indicating a fully-up 
configuration is set to the appropriate value and the time of the start of the fully-up 
dispatch period (tFU:START) is set to the current time (f4 in this case). This would give a 
situation similar to that at the start of the example shown in Figure 6.9.2. However, the 
system is not in the fully-up configuration, since faults A and B are present. This, 
together with the fact that the dispatch times relating to faults A and B have been 
updated up to 14, the current time, the times of the fault occurrences stored in the 
schedule are changed to the current time. This prevents the time before the current 
maintenance deadline being added again to the total time spent in the relevant 
dispatchable configurations. 
The next events in the example are the occurrences of faults C and D, then at some time 
after this the simulation ends. It is not specified here whether this is because of the 
system maximum lifetime being reached or the system failing. Both cases will now be 
discussed. Considering firstly the case of the system maximum lifetime being reached, 
the procedure carried out is identical to that which is carried out at maintenance. Thus: 
lA =IA + (lEND - 141 
IB = IB + (lEND - /4), 
lAB =IAB + (lEND - 14)' 
le =Ie + (lEND - Is1 
elc ... 
6.9.4 
All the times spent in the dispatchable system configurations are updated accordingly, 
using the current time, tEND, and the time of the end of the flight in which the last fault 
in the configuration occurred, Is or 16. 
In the case where the simulation ends as the system fails a similar procedure is again 
carried out. There are two small differences from the procedure used before 
maintenance and as the system maximum lifetime is reached. Firstly, any faults that 
occurred in the final flight during which the system failed (including the fault that 
caused the system failure) are not included in any of the dispatchable configurations 
whose times and number of failures must be updated. This is because the system has not 
been dispatched with these faults present within it at this time. Note that, in the case of 
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the procedure carned out before maintenance or as the system maximum lifetime is 
reached, if we try to calculate the time spent dispatching for a fault that occurs in the 
flight immediately prior to the maintenance or maximum lifetime then the dispatch time 
will not be updated. This is because the time of the end of the flight in which the fault 
occurs is equal to the current time (time of the maintenance or maximum lifetime) and 
thus the quantity in brackets given in equations 6.9.2 and 6.9.4 is equal to zero, meaning 
no time will be added. This characteristic cannot be utilised when the system fails, since 
if the system fails in mid-flight the time of the end of the flight in which a fault occurred 
could be after the system has failed, i.e. after the current time. This would make the 
quantity in brackets negative meaning that time would be subtracted from the total time 
spent in the dispatchable system configurations. This is the reason for testing for faults 
in the last flight to occur only in the case of system failure. The test is not carried out 
before maintenance or as the maximum system lifetime is reached since it will most 
likely be rare, meaning a test would perhaps unnecessarily slow the code. Also, the fact 
that the quantity in brackets above would be zero means that the test is unnecessary 
anyway. 
The second difference of the procedure carried out at system failure from the procedure 
carned out before maintenance or as the maximum system lifetime is reached is that, 
because the system has failed the number of failures from the dispatchable 
configurations must also be updated. This is performed in a similar manner to how the 
times are updated, considering the different order configurations, and updating the total 
system failures after dispatching from each of them accordingly. 
6.9.1.3 Importance Measures 
Two importance measures can be calculated during the process of system simulation. 
The first is a measure of basic event importance, essentially the Fussell-Vesely measure 
of importance, and the second is an importance measure that is similar to the Fussell-
Vese1y measure of minimal cut set importance, but which provides importance 
measures for the dispatchable system faults and fault combinations. Some of the data 
needed to calculate the importance measures is found when calculating the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC. 
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The basic event importance measure given by the TLD MCS code is the probability that 
the basic event has contributed to the cause of system failure given that the system has 
failed. It is obtained by dividing the total number of times that the basic event is present 
when the system fails by the total number of system failures. Similarly, the dispatchable 
fault importance measure provided by the TLD MCS code gives the probability of 
existence of a dispatchable fault given that the system has failed. Therefore, it is 
calculated by dividing the total number of times that the fault or fault combination is 
present at system failure by the total number of times that the system fails. When 
calculating the system LOTC rate and the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the 
various dispatchable system configurations for the system the total number of system 
failures and the number of times that the dispatchable faults and fault combinations are 
present when the system fails are already recorded. This means that the only data 
required in order to calculate the importance measures for the system are the number of 
times that each basic event is present when the system fails. This is carried out in the 
MCS code by checking the status of all basic events as the system fails and 
incrementing a counter specific to them if the basic event is in a failed state. As was the 
case for the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC, the importance measures are checked 
for convergence before being output. 
6.9.1.4 Updated Dispatch Criteria 
. When the TLD MCS code is used to automaticaIly set dispatch criteria for a system the 
dispatch criteria are set for, in turn, first order faults, second order faults, third order 
faults and so on in an iterative process, see Chapter 9. As this iterative process is 
implemented in the TLD MCS code a set of dispatch criteria is produced before each 
iteration, which is then tested against the LOTC rates from each of the dispatchable 
configurations. Each of these sets of dispatch criteria is output before the simulations 
are carried out, aIlowing the user to examine the intermediate steps involved when 
automaticaIly setting the dispatch criteria. 
Note that the updated dispatch criteria are output to file in different ways depending on 
whether the ordering of faults is important, as specified in the options input data file. 
Thus, if the ordering of faults is unimportant, and dispatch criteria are to be output for 
two dispatchable faults, A and B, dispatch criteria will be output for combinations, A, B 
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and AB. If fault ordering was important the combination BA would be output along 
with the three combinations just listed. 
6.9.2 Results' Output Format 
Due to the flexibility of Monte Carlo simulation techniques, it is possible to output data 
in a number of different ways. However, presented here are brief descriptions of the 
ways chosen to output results from the TLD MCS code. There are three main outputs 
available after system simulations. These are the system LOTC rate, the instantaneous 
LOTC rates from the dispatchable system configurations and the importance measures. 
These will be output to file together with infonnation about the user options that 
brought about the results (such as the convergence options and repair strategy options). 
If it is selected not to vary the operating life of the system the system LOTC rate is 
output to file in tabular fonn for varying values of the STD and L TD intervals. 
According to the options specified, separate files and tables of results will be produced 
for different maintenance approaches, repair strategies and inspection intervals. The 
tables of results are produced for values of the LTD interval that are greater than or 
equal to the STD interval. This means that the values of these intervals in the input data 
file must satisfy this inequality. 
If it is specified that the instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system 
configurations is also to be output the following happens. A file for the instantaneous 
LOTC rates is constructed every time one is constructed for the system LOTC rate. 
Then, for the same values of the dispatch intervals used for the system LOTC rates, the 
instantaneous LOTC rates are listed for each of the dispatchable system configurations. 
A similar process also takes place if importance measures are to be calculated. 
If the operating life of the system is varied the system LOTC rate is output to file 
alongside the operating life of the system that was applied to obtain that LOTC rate. 
One more output fonnat is possible. This shows a chronological list of events that occur 
within n simulations of the TLD MCS code (n specified) and allows the behaviour of 
the system in the simulations to be checked in an accountable, visual fashion. 
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Examples of all types of input and output files are provided in Appendix I, Appendix 3 
and Appendix 4. 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter has presented a general outline of the methodology behind the MCS code 
that was written to model the application of TLD to systems and explained the inputs 
required and outputs available. The main modules and functions within the code are 
described in Appendix 2. The method used to propagate faults and repairs was 
described and maintenance techniques were also explained. Four different repair 
strategies at maintenance were defined, along with how these repair strategies are 
implemented within the code. Opportunistic maintenance was also introduced and the 
option to include associated repairs at maintenance was discussed. The techniques used 
within the code to calculate the LOTC rate of the system, the instantaneous LOTC rates 
from the various dispatchable system configurations and importance measures were 
described. The varying output that may be obtained from the code was also outlined. 
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Chapter 7 : Analysis of Transient Markov Models for TLD 
7.1 Introduction 
The Markov analysis of systems and methods to construct Markov models of systems 
were described in Chapter 3. One of the assumptions made in constructing such a 
Markov model is that the system is stationary. This means that it behaves in the same 
way regardless of the current time. This is fine if the rates in the model are constant and 
failure and repair times follow exponential distributions. This can be the case for failure 
rates, but it may be preferable to model the repairs as taking place at periodic 
inspections. This behaviour can be incorporated in a Markov model and the resulting 
model can be solved using numerical integration techniques to give transient solutions. 
Only failure transitions are included in the Markov model and hence in the transition 
rate matrix that is developed for it. Repairs are carried out at discrete points within the 
integration procedure. As time is advanced during the numerical integration state 
probabilities are shifted at the appropriate times according to the repairs that must be 
implemented at these times. Once repairs have been implemented in this manner the 
numerical integration procedure continues until the time of the next maintenance 
operation is reached, when repairs will be carried out once more by shifting state 
probabilities. The following sections detail how this method can be used to address the 
application of TLD and, in particular, how such a numerical integration procedure to 
solving a Markov model was coded in the TLD MARKOV code using C++. 
7.2 TLD MARKOV 
A program, TLD MARKOV, was developed that constructs a Markov model and finds 
a transient solution to that Markov model. Figure 7.2.1 shows a diagram of the inputs 
required for and output obtained from the TLD MARKOV code. The construction of 
the Markov model is automated within the code since it was considered that 
constructing a Markov model (manually or otherwise) and correctly inputting all 
transitions within it would be a procedure open to the possibility of errors that could 
prove difficult to track. For this reason, the code developed takes as one of its inputs a 
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text file containing a fault tree of the system to be analysed, in a similar fashion to the 
TLD MCS code. The states of the Markov model are constructed by considering all of 
the basic events as components that are either working or failed and building all 
possible combinations of these working and failed components. Thus, if there are N 
basic events in the fault tree, there will be 2N states in the Markov model. The system 
fault tree is used to determine the system status for each of these Markov model states 
by setting the relevant basic events to true or false and propagating this logic up through 
the fault tree structure using a similar technique to that used in the TLD MCS code. In 
this way the failed system states (or LOTC states) can be identified within the Markov 
model for use when calculating the system LOTC rate. 
Inputs: 
FT structure 
component data 
TLD criteria 
Output: 
TLD 
}--fII MARKOV I---+C 
code 
System LOTC rate 
Figure 7.2.1. Inputs and output of the TLD MARKOV code. 
Along with the system fault tree text file another text file containing the basic event 
failure rates must be provided. Each of these failure rates will then be used when 
constructing the transition rate matrix for the Markov model. There are a number of 
times that must also be provided to the code. These are: the length of a flight (used to 
calculate when DND maintenance operations should take place), the STD and LTD 
intervals that will decide when their respective TLD maintenance operations must take 
place, and also the total time for which the system should be modelled. This is the time 
over which the numerical integration procedure will be performed and a time step size, 
d!, must also be provided that will be used in this numerical integration. 
Since the application of TLD is being modelled the dispatch criteria for this system 
must also be included in the model. These are also provided to the code in an input data 
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file where they are listed individually as groups of faults followed by a dispatch 
category. As these are input each of the non-failed system states is checked for the 
presence of the particular group of faults in the dispatch criterion. If that group of faults 
is present then the state is allocated the relevant dispatch category. If, when inputting 
the dispatch criteria, more than one dispatch category could be applied to a system state, 
the most restrictive dispatch category is applied. For example, if a system state could be 
allocated to either the DND or STD category then the DND category would be applied 
since it is the more restrictive of the two. Once all of the dispatch criteria have been 
input and the appropriate dispatch categories applied to each of the non-failed system 
states these dispatch categories can be used to decide what repairs will be carried out 
and when these repairs wiII take place. 
Each system state now has a dispatch category that has been assigned to it and the 
system states for each of the categories (DNO, STD and LTD) are added to lists. This 
enables the appropriate faults to be repaired in an efficient manner at the correct times 
during the implementation of the Markov model. Rather than working through the full 
list of system states at times when maintenance must be conducted, only the faults 
relevant to the maintenance wiII be considered as the maintenance takes place. 
Once the dispatch criteria are known for the various system states it remains to define, 
for each state, in which other state the system will reside after repairs have taken place. 
For instance, if all faults are to be cleared from the system at maintenance then all 
repairable system states will be returned to the full-up system state as maintenance 
operations take place. This repair strategy is automated within the Markov code but if 
other strategies are used they must be included in the code manually to cover any 
intricacies within the strategy. 
7.3 The Transition Rate Matrix 
Failure transitions lead from each of the system states to at least one other system state. 
This is true except in the case of the final fully failed system state from which there are 
no failure transitions since all of the system components are already failed in this 
system state. The transition rate matrix is constructed for the Markov model by 
comparing the system states and allocating the appropriate failure rates to the matrix. 
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Then the diagonal elements are added to the matrix by adding the other terms in the 
rows in which they are contained. Thus the elements of the transition rate matrix, A, are 
given by: 
0, if i * j and there is no transition from state i to state j, 
at" = A.", 
"' i,j 
if i * j and there is a failure transition from state i to state j, 7.3.\ 
n 
-La'k' ifi=j, 
k"'l 
where n is the number of states in the Markov model and ;'j is the failure rate from 
state i to state j. This transition rate matrix is stored in the Markov code as a two-
dimensional array. 
7.4 Calculating the LOTC Rate 
The LOTe rate is defined here as being the total (failure) transition rate into the states 
of the Markov model that represent LOTe from non-LOTe (i.e. non-failed) model 
states. Transitions from LOTe states to other LOTe states are not considered when 
calculating the system LOTe rate since the LOTe event has already occurred before 
this transition takes place. To illustrate this consider a number of states from a Markov 
model, shown in Figure 7.4.1. A single LOTe state from the model (state i) is shown, 
along with the y non-failed states which have a failure transition leading from them to 
the LOTe state i, labelled as (i, I) through (i, j) to (i, y). Each of these y states has a 
failure transition characterised by rate ;'j that leads to the LOTe state i. 
i,l 
Figure 7.4.1. Failure transitions into a general LOTe state. 
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Calculating the LOTC rate into state i involves adding the products of the probabilities 
of being in each of the states (i, 1) to (i, y) multiplied by the failure rates from those 
states to the LOTC state, i.e. 
LOTC, = A,.tQ,.t + ... + A,.jQ,.j + ... + A,.yQ,.y 
y 
= '" A, .Q .. L..J .} I,j 
7.4.1 
i",1 
If there are x LOTC states in the model then the system LOTC rate will be given by 
adding the LOTC rates. Thus, if LOTC state i has y/ associated system states that have a 
failure transition leading from them to LOTC state i then the system LOTe rate is given 
by: 
x y, 
LOTCsyS = LLA,.jQ,.J 7.4.2 
j=1 /=1 
Equation 7.4.2 is constructed within the Markov code using the transition rate matrix to 
find which model states involve a failure transition to LOTe states (i.e. failed system 
states). Knowing these states allows the failure rates, A/J, to be stored in an array type 
structure together with the associated state reference which in turn allows the state 
probabilities, Q'j, to. be multiplied by the correct failure rates when calculating the 
system LOTC rate. 
7.4.1 The Average System LOTC Rate 
The average system LOTC rate can be calculated by taking an average of LOTCsys over 
the length of the numerical integration procedure, which will cover the system 
. operational lifetime. In the Markov code this is conducted at two separate times, these 
being at the start of flights and at the end of flights. These give slightly different values 
and to illustrate this consider two consecutive flights. As the first flight ends the system 
LOTe rate can be calculated. Then, before the next flight begins the LOTe rate can 
again be calculated. However, these values will not be the same since, in the intervening 
period repairs will have been implemented (i.e. probabilities will have been shifted). 
7.5 Numerical Integration 
The transition rate matrix, A, forms a system of ordinary differential equations: 
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-----_. 
Q(t)=Q(t)A, 7.5.1 
where 
Q(t) = [Q,(t ),Q2 (t ), ... ,Qn (t )]. 7.5.2 
Qj(t) is the probability of the system being in state j at time t and there are n system 
states in the model. Therefore, in order to find a solution to the Markov model, the 
system of ordinary differential equations given in equation 7.5.1, together with the 
initial conditions, must be solved. A common method of solution is to use a numerical 
integration technique. The code employs a 4th order Runge Kutta algorithm based on 
pseudo code given in [19]. Initial conditions are used to start the numerical integration 
procedure. These are: 
{
I, Q,= 
0, 
when j is the full- up state, 
for all states other than the full- up state, 
7.5.3 
i.e. the system initially resides in the full-up state. 
The Runge Kutta algorithm gives the values of the system state probabilities, Qj, after a 
time step of specified length dt. These state probabilities can be used at the appropriate 
times in the code to calculate the system LOTe rate by substituting the relevant Q/s 
into equation 7.4.2. The 4th order Runge Kutta algorithm gives: 
7.5.4 
where 
n 
k" = L:aj,Qj(t), 
i=l 
k2i = i:aAQj(t)+-tk"dtl 
i=1 
7.5.5 
k), = i:aJ,[Qj(t)+-tk"dtl 
j=1 
k4/ = i:aj,[Q/t)+k),dt} 
j=1 
However, in the code written to perform these operations, it would be inefficient to 
evaluate each of the summations in equations 7.5.5 since the majority of the a/s are 
zero. Thus, the non-zero terms of these a/s, which correspond to the columns of the 
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transition rate matrix A, are stored in array-type structures along with the value of j -
the row in the matrix from which the transition rate is taken. 
Therefore, if column i has nj non-zero terms, and the position (j, above) of the mth of 
these within the column of the transition rate matrix A is represented by say bm, then the 
equations 7.5.5 can be written as: 
" 
kli = L:ab.iQb. (t), 
m:i 
k21 = i:ab., [Qb. (t) + t klidtl 
m=1 7.5.6 
m=! 
m=! 
Calculating these values during the integration procedure within the Markov code will 
now be far more efficient. This is especially true as the number of states in the Markov 
model increases. 
7.6 TLD maintenance operations 
Repairs are carried out within the model at times in the integration that correspond to 
the times at which TLD maintenance should take place. DND repairs take place after 
the system of ordinary differential equations have been integrated for the length of a 
flight. STD and L TD repairs then take place at the appropriate intervals after an integer 
number of flights. The repairs in this type of Markov model represent the real process 
of repair that would take place in practice wherein faults are repaired between flights 
and not at a constant rate from the moment that the failure occurs. The process of repair 
involves identifying, for each repairable state, which of the other model states 
represents the system after the appropriate repairs have been carried out. In order to 
conduct the repairs the probability of the state to be repaired is set to zero after it has 
been added to the probability of the state in which the system will reside after repairs 
have been implemented. In effect the state probabilities are shifted from the states to be 
repaired to the states resulting from the repairs. In the Markov code the repairs are 
carried out in the order DND followed by STD followed by LTD. Repairs are carried 
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out in this order so that state probabilities are redistributed from the higher order fault 
states down through the lower order fault states, i.e. from states with higher numbers of 
faults to states with lower numbers of faults. This is true because it is generally the case 
that, given a certain fault combination, if more faults occur within the system the TLD 
category applied will become more restrictive. For example, one could imagine a L TD 
category being caused by the occurrence of a single fault. A further fault may cause the 
LTD category to be reduced to STD. This STD category could then be reduced to DND 
if a third fault occurred. In this process it could be the case that a repair strategy is 
implemented wherein the repair of 3 fault state would take the system from that DND 
state back to the 2 fault STD state and the repair of this state would take the system 
back to the LTD state. Repair from this LTD state would then lead to the 0 fault (full-up 
state). 
If one reached a stage in the Markov code where, for instance, all fault categories were 
to be repaired, then state probabilities would be redistributed for this group of fault 
states in the following manner. Firstly, the DND repairs would be implemented and the 
probability of being in the state with 2 faults present would be increased by the value of 
the probability of being in the state with 3 faults present. The probability of being in the 
state with the 3 faults present would then be set to zero, signifYing that repairs had been 
completed. This process is represented below: 
QO.DND = QO,or;g , 
QI,DND = Qt,orig , 
Q2.DND = Q2.orig + Q3,.orig' 
Q3.DND =0. 
7.6.1 
Qi,orig represents the original probability of being in the state with i faults present and 
Qi,DND represents the probability of being in state i after the DND repairs have been 
carried out. Next, the STD repairs would be carried out, by increasing the value of the 
single fault state probability by the value of the 2 fault state probability then clearing the 
2 fault state probability. This is demonstrated below: 
QO.STD = QO.DND' 
Q"STD = Q',DND + Q2,DND' 
Q"STD = 0, 
Q3,STD = Q3,DND' 
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7.6.2 
Finally, the L TD repairs would be implemented by shifting the probability of the single 
fault state to the state where no faults are present in the system. The computations 
involved are outlined below: 
QO.LTD = Qo.STD + Q'.STD' 
Q,.LTD =0, 
Q2.LTD = Q2.STD' 
Q3.LTD = Q3.STD· 
7.6.3 
Now, we may represent the probabilities of being in each of the states after the LTD 
repairs have been conducted by substituting equations 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 into equations 
7.6.3. This gives: 
QO.new = QO,or~g + QI,Orig + Q2,orig + Q3,Orig' 
Q,.new = 0, 
Q2.new = 0, 
Q3.new = 0, 
7.6.4 
where Qi,new represents the probability of being in the state with i faults present after the 
DND, STD and LTD maintenance operations have been implemented. Thus, as is 
desired, after all three of the TLD maintenance operations have been implemented the 
probability of being in the system states with 1, 2 and 3 faults present is zero. The 
probability of being in the state where no faults are present has been increased by the 
sum of the original probabilities of being in the other states. 
If, instead of carrying out maintenance in the order described above (i.e. DND, then 
STD, then LTD), one was to implement it in the order LTD, then STD, then DND the 
first step in the repair process would be conducted as follows: 
QO.LTD = QO,Orig + QI,Orlg , 
Q',LTD =0, 
Q2.LTD = Q2,or;g' 
Q3,LTD = Q3,,,,g , 
7.6.5 
Here, it can be seen that the probability of being in the state with one fault present has 
been shifted to the state with no faults present. Next STD faults would be carried out as 
shown below: 
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QO.STD = QO.LTD' 
Q'.STD = Q,.LTD + Q'.LTD' 
Q,.STD = 0, 
Q3.STD = Q3.LTD· 
7.6.6 
The probability of being in the state with 2 faults present has been shifted to the state 
with I fault present. Finally, DND maintenance will be carried out: 
QO.DND = QO.STD' 
Q,.DND = Q,.STD' 
Q,.DND = Q,.STD + Q3.STD' 
Q3.DND =0. 
7.6.7 
Substituting equations 7.6.5 and 7.6.6 into equation 7.6.7 gives the probabilities of 
being in each of the fault states after repairs have been implemented. These are shown 
below: 
QO.new = QO,orig + QI,Or;g' 
QI,new = Q2.orlg , 
Q2,new = Q),orig' 
Q3,n", = O. 
7.6.8 
Now the probabilities of being in the system fault states after the maintenance has been 
carried out in the two different orders can be. compared. Equations 7.6.4 show the 
probabilities after maintenance has been carried out in the order DND followed by STD 
followed by LTD. Equations 7.6.8 show the probabilities after maintenance has been 
carried out in the reverse order. It can be seen from equations 7.6.8 that the maintenance 
has not been carried out as would be desired, since, if we assume that the original 
probabilities of lying in each of the states, Qi.orig, was non-zero then the probability of 
being in the states with I and 2 faults present is non-zero. This would correspond to the 
situation where the repairs of the STD and LTD had not been completed. 
Conversely, equations 7.6.4 show that carrying out repairs in the order DND, STD, 
LTD results in the state probabilities being as is needed after all ofthe repairs have been 
implemented. This demonstrates why the maintenance operations are carried out in this 
specified order in the Markov code when more than one of the TLD categories of fault 
must be cleared at the same time. It should also be noted that other repair strategies at 
maintenance could be covered within the Markov code. For instance, if all faults were 
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to be cleared from the system at maintenance then, irrespective of the ordering of the 
TLD maintenance operations, state probabilities as shown in equations 7.6.4 would 
result. However, as shown above, the ordering of maintenance operations prescribed 
yields desirable results whatever the repair strategy at maintenance. 
7.7 Maintenance after LOTC events 
When a LOTC event occurs due to the failure of a FADEC system the most likely 
course of action taken wiII be to replace or fully repair the FADEC before further 
dispatch of the aircraft. In this way one can think of all probability from the LOTC 
states in the Markov model being shifted to the full-up state at the end of every flight. 
Thus, in the Markov code, at the end of every flight the probability of being in the 
LOrC states is added to the probability of being in the full-up state and the probability 
of being in the LOTC states is set to zero. If there are x LOTC states in the Markov 
model the process carried out is as follows: 
Q jull-up,new = Q fo/l-up,orlg + t Qj, 
;=1 
Q, =0, 
7.8 Maintenance Approaches 
;is a 
LOTCstate 
i=l, ... ,x. 
7.7.1 
Before using the Markov code whose methods have just been described it is necessary 
to think about the way that the model used impacts on the TLD analysis performed. 
Consider the way that maintenance will be implemented in the Markov code. At certain 
times within the code all probabilities from relevant dispatchable system states will be 
shifted to the full-up state. For example, in the case of DND faults all probabilities of 
DND category fault states will be shifted to the full-up state at the appropriate discrete 
time points during the numerical integration. These time points will be the multiples of 
the length of a flight. In this way, throughout the numerical integration, DND faults will 
effectively be repaired after each flight, giving a reasonable representation of DND 
maintenance. 
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Considering STD category faults in carrying out maintenance within the model one 
must specity the time points when probabilities are shifted and maintenance takes place. 
This notion leads to the requirement that, when finding transient solutions to Markov 
models, the repair intervals specified for use within the models must in fact relate to the 
inspection intervals applied for PIR maintenance. Thus a maximum of twice the 
dispatch interval applied to faults can be applied as the period of time between repairs 
in the transient Markov model. This is true for both STD and LTD category faults. Note 
- that the transient Markov model is limited in that it can only be thought of as 
representing PIR maintenance with differing dispatch intervals and the inspection 
interval set to twice the dispatch interval. 
7.9 Summary 
A method of calculating a transient solution to the application of TLD to a system has 
been described. The method takes a fault tree description of a system and uses it to 
construct a complete (i.e. non-reduced) Markov model to which failure transitions are 
added according to basic event failure rates. Maintenance within the Markov model is 
conducted by considering the dispatch criteria that must be applied to each of the 
system states (these are also supplied to the code) and shifting state probabilities at the 
appropriate times within the numerical integration procedure carried out within the 
code. Consideration is taken of the order in which the shifting of the probabilities must 
be implemented during the modelling of this repair. The similarity of this modelling 
approach to the PIR maintenance approach with the inspection interval set at twice the 
dispatch interval is noted. 
It is also noted that the way that maintenance is included within the model will not 
represent exactly the maintenance approach that would be applied in reality when TLD 
is applied. A point not noted previously, but worthy of note, is the fact that the repair 
strategy at maintenance described throughout this chapter is the one wherein all faults 
will be cleared from the system at maintenance. It might be possible to include other 
maintenance approaches in transient Markov models but the implementation of this will 
be far from straightforward. 
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Chapter 8 : Modelling TLD for Simple Systems 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters a number of modelling techniques have been described for 
analysing the application of TLD to systems. In this chapter the F AA recommended 
methods described in Chapter 5, the transient Markov solution described in Chapter 7 
and the Monte Carlo simulation technique described in Chapter 6 are used to study a 
simple system. This system was given as an example in [I] and results on this were 
published in [20]. Other systems that were extensions of this were considered in work 
published in [21] and [22]. 
8.2 Two Component System Example 
Consider the system depicted in Figure 8.2.1, which consists of two components, 
labelled as unit I and unit 2, configured in parallel. 
Unit 1 
- r--
Unit 2 
Figure 8.2.1. Two component system. 
This example is given in [I] in order to demonstrate the application of the TWA and 
single fault state Markov approaches to modelling TLD. Each unit has associated with it 
a failure rate, 2.0x 10.4 failures per hour for unit I and l.Ox I 04 failures per hour for unit 
2. The flight time for the system is assumed to be 5 hours and the operational lifetime of 
the system is assumed to be 130000 hours. This would correspond to a total lifetime of 
about 20 years if the system was used for an average of 15-20 hours per day throughout 
its life cycle. The STD interval is to be set at 100 hours and the LOTC rate is to be 
calculated over a range of values for the L TD interval, rising from 100 hours to 500 
hours. 
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Due to the simplicity of the system there are only two dispatch criteria that will be 
applied to it. Ignoring, for the sake of this simple example, the allowable failure rates to 
LOTe from the dispatchable system states for STD and L TD category faults, the 
dispatch criteria are defined as follows. When unit I fails a LTD interval is initiated and 
when unit 2 fails a STD interval is initiated. The presence of one failed unit in the 
system means that the failure of the remaining unit will cause system failure. Thus the 
failure rate to LOTe from each of the failed dispatchable configurations (Le. with one 
unit failed) is simply the failure rate of the remaining working unit. Recalling the 
general system model described in Section 5.2, the full-up system state with no faults 
will be represented as state i = I, the STD dispatchable system state (i.e. that with unit 2 
failed) will be state i = 2 and the LTD dispatchable system state (with unit 1 failed) will 
be state i = 3. Thus, for the STD and LTD dispatchable system states, the associated 
failure rates into the states (A;) and failure rates from the states to LOTe (A;.L) take the 
values as shown in Table 8.2.1. 
State, i 
2 
3 
1.0x10-4 
2.0x10-4 
..1.;.L 
2.0x10-4 
1.0x10-4 
T; 
Table 8.2.1. Failure rates into the failed dispatchable system 
states and from them to LOTe and dispatch intervals. 
With this information one may now apply the TW A and reduced-state Markov 
modelling techniques. The following sections outline these processes. Since the two 
component system considered here is so simple the failure rate due to 
mechanicallhydromechanical faults, AHMc (see Section 5.3.1), and the failure rate due 
to unrevealed faults, AUR (see Section 5.3.2), are not used in the applications of the 
TW A and reduced state Markov models. Thus set 
8.2.1 
8.2.1 TWA Model 
Before commencing with the process of modelling the system using TW A it should be 
noted that two different models exist according to the fractional coefficients that are 
used within the model. Section 5.4 describes why the balanced fractional coefficients 
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could be considered as the best of the representations of the fractional coefficients and 
these balanced fractional coefficients are the ones that are used in this TWA analysis. 
The values of A; displayed in Table 8.2.1 may be substituted into equations 5.3.4 to 
give: 
ASTD = 1.0 x 10-4 , 
ALTD = 2.0 X 10-4. 
8.2.2 
Similarly, substituting the values of Aj and Aj.L from into equations 5.3.6 gives the 
following values for the average failure rates to LOTC: 
ASTD L = 2.0 X 10-4, 
ALTDL =1.0xI0-4. 
8.2.3 
It now remains to estimate the failure rate for full-up electronics, AFU,L, using equation 
5.3.18, which gives: 
8.2.4 
Given the above values one may obtain the following expression for the TW A LOTC 
rate using the balanced fractional coefficients, obtained using equation 5.4.6: 
A _ 1.125 X 10-7 + 2.0 X 10-8 X TSTD + 2.0 X 10-8 X TLTD 
TWA.ba/ - I 10 10-4r 20 10-4T ' 
+.x STD+' x LTD 
8.2.5 
This expression for the TW A LOTC rate of the system can be used to compute LOTC 
rates by setting the STD interval, TSTD, and then varying the value of the LTD interval, 
TLTD. The calculated LOTC rate obtained for varying hTD when TSTD is set at 100 hours 
is shown in the second column of Table 8.2.2. 
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TWA- Single First order Simplified 
balanced fault approx. to SFS TLTD fractional state SFS approx.Jor 
coe.fft (SFS) Markov short TLD Markov intervals 
100 3.99 3.83 3.83 3.88 
150 4.94 4.73 4.73 4.83 
200 5.88 5.61 5.60 5.77 
250 6.81 6.46 6.45 6.70 
300 7.73 7.29 7.27 7.62 
350 8.64 8.10 8.07 8.53 
400 9.54 8.88 8.84 9.43 
450 10.43 9.65 9.59 10.33 
500 11. 32 10.39 10.31 11. 21 
Table 8.2.2. LOTC rates (no. of failures per 106 flt. hrs.) 
obtained for the two unit system for varying TLTD (hrs.) with 
TSTD = 100 hrs. Results shown are for F AA recommended 
methods. 
8.2.2 Single Fault State Markov Model 
The single fault state Markov model for the two component system makes use of the 
same values for A; and Ai,L that were used in the TW A approaches just demonstrated, 
given in equations 8.2.2 and 8.2.3. Using equation 5.5.15 and recalling that 
AHMC = AUR = 0 the single fault state Markov LOTC rate is thus given by: 
A
SFS
=( ). I A2 AJ 
+ v2 +A2•L + vJ +~.L 
8.2.6 
Substituting into this the values of A; and Ai.L and the repair interval from equation 5.5.1 
gives: 
( 2.0xI0-s xTSTD 2.0xI0-s XTLTD ) 
"==[ 1+2.0"1O-;"T= +1+1.0"10~"T,,, r 
1 1.0 x 10- X TSTD 2.0 x 10- X TLTD + 4 + 4 I +2.0x 10- XTSTD 1 + 1.0 x 10- X TLTD 
8.2.7 
which may be rearranged to give: 
A = 2.0xlO-S(TsTD + TLTD )+ 6.0x 10-12 TSTDTLTD 
SFS 1+3.0xlO-4 (TSTD +TLTD)+7.0xI0-STSTDTLTD' 
8.2.8 
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Similarly to when the TWA LOTe rate was calculated, TSTD is now fixed at 100 hours 
and the LOTe is calculated for varying values of TLTD• The results are shown in the 
third column of Table 8.2.2. 
8.2.2.1 r' Order Approximation to the Single Fault State Markov LOTe Rate 
The first order approximation to the single fault state Markov model LOTe rate of the 
two component system may also be computed (see Section 5.5.3). Substituting the 
appropriate transition rates into equation 5.5.24 gives the following expression: 
A _ 2.0xI0-S(Tsro +TLro )-2.0xlO-t2 (2Tiro +TL2ro) 
SFS,t - 1.0 + 10-4 (Tsro +2TLTD)-2.0xlO-S(Ts2ro +TiTDJ' 8.2.9 
The results of the model are given in the fourth column of Table 8.2.2. 
8.2.2.2 Simplified Approximation/or Short Dispatch Intervals 
The simplified approximation for short dispatch intervals described in section 5.5.4 and 
given in equation 5.5.27 is shown below for the two component system. After the 
substitution of the transition rates into and out of the system states and the dispatch 
intervals for each of the states in the model the following expression is obtained: 
A _ 2.0 x I O-s (Tsro + TLTD ) 
SFS"'o,, - 1+ 1.0 X 10-4 (TSTD + 2TLTD )' 
8.2.10 
This is equivalent to the first order approximation to the single fault state Markov 
LOTe rate, ASFS.!. without the squared terms in Ti. The results are given in the fifth 
column Table 8.2.2. 
8.2.3 Transient Markov Model Solutions 
The conventional Markov model of the two component system takes the form shown in 
Figure 8.2.2. Note that the transition rates, A; and Vi, shown on the model represent the 
failure and repair of unit i in this model, and not the failure and repair rates into and out 
of state i, as was the case with the single fault state Markov model discussed previously. 
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In the case where transient solutions to the model are found and the maintenance is 
incorporated in the model at discrete time points during the numerical integration the 
Markov model will not contain any repair transitions. The state probabilities will 
instead be shifted at the appropriate times during the numerical integration from state 2 
to state I and from state 3 to state I. In this case the repair interval will be set at 200 
hours for the STD fault and similarly the repair interval for the L TD fault will be set at 
twice the desired dispatch intervals for the LTD fault. The model is as shown in Figure 
8.2.2, with the repair rate for the STD and L TD faults included as the reciprocals of 
TSTD and TLTD respectively. 
In both cases the state 4 probability will be shifted to state I at the end of each flight by 
the numerical integration procedure. In order to compute the solutions to the problem 
the fault tree for the two component system is passed to the Markov code described in 
Chapter 7, along with files containing the failure rates of the individual units of the 
system and the dispatch criteria that will be applied to the system. A step length of 0.1 
is used in the Runge-Kutta integration routine. 
Figure 8.2.2. Conventional Markov Model of the Two 
Component System. 
8.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The TLD MCS code was also used to simulate this two component system. Due to the 
flexible nature of the code it was possible to simulate the use of different maintenance 
approaches (MEL or PIR) applied to each category of fault (i.e. each unit). It is also 
possible to model the four different repair strategies at maintenance deadlines described 
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in Section 6.7. However, in the case of this simple example system the differences 
between the repair strategies do not make any difference. To illustrate this, consider 
repair strategy I, where only the fault causing the maintenance deadline is repaired and 
strategy 4, where all faults are cleared from the system at maintenance. In fact, these 
represent the same strategy for this system, since there can only ever be a maximum of 
one fault present in the system at dispatch. In fact, all of the repair strategies are 
equivalent for this system. The fault tree structure was passed to the code, along with 
the failure rates of the units and the dispatch category that should be applied to each of 
them. The results are shown in Table 8.2.3. In order to obtain the results an accuracy of 
3 s.f. was specified for the results and I 000 000 simulations were carried out before 
checking for convergence of the results. The results were subsequently checked every 
50 000 simulations. Three consecutive values for the LOTC rate were required to match 
to 3 s.f. before convergence was assumed. 
Transient Markov Model MCS 
TLTD 
repairs discrete discrete STD·MEL 
as rates repair - start repair - end LID·MEL 
100 3.82 3.79 3.98 3.96 
150 4.73 4.70 4.89 4.85 
200 5.60 5.62 5.80 5.75 
250 6.45 6.49 6.68 6.62 
300 7.28 7.37 7.56 7.47 
350 8.08 8.21 8.40 8.30 
400 8.86 9.06 9.24 9.10 
450 9.62 9.87 10.05 9.88 
500 10.40 10.70 10.87 10.70 
Table 8.2.3. LOTC rates (no. of failures per 106 flt. hrs.) 
obtained for the two unit system for varying TLTD (hrs.) with 
TSTD = 100 hrs. Results shown are for the transient Markov 
model and the MCS. 
8.2.5 Comparison a/the Modelling Approaches 
The LOTC rate of the two component system has been evaluated using several different 
modelling approaches. An expression was obtained for the LOTC rate using the TWA 
method using the balanced time coefficients. Of the reduced-state Markov models, the 
only one suitable for this two component system is the single fault state model. An 
expression has been derived for the LOTC rate of the system using this model, along 
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with further expressions obtained by truncating series expansions for the original single 
fault state Markov model LOTC rate. The final analytical model used was a 
conventional Markov model, for which an expression for the asymptotic failure rate 
was calculated. All of these expressions for the LOTC rate contain terms for the STD 
and LTD intervals, TSTD aild TrTD. For this simple system the LOTC rate was calculated 
for a value of 100 hours for TSTD and for values of TLTD ranging from 100 to 500 hours 
in increments of 50 hours. These values of dispatch intervals were also used in the TLD 
----MCS code and, as was mentioned previously, the LOTC rate was obtained for the 
different possible maintenance approaches. 
Table 8.2.2 and Table 8.2.3 show the results obtained using the methods outlined above 
for the 2 unit example system. Table 8.2.2 shows the results. obtained using the TW A 
technique (column 2) and the single fault state Markov model (column 3). The two 
recommended approximations for the single fault state Markov model (columns 4 and 
5) were also used. Table 8.2.3 shows the LOTC rate calculated for the system using the 
transient Markov model (columns 2, 3 and 4) and also the MCS (column 5). Results 
were obtained using the transient Markov model in 3 ways, all of which have been 
described previously. The first way was to include repairs in the Markov model as 
transitions with associated rates that appear in the transition rate matrix for the model 
and carrying out a numerical integration. The LOTC rate is calculated as time 
progresses within the integration and averaged over the period of the integration. This 
average converges and gives the results shown. The second and third ways both involve . 
including repairs in the model at certain discrete time points within the integration 
procedure by shifting the appropriate state probabilities. The average LOTC rate is 
again obtained by averaging the LOTC rate over the course of the numerical integration 
and the results are shown after this average has converged. The difference between the 
two sets of results lies in when the LOTC rates are calculated - either at the start of a 
flight or at the end. The LOTC rate is higher when calculated at the end of a flight since 
it is before maintenance has taken place. At the start of a flight the maintenance will 
have been carried out and this means the LOTC rate, when calculated, will no longer 
include transitions from the repaired states whose probabilities will be zero because of 
the repairs. 
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First note that a desired behaviour is obtained whtm using all of the models in that the 
LOTC rate is seen to increase as TLTD increases for the fixed value of T STD. This is as 
would be expected, since the probability of a LOTC event occurring should be higher if 
dispatching with faults present in the system for longer periods of time. Looking at the 
values of LOTC rate obtained using the different methods it can be seen that they are all 
quite similar, although some differences can be noted. One might reasonably expect 
similar results from such a simple example, due to the fact that the small size of the 
model doesn't allow any approximations within the models to have a great effect on the 
results. 
In order to be able to better compare the models it is better to consider the graphical 
representations of the results tables. These are shown in Figure 8.2.3 and Figure 8.2.4. 
In each figure there are two representations of the same data. The first shows a line 
graph of the data, which demonstrates the comparative LOTC rates obtained using the 
different methods. However, in both figures, some of the line graphs are so close as to 
be virtually indistinguishable and for this reason a bar chart displaying the same data is 
also included. This shows the values of the LOTC rate obtained using the different 
methods for each value of TrTD considered. The bar charts more clearly show the 
underlying trends in the differences of the LOTC rates calculated using the different 
analysis techniques. 
Consider first Figure 8.2.3, which shows the results obtained for the TWA approach 
with balanced coefficients (TWA, bal), the single fault state Markov model (SFS), the 
first order approximation to the single fault state Markov model (SFS,I) and the 
approximation to the single fault state Markov model used when dispatch intervals are 
short (SFS,short). 
• The TW A approach gives, across the range of TLTD covered, higher LOTC rates 
than the single fault state Markov approaches, although the single fault state 
Markov approximation used when dispatch intervals are short gives similar 
results to the TW A approach, but marginally lower. 
• The single fault state Markov model and its first order approximation are close 
in their calculated LOTC rates with the approximation giving results slightly 
below the single fault state Markov results. 
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Figure 8.2.3. LOTe rates calculated for the 2 unit system 
using the TWA approach and 3 versions of the single fault 
state Markov approach for a STD interval of 100 flight hrs. 
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Moving on to Figure 8.2.4, this shows the MCS results (MCS) obtained when both STD 
and LTD faults are maintained using MEL maintenance, and the three different sets of 
results obtained when transient solutions are found to Markov models. Repairs are 
included in the transition rate matrix (Mkv - rate), or implemented at discrete points in 
time within the integration procedure (Mkv - disc). When repairs are implemented at 
discrete points in time the average LOTC rate is calculated using values obtained at the 
start (- s) or end of flights (- e). 
• The transient Markov model in which LOTC rates are calculated at the start of 
flights gives generally similar results to the MCS model. 
• The transient Markov model in which repairs are included in the Markov model 
as rates gives a LOTC rate that falls further and further below the MCS rate and 
transient model with repairs included discretely as hTD increases. This can be 
explained by the fact that the repairs are included more realistically in the latter 
three models. When the TLTD interval becomes larger the repairs are effectively 
'spread out' over a longer period of time rather than acting instantaneously. 
• As expected, the solutions obtained using the discrete repair times in the 
transient Markov model differ, with the average LOTC rate obtained at the start 
of flights lower than the average LOTC rate obtained at the end of flights. This 
is explained by the repairs that take place between the end of one flight and the 
start of the next. 
Figure 8.2.5 shows a comparison of the results obtained using the MCS approach and 
the TW A and single fault state Markov approaches. The LOTC rates obtained using the 
MCS is sandwiched by the other two methods, the TWA approach giving a higher rate 
and the single fault state Markov approach giving a lower rate. It is reasonable to 
assume that the MCS approach gives the more accurate results since it models the 
system in the most accurate manner, with dispatch and maintenance taking place 
exactly as intended. Bearing this in mind, the fact that the TW A approach overestimates 
the LOTC rates in comparison to MCS is good in that it is at least pessimistic. 
However, the fact that the single fault state Markov model underestimates the LOTC 
rate in comparison to the MCS approach is not good since this, in effect, gives an 
optimistic measure of the LOTC rate. For this simple system this is not a problem. 
However, if this kind of underestimation was to be displayed for a real system then the 
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consequences could be undesirable because the dispatch intervals set may be too 
lenient. 
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Figure 8.2.5. A comparison of the LOTC rates obtained for the 
2 unit system using the TWA, single fault state Markov and 
MCS approaches for TSTD = 100 fit. hrs. 
The dispatch intervals allowed for use with the 2 unit system will differ according to the 
model used. Recall that the limit for the average LOTC rate of the system is 10 failures 
per 106 fit. hrs. Given that, for each of the models, T STD was set to be 100 fit. hrs. it 
remains to find the largest allowable value of TLTD that can be applied whilst remaining 
below the 10 failures per 106 fit. hr. limit. This could be done using the graphs shown in 
Figure 8.2.3 and Figure 8.2.4 and tracing across from the 10 failures per 106 fit. hrs. 
mark on the y-axis to the relevant curve and down to the corresponding value of TLTD on 
the x-axis. Table 8.2.4 shows the allowed value of TLTD for each of the modelling 
approaches. The values in the table were actually calculated by linear interpolation of 
the results given in Table 8.2.2 and Table 8.2.3 and then rounded to the nearest 5 fit. 
hrs. It can be seen that the values vary from 425 hours for the TW A method to 480 
hours for the first order approximation of the single fault state Markov model. This 
difference equates to II flights of 5 hours. Taking the results of the MCS, it can be seen 
that the LTD interval can be set at 460 hours. If one takes this as the benchmark (which 
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is considered reasonable given the techniques used in the MCS code) then three of the 
methods overestimate the L TD interval, these being the transient Markov solution with 
repair rates included in the transition rate matrix, the single fault state Markov model 
and the first order approximation to the single fault state Markov model. 
Transient Markov Model MCS 
repairs discrete discrete STD-MEL 
as rates repair· start repair. end LTD-MEL 
475 460 450 460 
ATWA,baf itSFS itSFS,1 ASFS,short 
TLTD 425 475 480 430 
Table 8.2.4_ The values of TLTD for which the LOTC rate is at 
the 10 failures per 106 fit. hrs_ allowable limit (values given to 
the nearest 5 fit. hrs.) 
8.3 Summary 
A simple example system has been presented and used to demonstrate the application of 
the different techniques to modelling TLD. The results obtained using each of the 
methods were presented and compared. This example allowed the techniques to be 
introduced. However, when using this simple example it is not possible to utilise many 
of the options available in the TLD MCS code and also the system is not of sufficient 
complexity to properly analyse the differences between the models. For this reason a 
I 
larger example system is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 : Automatically Setting Dispatch Criteria 
9.1 Introduction 
As part of this research project a method has been developed that allows dispatch 
criteria to be automatically set within a MCS. This method is included in the TLD MCS 
code and is described in the following section. The module of the TLD MCS code that 
performs this process is described in Appendix 2, Section A2.3.13. After the method is 
described here an example system is discussed and the dispatch criteria are set for that 
system and the different models available are applied. The system considered in this 
chapter is a progression from the system considered in the previous chapter, containing 
a greater number of components and applying TLD to different elements of the system. 
9.2 The Methodology 
When dispatch criteria are to be automatically set by the TLD MCS code a set of 
dispatch criteria can be specified in the data input file. An iterative process is then 
started using this set of dispatch criteria as the initial criteria which will be iteratively 
tested and amended. If no dispatch criteria are specified then the code will initially 
assume the most lenient scenario, where all dispatchable faults are assumed to be in the 
LTD category. 
The iterative process of setting dispatch criteria begins by testing single faults for the 
initial set of dispatch criteria. The instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are found for 
these faults. Of course, when carrying out this procedure dispatch intervals must be 
specified for each of the STD and LTD categories of faults. Since ranges of these values 
within which the system LOTC rate will be calculated for the final set of allocated 
dispatch criteria must be specified in the input data file, the largest values of these 
intervals are used when setting the dispatch criteria. To illustrate this, consider that it 
has been specified that the system LOTC rate will ultimately be calculated for values of 
STD interval between 100 and 500 hours inclusive and values of L TD interval between 
1000 and 5000 hours inclusive. When the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are to be 
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calculated, the largest possible values for these intervals will be chosen, that is 500 
hours for STD faults and 5000 hours for LID faults. This ensures that ultimately, when 
the system LOTC rate is found, the dispatch criteria that have been applied to the 
system will be valid for the fuU range of values of dispatch intervals specified. This is 
the case since the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for the various system 
configurations will have been calculated for the largest possible times of exposure to the 
faults. Once the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are found, by caUing the 
control_sims module, for the single faults they are checked for agreement with the 
dispatch categories that were applied to those single faults. At this stage any faults 
categorised as LTD faults whose failure rate lies above 75 or 100 failures per 106 flight 
hours will be amended to STD or DND faults respectively. STD faults whose failure 
rate is less than 75 failures per 106 flight hours will be amended to the LTD category 
(but only if no restrictions on the TLD category in the initial dispatch criteria have been 
supplied). STD faults whose failure rate is greater than 100 failures per 106 flight hours 
will be amended to the DND category. FinaUy, any faults that were initiaUy DND faults 
will remain so. This adds an element of conservatism to the practice of setting dispatch 
criteria automaticaUy. In the same way, throughout the entire process of automaticaUy 
setting dispatch criteria, any DND faults will remain in that category once assigned. 
This is considered a reasonable practice because of its conservative nature. 
Once TLD criteria have been set and adjusted for single faults the process continues for 
dual faults in the same way. The TLD criteria just calculated for the single faults are 
applied to the system and instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are calculated for aU 
dispatchable faults up to dual faults. These are then checked for agreement with the 
dispatch criteria applied and new dispatch criteria are set accordingly. This process 
continues until TLD criteria have been set for faults up to the order specified. Once this 
order has been reached, if the TLD criteria had to be reassigned then the instantaneous 
LOTC rates will be checked against the TLD criteria again in order to verify that 
whatever dispatch criteria have just been amended have not affected the dispatch 
criteria applied to other faults. In this way the dispatch criteria are, in a sense, 
optimised. This process of re-checking specific orders of faults does not need to be 
carried out for each order of fault up to that specified by the user as the maximum since 
this procedure will automaticaUy take place. This is because all dispatch criteria are 
tested each time the fault order is increased. To illustrate this concept consider a case 
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where 3 single faults, A, B and C are initially assigned to the LTD category, their 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are checked and faults A and B are seen to need 
placing in the STD category, whereas fault C should be in the DND category. If these 
criteria are applied it could be possible that the restriction placed on fault C could lead 
to fault A no longer needing to be in the STD category and actually being LTD, while 
fault B must remain in the STD category. The single faults alone could be tested to find 
out this information but if the dual faults are also tested (i.e. the instantaneous failure 
- rates to LOTC for dual faults are also tested) then the single fault dispatch criteria will 
be updated appropriately along with the dual faults' criteria. The only time that this 
process wouldn't occur is once the order of faults specified has been reached. Hence the 
requirement for the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC to be checked for the highest 
fault order until the TLD criteria do not need to be reassigned. 
During the process of setting dispatch criteria a number of output files are produced, 
which give the TLD criteria applied at each iteration of the automated process, the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the dispatchable system configurations for 
each of these sets of dispatch criteria and also the system LOTC rate obtained for these. 
As previously mentioned, these instantaneous LOTC rates are calculated for the upper 
values of the STD and L TD intervals specified as input data. The final values output by 
the TLD MCS code are the system LOTC rates that vary over the ranges of STD and 
LTD intervals specified. Since the TLD criteria allocated to the system satisfy the 
requirements related to the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for the maximum 
specified values of the STD and LTD inte.rvals, it is certain that the same requirements 
will be met for the lower STD and L TD intervals in the ranges, since the maximum 
possible exposure to the various fault combinations will be lower. If the code was used 
to automatically set the TLD criteria and then calculate the average system LOTC rate 
using the code for values of STD and LTD interval higher than those specified when 
setting the criteria for the system then checks should be carried out to ensure that the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTe from the various dispatchable system 
configurations meet the certification requirements for the category applied to those 
dispatchable system configurations. 
It should also be noted here why the TLD criteria are assigned in an iterative manner 
(assigning criteria for single faults, then dual faults, etc.) when the code is used to 
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automatically set the dispatch criteria. This method was chosen because of the increase 
in time involved in using the MCS code to calculate instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC for higher order fault combinations, which, as a general rule, occur less 
frequently than lower order fault combinations. Thus, if dispatch criteria for lower order 
faults are set to the correct categories before higher order faults, there will be, in 
general, less chance that the higher order faults will also need to be changed. 
----9.3 Eight Component System Example 
Consider the system depicted in Figure 9.3.1, which shows a reliability block diagram 
of a system containing 8 components. The system comprises of two channels, X and Y, 
each of which performs two functions, FI and F2. Function FI on channel X, FIX, is 
performed by the components A and B in parallel, F2X is performed by C and D in 
series. The equivalent functions on channel Y, FlY and F2Y, are performed respectively 
by A and E in a parallel configuration and F and G in a series configuration. There is 
also a link between the channels that, in the event of a function failure on one channel, 
allows the corresponding function on the other channel to be used in its place. This link 
is represented on the diagram by component H. The component failure rates for this 
system are given in Table 9.3.1 and the system fault tree is shown in Figure 9.3.2. 
F,X 
F,Y 
Figure 9.3.1. Eight component system. 
Componentls Failure rate (failures per hour) 
A 7.5xlO-5 
E, E 4. OxlO-5 
C,F 3.0xlO-5 
D,G,H 2.0xlO-5 
Table 9.3.1. Component failure rates for the system. 
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The loss of the functions FIX, F Z){, FI Y and F2Y and the loss of the link between the 
channels, H, are the system faults that will be included in the following TLD analyses. 
This represents the fact that the faults included in a TLD analysis of a real system will 
not necessarily correspond to the basic events of a fault tree, which will most likely 
correspond to component level failures, as is the case here. The flight length is assumed 
to be IO hours and the system operational lifetime is assumed to be 130 000 hours. This 
system will, when modelled, require the inclusion of combinations of faults of order 
two and above in the dispatch criteria. These combinations will play a role in the LOTC 
rate of the system. As such, the TW A model is inappropriate for use in modelling this 
system because of the (dispatchable) combinations of faults that can occur and the fact 
that failure rates into these fault combination states would need to be calculated for use 
in the model. This brings in an extra level of approximation over and above that used in 
the dual fault state Markov model. This model is the most appropriate of the SAE 
techniques because it will at least account for transition into the dual fault states by 
including transitions from the single faults states to the dual fault states. This is in 
contrast to the TW A approach, which instead requires that a failure rate into the dual 
fault states must be calculated. For this reason the dual fault state Markov model is the 
only SAE model covered for this example. This is considered acceptable here, since, 
even in the case of the 2 unit example covered previously, the results obtained from the 
TW A model were the least accurate of the SAE models. 
Rather than deciding on a set of dispatch criteria before modelling the system, the 
dispatch criteria are to be set using methods appropriate to the technique used to 
perform the analysis. Thus, for the MCS the TLD MCS code will be used to 
automatically set the dispatch criteria. For the dual fault state Markov approach the 
dispatch criteria will be set by first approximating the failure rates to LOTC from each 
of the system states using the technique of dividing a failure probability by a flight time 
described in section Section 5.3.6, equation 5.3.17, then applying the appropriate 
dispatch category. When finding the system LOTC rate using the transient solution of 
the conventional Markov model, the dispatch criteria from the other methods (i.e. MCS 
model or dual fault state Markov model) will be applied in turn. The STD interval, TSTD, 
is set at 500 hours and the LOTC rate must be modelled for values of L TD interval, 
TLTD, ranging from 500 to 2500 hours in 500 hour intervals. 
158 
Figure 9.3.2. Fault tree of the eight component system. 
9.3.1 The Dual Fault State Markov Model 
Before the dual fault state Markov model can be constructed for the eight component 
system the instantaneous failure rates to LOTe for each of the fault combinations must 
be calculated. This then determines which of the fault combinations are dispatchable 
and should be included in the dual fault state Markov model. Once this process has been 
carried out the transition rate matrix for the model can be constructed and then used to 
calculate a solution. These steps are described below. 
9.3.1.1 Determination of the Instantaneous LOTC Rates 
Calculating the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC is the first step that must be carried 
out before a dual fault state Markov model can be constructed. The technique used to do 
this is that described in section 5.3.6, equation 5.3.17, where the failure probability of 
LOTC from each dispatchable configuration is divided by the length of a flight. To 
illustrate the process that will be used here consider, for example, the fault FIX, which 
occurs when components A and B are failed. When these component failures are present 
in the fault tree the Boolean representation of the system top event LOTC is given by: 
LOTC FIX = E + C.F + c.G + D.F + D.G + FH + GH 9.3.1 
where LOTCFIX represents the LOTC of the system given that FIX is failed and '+' and 
'.' represent the Boolean OR and Boolean AND operators respectively. The rare event 
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upper bound approximation for the system unavailability given that FIX is failed is 
given by: 
QSYSIFIX =qE +qCqF +qcqG +qOqF +qoqG +qFqH +qGqH' 9.3.2 
where qi represents the probability of failure of component i and is calculated as 
follows: 
q, = 1- exp(- A,t fit)' 9.3.3 
where Iftt represents the length of a flight in hours. The use of the upper bound 
approximation brings a degree of conservatism to the calculations. In order to calculate 
the instantaneous failure rate to LOTC for FIX equation 9.3.2 is divided by Ift/. 
Substituting the component failure rates from Table 9.3.1 into equation 9.3.2 gives a 
value of 4.0027x 10.5 failures per flight hour for the instantaneous failure rate to LOTC 
from fault state FIX The instantaneous failure rate to LOTC for fault state FI Y is 
identical due to the symmetry of the system. 
Consider now fault state F,x, which occurs when either component C or component D 
is failed. A degree of conservatism can be introduced if, when approximating the failure 
probability of LOTC given that F,x is failed, both components are considered to be 
failed. Thus, by considering both components to be failed and carrying out the same 
procedure as that demonstrated above for FIX, the rare event upper bound 
approximation for the system unavailability (itself an upper bound here) given that F,x 
is failed is given by: 
QSYSJF2X =qF +qG +qAqEqH +qAqBqE' 9.3.4 
which yields a value of 4.9994x I 0.5 failures per flight hour for the instantaneous failure 
rate to LOTC from fault state F,x. The instantaneous failure rate to LOTC for fault 
state F2Yis identical due to the symmetry of the system. 
The single fault state where H is failed has a fault tree whose Boolean representation is 
given by: 
LOTC H = CF + C.G + D.F + D.G + AB.E + AB.F + A.B.G + A.C.E + AD.E 9.3.5 
which leads to the following rare event upper bound approximation for the system 
unavailability given that Hhas failed: 
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9.3.6 
+qAqBqG +qAqCqE +qAqDqE' 
This gives a value of 2.5035xlO·7 failures per flight hour for the instantaneous failure 
rate to LOTC from fault state H. 
For the dual fault states the same technique is applied, with a conservative estimate 
applied (as above) when either of F2X or F2Y are present. The upper bound 
approximations for the system unavailability given that the various faults and fault 
combinations have occurred are then divided by the flight time (10 hours) to give the 
approximations for the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for fault combination i, Ai.f" 
given in Table 9.3.2. Also shown in this table are the TLD categories that must then be 
applied to the faults and fault combinations given the value of A..f,. Recall that if the 
instantaneous failure rate to LOTC is greater than 100 failures per 106 flight hours (i.e. 
104 failures per hour) then the dispatch category must be DND, if the rate lies between 
75 and 100 failures per 106 flight hours (i.e. between 7.5xlO·s failures per hour and 104 
failures per hour) then the dispatch category must be STD and, finally, if the rate lies 
below 75 failures per 106 flight hours then the dispatch category must be LTD. 
Fault (i) Ai.!: TLD Category 
H 2.5035x10- 1 LTD 
F,X 4.0027 x 10-5 LTD 
F,Y 4.0027 x 10-5 LTD 
F2X 4.9994x10 5 LTD 
F2 Y 4.9994xlO-5 LTD 
H.F,X 8.9986x10-5 STD 
H.F,Y 8.9986x10-5 STD 
H.F2X 5.0023x10-5 LTD 
H.F2Y 5.0023x10-5 LTD 
F,XF2X 8.9986x10-5 STD 
F,XF2Y 1.0998x10-l DND 
F,Y.F2X 1.0998xlO-l DND 
F,Y.F2Y 8.9986x10-5 STD 
Table 9.3.2. The eight component system faults, their 
associated upper bound instantaneous failure rates to LOTC 
(calculated for the dual fault state Markov model) and the 
associated TLD categories. 
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9.3.1.2 The Dual Fault State Markov Model 
Given the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC and the associated dispatch categories for 
each of the fault combinations a dual fault state Markov model can be constructed. 
There are 11 dispatchable system fault states and the model is depicted in Figure 9.3.3. 
Note that repair transitions are excluded from the model for clarity and that they will 
lead from each of the dispatchable fault states (numbered 1 to 11 inclusive) back to the 
full-up state. The feedback transition, with rate /J12 is shown on the model. Failure 
transitions lead from each of the dispatchable system states (including the full-up state) 
to the LOTC state 12. 
-------------~~-~--------------. 
,....... ~L ~~" 
,'" H.F,X 6.... .. .. , 
, . , 
" H '.. \ 
" 1 .......... ', \ 
I -.." , 
I H.F1 Y 7.. ',\ \ 
" .... \\ ' 
: F1X ------------ .......... " .. \\ \ 
I ... , \ \1 ~ 
: H.F2X 8 ..... ' .. "\ ' 
F,Y 
4 
/112 
" ... :',:-/-" :..........--.., 
---------------~:;: LOTe 
.... y' ,;' ,'" 
H.F2Y 9 " " 
'---=-_-'<.l ." " I 
..... ,,',': 
,-__ --,,)If ,',' 
F,X.F2X 10' ... // 
-----------_ .. '" ,.' 
F,Y.F2Y 11 ,-' 
Figure 9.3.3. Dual fault state Markov model showing only 
failure transitions. 
The dual fault state Markov model gives rise to a system of ordinary differential 
equations of the form given in equation 3.3.7. A is the transition rate matrix for the dual 
fault state Markov model, given by: 
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-LO AH AF1X Ap1y AF2X AF2y 0 0 a 0 0 0 Ao,L 
1', -L, 0 a 0 ~O AF1X AF1y Anx AF2y 0 0 A"L 
1', 0 -L, 0 0 0 AH 0 0 0 AF2X 0 A2,! 
1', 0 0 -L, 0 0 0 AH 0 0 0 Any ..1.3,£ 
1', a 0 0 -L, 0 0 0 AH 0 A.F1X 0 A4,L 
1', a a 0 0 -L, 0 0 0 AH 0 AF1y A.S•L 
1', a 0 0 0 0 -L, a 0 0 0 0 A,6,L 9.3.7 
1', 0 0 0 0 a 0 -L, 0 0 0 0 A.7,L 
1'. 0 0 0 0 a 0 a -L. 0 0 0 :<'.L 
1', 0 0 a 0 a 0 a 0 -L, 0 0 A,9,£ 
1'10 0 a a 0 a 0 a 0 0 - 1: 10 0 A]O.L 
1'" 0 a a a a a a 0 0 0 - III A11,£ 
1'" a a 0 0 a a a 0 0 0 0 - 1:12 
where AH, AFlx, AFI y, AF2X, Any represent the failure rates of the faults considered for 
TLD. Pi represents the repair rate for state i and A;,L represents the instantaneous failure 
rate from state i to the LOTC state. L; represents the sum of all elements except the ith in 
the i'h row of the matrix. The failure rates for the faults H, FIX, FI Y, F2X and F2Y are 
calculated here using a similar method to that used to calculate the instantaneous failure 
rates to LOTC, i.e. the probability of the relevant fault occurring (approximated using 
the rare event upper bound) is divided by the length of a flight (i.e. 10 hours). For 
example, consider fault FIX. This fault occurs ifboth of components A and B fail. Thus, 
for a fault tree top event FIX the Boolean representation would be: 
F,X = A.B, 9.3.8 
giving a failure probability of: 
QFIX = q Aq B' 9.3.9 
This is then divided by the length of a flight to give an approximation for the failure rate 
into fault state FIX. Considering now fault F2X, the Boolean representation of the a fault 
tree with this top event would be: 
9.3.10 
giving a failure probability of: 
QF2X =qc +qD' 9.3.11 
This is then divided by the length of a flight to give an approximation for the failure rate 
into fault state F2X. The failure rates for faults FI Y and F2Y are found in the same way. 
These failure rates are shown in Table 9.3.3 
163 
Fault (I) 
H 2.0000 x 10-5 
2.9983x10-B 
2.9983x10-B 
4.9994x10-5 
F2Y 4. 9994x10 5 
Table 9.3.3. Failure rates (failures per flight hour) for each of 
the faults considered for TLD. 
The final failure rate to be calculated for the model is the full-up failure rate to LOTC, 
~,L, which is calculated in a similar way to previous rates in the model by finding a rare 
event approximation of the failure probability of LOTe from the full-up state and 
dividing this by the length of a flight. Taking the rare event approximation to the system 
unavailability and dividing by 10 hours gives a value of 2.5x 10'8 failures per flight 
hour. 
All transition rates that are needed for solution of the dual fault state Markov model are 
now calculated and equation 5.5.29 can be used to give: 
11 Q, 
AO.L + 2:-A,.L 
, '-I Qo 
"DFS = 11 Q 
1+ 2:-' 
'-I Qo 
9.3.12 
which is the dual fault state Markov LOTe rate for the eight component system. The 
equations represented by columns 2 to 12 (i.e. where i= 1, ... ,11) of the transition rate 
matrix given in equation 9.3.7 are used to give algebraic expressions for Q;lQo which 
are then substituted into equation 9.3.12 to give an expression for the dual fault state 
LOTC rate of the system. This is then used to calculate the dual fault state LOTe rate of 
the system for the desired STD and LTD intervals by approximating the repair rates by 
the reciprocal of the relevant dispatch interval, see equation 5.5.1. Note that the final 
result for the dual fault state LOTe rate will not depend on the value of the feedback 
rate /112. The results obtained using this solution are given in column 4 of Table 9.3.4. 
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Transient Markov Model dual fault 
state 
repairs discrete discrete Markov Tuv as rates repair - start repair- end 
model 
500 5.62 5.64 5.71 2.35 
1000 7.95 8.18 8.24 4.37 
1500 9.91 10.36 10.41 6.15 
2000 11.60 12.27 12.33 7.71 , 
2500 13.00 14 .07 14.12 9.11 
Table 9.3.4. Average system LOTC rates (failures per 106 
flight hours) obtained for TSTD = 500 hours using the transient 
Markov model and the dual fault state Markov model. 
9.3.2 The Transient Markov Model 
The construction of the conventional Markov model for this system first involves 
identifying all of the possible system states. Since there are 8 components in the system 
the Markov model produced in the Markov code will contain 28 = 256 states. As 
discussed previously, and carried out for the two unit system, two solution methods are 
possible when implementing the transient Markov solution. These involve including 
repairs as rates within the Markov model or modelling the repairs at discrete points in 
time within the numerical integration procedure. The fault tree and repair rates for 
individual components are passed to the Markov code described in Chapter 7, along 
with a file containing the TLD criteria for the system in terms of the basic events. This 
was done for the dispatch criteria calculated for the system for use in the dual fault state 
Markov model just described and also for the dispatch criteria calculated using the TLD 
MCS code. A step length of 0.1 is used in the Runge-Kutta integration routine. 
In the case where repairs are included as rates within the transition rate matrix for the 
Markov model the STD interval, TSTD, is set at 500 hours and the L TD interval, TrTD, set 
from 500 to 2500 hours in 500 hour intervals. Recall that, in the case where repairs are 
included at discrete points in the integration procedure, the points at which repair must 
take place are set at twice the equivalent value for the other case, since the repair 
intervals are analogous to the inspection intervals that are used in PIR maintenance. The 
results obtained using the transient Markov model code are given in columns 2 to 3 of 
Table 9.3.4. 
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9.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation 
When using the TLD MCS code to model the eight component system the option was 
taken to set the dispatch criteria automatically using the code, before the system LOTC 
rate was calculated over the range of STD and L TD intervals required. This was 
implemented for each of the repair strategies that are possible at maintenance within the 
TLD MCS code with MEL maintenance applied to both STD and LTD category faults. 
The results obtained are shown in Table 9.3.5. In all cases modelled an accuracy of 3 
s.f. was specified for the results and 1 000 000 simulations were carried out before 
checking for convergence of the results. The results were subsequently checked every 
50000 simulations. Three consecutive values for the L0.TC rate were required to match 
to 3 s.f. before convergence was assumed. 
MCS Repair Strategy 
TLTD I 2 3 4 
500 11.10 11.10 11.00 5.68 
1000 13.50 13.40 13.30 8.17 
1500 15.50 15.40 15.40 10.40 
2000 17.30 17 .20 17 .10 12.40 
2500 18.90 18.80 18.70 14.10 
Table 9.3.5. Average system LOTe rates (failures per 106 flt. 
hrs.) obtained to 3 s.f. for TSTD = 500 hours using the TLD 
MCS code with MEL maintenance applied to both STD and 
LTD faults. 
9.3.4 Comparison of Results Obtainedfrom Alternative~Models 
The first comparison to be made between the different methods is the dispatch criteria 
that are obtained for use with the system. Here only the dual fault state Markov model 
and the MCS models can be compared since the transient Markov model solutions are 
found using these dispatch criteria. The dispatch criteria for the dual fault state Markov 
model were calculated earlier. The dispatch criteria were set automatically by the TLD 
MCS code for the 4 different repair strategies possible at maintenance. Table 9.3.6 
shows the instantaneous LOTC rates obtained for each of the repair strategies using the 
TLD MCS code (repl...rep 4) and also the approximations obtained for use in the dual 
fault state Markov model. The rates are shown as the number of failures per 106 flight 
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hours. Also indicated on the table are the dispatch criteria associated with each failure 
rate. 
Fault Re21 re22 r~3 re24 DFS 
H 20.5 21.3 22.4 20.2 2.5 
F\X 48.0 48.5 49.1 49.6 40.0 
F\Y 48.0 48.5 49.1 49.6 40.0 
F2X 60.9 60.8 60.8 56.2 50.0 
F2Y 60.9 60.8 60.8 56.2 50.0 
H.F\X 90.0 89.9 90.0 89.9 90.0 
H.F\Y 90.0 90.1 89.8 90.4 90.0 
H.F2X 79.5 80.1 80.1 72.7 50.0 
H.F2Y 79.4 80.0 80.3 72.5 50.0 
F\XF2X 89.9 89.9 90.1 90.1 90.0 
F\XF2Y /:;];1 0;0::~c::/11 0::0:~j;1'10';:00;'-:'/110:./000];:10;(0~ 
F\Y.F2X ::{;11 0'; 0:;:0;110:(0~%;11 0<O»;;~110.'.0;;;;~UO:(O~ 
F\Y.F2Y 90.0 90.0 89.9 90.2 90.0 
H.F\XF2X 91. 9 90.9 91. 5 90.0 
H.F\Y.F2Y 89.3 91.4 90.4 89.4 
Key: LTD STD ;';';';:DND~I /.' ... /~" :-; 
Table 9.3.6. Instantaneous failure rates to LOTC (in failures 
per 106 flight hours) for the eight component system obtained 
using the MCS code (repair strategies I - 4) and 
approximated for the dual fault state (DFS) Markov model. 
It can be seen from the pattern of shading on the table that the dispatch criteria applied 
for the MCS where repair strategies 1, 2 and 3 are implemented are identical. The 
dispatch criteria for the MCS where repair strategy 4 is implemented and the dual fault 
state Markov model are also identical, differing from repair strategies 1, 2 and 3 only 
for the H.F2X and H.F2Y fault combinations (note that there are no rates calculated for 
the triple fault dispatchable criteria for the dual fault state Markov since, by definition, 
these states are not considered). However, there are discernable differences in the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC obtained for the different models. The values used 
in the dual fault state Markov model for all single faults and the H.F2X and H.F2Y fault 
combinations are markedly different from those obtained using the TLD MCS code. 
This is particularly true for fault H, which has a rate 10 times smaller in the dual fault 
state Markov model than that obtained using the TLD MCS code. 
Note that the LOTC rates calculated using the TLD MCS code show less symmetry as 
the number of faults increases. For instance, due to the symmetry of the system one 
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would expect FIX and FI Y to have identical instantaneous failure rates to LOTC. This is 
the case. Indeed, in both cases where results should match for single fault states, this is 
so. When one looks at dual fault states, a slight variance is noted between states whose 
rates should be identical, although it is no more than a fraction of a percent. Looking at 
the triple fault states, the difference is greater, but is still less than one percent. This 
behaviour is easily explained. As the order of faults increases the occurrence of the 
faults and fault combinations become rarer. Thus, within the TLD MCS code, 
.. - convergence is assumed when the instantaneous LOTC rates for the similar 
combinations have different values. The potential for differences is greater for higher 
order fault combinations. This is no problem here and could easily be overcome by 
changing the convergence criteria within the TLD MCS code or changing the number 
of simulations carried out or a combination of both of these solutions. The results are 
left in this format here in order to demonstrate the point that some variation is possible 
in the MCS results according to the convergence criteria chosen. Also, in this example 
the rates have converged sufficiently to allow the TLD criteria to be set. It is unlikely 
that the rates would need to be calculated to a greater accuracy than this. 
The dispatch criteria found above were used in the system model for the appropriate 
solution technique and also when finding the transient Markov solution. Since the 
dispatch criteria are identical for the MCS when using repair strategy 4 and for the dual 
fault state Markov approach, these were the dispatch criteria used in finding the 
transient Markov solutions. The dispatch criteria found for the other repair strategies in 
the MCS were not used because the transient Markov code is written such that it models 
the situation where all faults are cleared from the system (i.e. repair strategy 4 ). 
Table 9.3.4 shows the results obtained using the conventional transient Markov model 
and the dual fault state Markov model for a value of TSTD of 500 hours. The system 
LOTC rate obtained using the transient Markov model is again averaged at the start of 
flights and at the end of flights. 
The average system LOTC rates obtained using the TLD MCS code for repair strategies 
I - 4 when MEL maintenance is applied to both STD and L TD category faults are 
shown in Table 9.3.5. As would be expected, as the repair strategy changes from I to 4 
(and maintenance is carried out in a more stringent way) the LOTC rate obtained drops. 
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The most notable drop occurs from repair strategy 3 to repair strategy 4. This should be 
expected, since strategy 4 involves repairing all faults present in the system at 
maintenance. Consider the difference between repair strategy I (repair only the last of 
the faults causing the maintenance deadline) and repair strategy 2 (repair only the group 
of faults causing the maintenance deadline). This difference will probably be small for 
all systems, since one would expect single faults to dominate the LOTC rate. However, 
for a system of this size, with only 5 TLD faults, the difference could be expected to be 
very small indeed, which it proves to be. Next consider the difference between repair 
strategy 2 and repair strategy 3 (repair all faults of the same category as the one 
initiating the maintenance deadline). Again, this difference between the two strategies 
could be expected to be small because the extra time that faults remain in the system in 
strategy 2 will be relatively small in comparison to the system lifetime. This should 
again be accentuated by the fact that the system is relatively small. This appears to be 
borne out by the results. 
The LOTC rates obtained are more easily examined using the diagrams in Figure 9.3.4 
and Figure 9.3.5. Look first at Figure 9.3.4. The results obtained using the transient 
solution of the conventional Markov model display the behaviour exhibited by the same 
technique when used to model the 2 unit system, i.e.: 
• When repair is included at discrete points within the numerical integration 
procedure the average LOTC rate calculated at the end of the flights is higher 
than the average LOTC rate calculated at the start of the flights, 
• When repair is included as a transition rate in the model the average LOTC rate 
is closer to the results obtained using the discrete repair model for smaller 
values of TLTD. This can be explained by the fact that the repairs are included 
more realistically when included at discrete' points in time in the transient 
Markov model. When the TrTD interval becomes larger the repairs (in the model 
where repairs are included as transition rates) are effectively 'spread out' over a 
longer period of time rather than acting instantaneously. 
The LOTC rates obtained using the dual fault state (DFS) Markov model have the 
following attributes: 
• The LOTC rates are generally far lower than for the transient Markov models, 
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• The gradient obtained over the range of nTD is generally similar to that obtained 
when using the transient models. 
Figure 9.3.5 illustrates the points made earlier that the system LOTe rate falls as more 
repairs are carried out at maintenance (i.e. as we move from repair strategy 1 to repair 
strategy 4) and that there is a marked difference between repair strategy 4 and the other 
maintenance strategies. The interesting point to note here is that all of these strategies 
comply with the regulations but there are considerable differences between the different 
maintenance approaches. 
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Figure 9.3.4. LOTe rates calculated for the eight component 
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The next step is to compare the MCS results with the other approaches, shown in Figure 
9.3.6. Due to the similarity between some of the results a restricted dataset is 
considered. The MCS results for repair strategies 1 and 4 are compared with the 
transient Markov results obtained when repair is included at discrete points in the 
integration and the LOTC rate is averaged at the end of flights. The final results 
included in the figure are for the dual fault state Markov model. 
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Figure 9.3.6. A comparison of the LOTC rates obtained for the 
eight component system using the TLD MCS code, the dual 
fault state'Markov model and the transient solution to the 
conventional Markov model. 
As was the case with the 2 unit system, it is assumed that the results obtained using the 
TLD MCS code are the most accurate because of the way that the dispatch and 
maintenance methods are most faithfully reproduced within the model. With this in 
mind the transient solution to the conventional Markov model compares favourably 
with the MCS results using repair strategy 4 (i.e. where all faults are cleared at 
maintenance). The dual fault state Markov model underestimates wildly in comparison 
to both of the other techniques. To illustrate the potential consequences if this was a real 
system imagine that the dual fault state Markov model was used to certify the system. 
This would allow a L TD interval of over 2500 hours for a STD interval of 500 hours 
and the LOTC rate would be under 10 failures per 106 flight hours. However, if one 
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looks at the MCS results where repair strategy 4 is used at maintenance one can see that 
the likely allowable value of LTD interval is below 1500 hours, a difference of 1000 
hours or 100 flights. Then again, if one considers the worst-case scenario at 
maintenance, repair strategy I, the allowable L TD interval would be below 500 hours, 
over 2000 hours lower. Clearly this would not be applied in reality since the LID 
interval would be shorter than the STD interval. Therefore the STD interval would most 
likely be shortened as well as the L TD interval. 
9.3.5 Further Dual Fault State Markov Model 
It is clear that the dual fault state Markov model is not modelling the system in the 
correct manner for this eight component system. A possible reason for this is that the 
failure rates included in the dual fault state Markov model are incorrect. Recall that, in 
Table 9.3.6, a difference was noted between some of the instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC obtained using the TLD MCS code and those approximated for use in the dual 
fault state Markov model. Note that the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC were lower 
for the dual fault state Markov model than obtained in the MCS. Thus, it could be 
useful to use the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the TLD MCS code in the 
dual fault state Markov model to see if the poor results obtained for the LOTC rate is 
caused by the approximations used to calculate the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC 
(despite the fact that these were approximated in a prescribed, conservative manner). 
Recall that the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC obtained using the TLD MCS code 
showed a small lack of symmetry for the dual and triple fault states. Before using the 
rates for the dual fault states in the dual fault state Markov model the appropriate rates 
were averaged to recapture the symmetry for the system. For example, the LOTC rates 
obtained for the dual faults F1X.F,}{ and FI Y.F2Y were averaged and the average value 
assigned to each of the combinations in the dual fault state Markov model. Also 
included in the model is the full-up failure rate calculated using the TLD MCS code -
7.34x 10.6 failures per hour. Note that it is likely that the instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC for the different faults and fault combinations will be slightly lower when the 
LTD interval is reduced. The instantaneous failure rates to LOTC substituted into the 
dual fault state Markov model from the TLD MCS code are calculated for a L TD 
interval of 2500 hours. The rates are likely to be lower for a L TD interval of 500 hours, 
at the bottom end of the L TD range for which average system LOTC rates are to be 
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calculated. This is not considered a problem here, however, since the use of the higher 
values will introduce a degree of conservatism into the model. 
This prdcedure of substituting the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the TLD 
MCS code into the dual fault state Markov model was implemented and the results are 
shown (labelled as DFS - new) in Table 9.3.7, along with the results obtained using the 
TLD MCS code using repair strategies 1 and.4 and the original dual fault state Markov 
approach (labelled as DFS - orig). The same results are displayed in Figure 9.3.7. It can 
be seen that the dual fault state Markov model with the MCS rates included within it 
now produces system LOTC rates that lie closer to those produced by the MCS code 
with repair strategy 4. However, the LOTC rates obtained are still generally lower than 
for the MCS. This suggests that, given the right failure rates for inclusion in the model, 
a reasonable approximation to the LOTC rate can be obtained. However, a question 
remains as to how these failure rates should be accurately calculated. Also, the accuracy 
of the dual fault state Markov model must be questioned when it provides an 
underestimate of the results obtained using the TLD MCS code. This suggests that, 
structurally, there is a problem with the dual fault state Markov model. A final point 
should be made that echoes a point made previously· - that the system could be 
maintained in practice using the techniques outlined for repair strategies 1-3, which all 
give similar results to repair strategy 1 for this system (strategy 1 is plotted). If the 
system was to be maintained in this way at any point the dual fault state Markov model 
provides no way of calculating the appropriate allowed TLD intervals. 
TLTD MCS-1 MCS-4 DFS-orig DFS-new 
500 11.10 5.68 2.35 5.45 
1000 13.50 8.17 4.37 7.75 
1500 15.50 10.40 6.15 9.76 
2000 17.30 12.40 7.71 11.55 
2500 18.90 14.10 9.11 13.13 
Table 9.3.7. Average system LOTC rates (failures per 106 fit. 
hrs.) obtained to 3 s.f. for TSTD = 500 hours using the TLD 
MCS code with MEL maintenance applied to both STD and 
LTD faults compared with the LOTC rates obtained by 
substituting the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the 
TLD MCS code into the dual fault state Markov model. 
175 
20,----------------------------------------. 
18---------
...,. 16 
11 
'" 14 
-
"0 
": 12 
1l. 
~ 10 
.2 g 8 
~ 6 ~ 
9 4 
2 
O~----~----__ ----~----__ ----~----~ 
o 500 1000 1500 
TLTD (flt. hrs.) 
2000 2500 3000 
--e-MCS 1 
-+-MCS-4 
--*"" DFS - new 
--6-- DFS - orig 
Figure 9.3.7. A graph of the results shown in Table 9.3.7. 
9.3. 6 Conclusions 
A number of conclusions may be drawn about the modelling of the eight component 
system using the different modelling techniques. The first point to make is that the TLD 
MCS code appears to produce the more accurate results for this system, which is due to 
the fact that it models the system more realistically. Dispatch is covered in the desired 
way and the appropriate repairs are carried out at maintenance that is carried out at the 
correct times. The results obtained using the conventional Markov model when 
transient solutions are found appear to back this up. The conventional Markov model 
with repairs included at discrete points in time in particular produces results that 
correspond well to those of the TLD MCS code. However, the conventional Markov 
model has a number of drawbacks, even for this small system. In no particular order, 
these are: 
• The conventional Markov model requires dispatch criteria to be set for the 
system in some way. Here the techniques used to set the criteria for the TLD 
MCS code and the dual fault state Markov model were used. 
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• The conventional Markov model wi1\ increase in size exponentially. Even for 
this small system, the model contains 256 fault states, not a problem here, but 
this would soon become a problem for larger systems even if conventional 
methods of reducing the size of the Markov model were used. Ultimately, this is 
why conventional Markov models cannot be used to model TLD. 
The dual fault state Markov model seems to not compare favourably with the other two 
methods used here. The possible reasons for this are listed below: 
• The methods used to calculate the transition rates used in the model, while 
supposed to be conservative, cannot guarantee upper bounds, at least for this 
system. However, since the system considered here is still relatively small and 
simple, this could suggest a problem in executing reduced state Markov 
methods for larger systems. 
• Given the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC calculated using the TLD MCS 
code, these were substituted into the dual fault state Markov model. This 
improved the results obtained using the dual fault state Markov model. 
However, the average system LOTC rates were still underestimated somewhat. 
This problem could be exacerbated when larger systems are considered. The 
fact remains that the dual fault state Markov model, if used in isolation, simply 
produces results that would be difficult to verify. The inaccuracies of the model, 
even for such a small system with correct rates included in it, suggests that the 
fundamental structure of the model might not be appropriate. 
• The final point about the dual fault state Markov model, and the other 
commonly used reduced state Markov models (the SAE models, not 
conventional reduced Markov models), is that they are constructed in such a 
way that they model a particular maintenance method (equivalent to repair 
strategy 4 in the TLD MCS code). However, as has been demonstrated for this 
simple system, the results obtained for different repair strategies at maintenance 
can vary. This could cause problems when analysing the application of TLD to 
systems for certification. 
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9.3.7 Further Results Obtained Using the MCS Code 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the TLD MCS code allows great flexibility when modelling 
a system. The following sections give brief examples of some of the different 
information that can be gleaned from the code and some of the other situations that can 
be modelled. This is intended to give a flavour of the options available when using the 
TLD MCS code. The options considered are the inclusion of PIR maintenance, 
opportunistic maintenance, calculating importance measures and varying the system 
operational lifetime. Sample output obtained from a single simulation is also shown. 
The length of a flight was 10 hours and the operational lifetime of the system was 
13 0000 hours. 
9.3.7.1 PIR Maintenance 
The eight component system was modelled using the TLD MCS code for the case 
where MEL maintenance is used for STD faults and PIR maintenance is used for LTD 
faults. The ratio of inspection interval to dispatch interval was set at 2, the maximum 
allowed. A system LOTC rate was obtained for TSTD = 500 hours and hTD = 500 ... 2500 
hours in 500 hour intervals. The TLD criteria used were those calculated for the system 
when using repair strategy 4 shown in Table 9.3.6. Table 9.3.8 shows the results 
obtained. As would be expected, the LOTC rate generally increases as the ratio of 
inspection interval to dispatch interval is also increased. As the ratio increases the 
average exposure of the system to TLD faults is also increased. This increase in average 
exposure leads to the observed increase in LOTC rate. 
PIR ratio of inspection to dispatch interval 
Tao 1.0 1.5 2.0 
500 5.61 5.66 5.67 
1000 8.05 8.06 8.20 
1500 10.10 10.20 10.40 
2000 11. 90 12.00 12.30 
2500 13.50 13.60 14.10 
Table 9.3.8. LOTC rates (failures per 106 flt. hrs.) obtained 
using the TLD MCS code for the eight component system 
with LTD faults obtained using PIR maintenance. 
178 
9.3.7.2 Opportunistic Maintenance 
The eight component system was modelled using the TLD MCS code for a situation 
where opportunistic maintenance is included in the maintenance strategy and repair 
strategy 2 is used. The opportunistic maintenance window was set to be 250 hours. As a 
reminder, this means that as maintenance takes place, if further maintenance is planned 
for within the next 250 hours then this maintenance will also be carried out at the 
current maintenance. A system LOTC rate was obtained for TSTD = 500 hours and 
hrD = 500 ... 2500 hours in 500 hour intervals. The TLD criteria used were those 
calculated for the system when using repair strategy 2 shown in Table 9.3.6. Table 9.3.9 
shows the results obtained. As would be expected, when opportunistic maintenance is 
used the system LOTe rate can be seen to fall. This is an important result in practice, 
since it is likely that opportunistic maintenance will be implemented in real situations. 
Opportunistic maintenance will give the opportunity for faults to be repaired in advance 
of their scheduled maintenance time, thus giving a potential benefit in terms of reducing 
potential delays brought about by maintenance operations. It will also allow the number 
of maintenance operations to be reduced by utilising the flexibility ofTLD. As such it is 
important that opportunistic maintenance can be modelled in this way for systems. As 
seen here, using opportunistic maintenance reduces the LOTC rates observed for the 
eight component system. These reduced LOTC rates would allow longer dispatch 
intervals to be legally set for the system, fully utilising the benefits ofTLD. 
TLTD with w/o 
500 11. 00 11.10 
1000 13.30 13.40 
1500 15.10 15.40 
2000 16.60 17 .20 
2500 17.90 18.80 
Table 9.3.9. LOTC rates (failures per 106 flt. hrs.) obtained 
using the TLD MCS code for the eight component system 
with and without (w/o) opportunistic maintenance with a 
window of250 hours. 
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9.3.7.3 Varying the System Operational Lifetime 
All the previous MCS models of the eight component system have considered an 
operational lifetime of 130000 hours for the system. However, it should be clear that 
the operational lifetime of the system could have an effect on its computed LOTC rate. 
In order to demonstrate this a system LOTC rate was calculated for repair strategy 4, 
with TSTD = 500 hours and TLro = 1500 hours. The length of a flight remained at 10 
hours but the system operational lifetime was varied between 1 000 and 130 000 hours. 
Between 1 000 and 10 000 hours the LOTC rate was calculated at 1 000 hour intervals 
and between 10 000 and 130 000 hours the LOTC rate was calculated at 5 000 hour 
intervals. The TLD criteria used were those calculated for the system when using repair 
strategy 4 shown in Table 9.3.6. Table 9.3.10 shows a restricted set of the results. 
Figure 9.3.8 shows the full set of results obtained. The system LOTC rate can be seen to 
rise sharply initially as the operational lifetime increases. After this it tends towards a 
value of just over 10 failures per 106 flight hours. What this example demonstrates is . 
that the operational lifetime of a system does indeed have an impact on the average 
system LOTC rate. This is yet another facet of the application of TLD that cannot be 
modelled using the recommended methods of reduced state Markov and TW A 
approaches. 
Operational Lifetime LOTCRate 
5000 6.58 
10000 7.96 
15000 8.60 
20000 9.01 
25000 9.33 
30000 9.51 
35000 9.67 
40000 9.71 
45000 9.77 
50000 9.84 
55000 9.88 
60000 9.92 
65000 9.96 
70000 9.99 
75000 10.00 
Table 9.3.10. LOTC rates (failures per 106 flt. hrs.) obtained 
using the TLD MCS code for the eight component system for 
a varying system operational lifetime. 
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9.3.7.4 Importance Measures 
The eight component system was modelled using the TLD MCS code for repair strategy 
4 with a flight length of 10 hours and an operational lifetime of 130 000 hours, as 
before. Importance measures were obtained for- the components and TLD faults of the 
system for TSTD = 500 hours and hTD = 1500 hours. The TLD criteria used were those 
calculated for the system when using repair strategy 4 shown in Table 9.3.6. 
Table 9.3.11 shows the results obtained for the system components. Figure 9.3.9 shows 
a bar chart that depicts the same results. These importance measures rank the 
components as one might expect for this system, with component A being ranked as the 
most important and component H being ranked as the least important. These importance 
measures give an indication of which components attention should be focussed upon in 
order to improve the system performance (in terms of the average system LOTC rate). 
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Fault Importance Measure 
A 5.55xlO- i 
B 4. 99xlO-1 
D 2.46xlO-1 
E 4.99xlO-1 
G 2.46xlO-1 
H 3.55xlO-2 
Table 9.3.11. Importance measures (to 3 s.f.) for the 
components of the eight component system obtained using the 
TLD MCS code. 
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Figure 9.3.9. Component importance measures for the eight 
component system. 
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Table 9.3.12 shows the importance measures obtained for the single and dual 
dispatchable TLD faults. The corresponding bar charts are shown in Figure 9.3.10. 
The single dispatchable faults are generally more important than the dispatchable dual 
faults in this model. This could be expected. Of the single faults it can be seen that F2X 
and F2Y are ranked as by far the most important faults. This could also be expected 
because of the fact that they both consist of components in series, although one could 
equally expect that faults FIX and FI Y would be ranked as more important because of 
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the fact that they contain the most important component, A. Considering the dual faults, 
H.F 1X and H.F2 Y are ranked as the most important. 
Importance measures such as these will be useful in the event of a real analysis because 
they demonstrate where resources are best expended in order to improve the system 
performance. 
Fault ImE0rtance Measure 
H 3.55xlO-2 
FIX 7.48xlO-2 
FlY 7.48xlO-2 
F1X 3.15xlO-l 
F2Y 3.15xlO-l 
H.FIX 2.69xlO-3 
H.FIY 2.69xlO-3 
H.F2X 1.17xlO-2 
H.F2Y 1.17xlO-2 
FIXF1X 6.67xlO-3 
FIY.F2Y 6.67xlO-3 
Table 9.3.12. Importance measures (to 3 s.f.) for the 
dispatchable single and dual faults of the eight component 
system obtained using the TLD MCS code. 
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Figure 9.3.10. Single and dual fault importance measures for 
the eight component system. 
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9.3.7.5 Optional Simulation Output 
When modelling TLD using the TLD MCS code it is possible to output a detailed 
account of the failures and maintenance operations that occur. within simulations and 
their times of occurrence. Failure propagation is also detailed, along with the TLD 
faults present in a system. Figure 9.3.11 shows a sample of such an output file, for 
repair strategy 4 with both STD and L TD faults covered by MEL maintenance and 
having TLD intervals of 500 and 1000 hours respectively. In the file a number of 
failures occur and also a number of maintenance operations relating to these failures. 
For example, initially component C fails (shown as basic event C - E:C) at time 
3083.40. The failure is propagated up through the fault tree and fault FVC is seen to 
occur (shown as G:F2X]AILS) and the appropriate LTD maintenance deadline (code 
70000) is added to the schedule 1000 hours after the end of the current flight at time 
4090.00. After all options for propagation of the fault up the fault tree are checked the 
TLD faults present in the system are output before the simulation continues. 
The next event in the schedule is the maintenance event. Because repair strategy 4 is 
being used all of the faults are cleared from the system. This means that F2X and Care 
no longer failed and a new failure time is generated for component C, which will fail 
again at time 46788.16. The simulation then continues. 
This kind of file is particularly useful when checking if TLD operations and 
maintenance strategies are being correctly implemented within the TLD MCS code. 
Files such as this were used extensively when writing the TLD MCS code in order to 
ensure that repair strategies were being implemented in the desired way. 
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3083.40 * E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G:F2 X FAILS fails - -
* Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 4090.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE_2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
Lo faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
4090.00 
5627,39 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 46788.16 
* E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLo faults present: 
6112.40 * E:B fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F1_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1_X_FAILS works 
TLo faults present: 
8706.50 * E:H fails 
E:8 is also failed 
E:E is also failed 
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 9710.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE 3 works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: E:H 
9710.00 I *** Maintenance *** 
12405.77 * E:A fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl _X_FAILS, AND gate 
• G:Fl X FAILS works 
chec-k1ng new status of parent G:Fl 
-Y-FAILS, AND gate 
• G: Fl_Y_ FAILS works 
:rLD faults present: 
13183.33 * E:G fails 
E:A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2_Y_FAILS, OR gate 
* G:F2_Y_FAILS fails 
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 14190.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE 2 works -
checki-ng new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE 3 works 
~LD faults present: G:F2_Y_FAILS 
14190.00 
21305.73 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_Y_FAILS now works 
I £:G 
* E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:F1_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1_Y_FAILS works 
TLD faults present: 
23079.31 I * E:A fails 
.cont •.••...•.... 
Figure 9.3.11 Sample output from the first part ofa single 
simulation of the eight component system. See Appendix 4 for 
the complete output. 
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9.4 Summary 
In this chapter, and the previous one, a number of different models have been used to 
obtain results for two simple systems, one containing just two components, the other 
containing eight components. It has been argued that MCS provided the most accurate 
results for these systems and there is no reason to expect that this would not be the case 
for larger systems. Certain flaws in the currently recommended approaches were 
identified: 
• The TW A approach yielded inaccurate results even for the two component 
system and cannot be used for systems where dual faults are to be considered. 
• The method of approximating failure rates for the SAE methods by dividing a 
failure probability by a flight time was seen to be potentially inaccurate. 
• The results obtained using the reduced state Markov models were shown to be 
heavily dependent upon the rates used within them - a problem when the failure 
rates themselves could be inaccurate. 
• The structure of the reduced state Markov models was called into question since 
the results obtained when more accurate failure rates were substituted into the 
dual fault state Markov model were seen to be optimistic in comparison to the 
MCS results. 
• The currently recommended models would require some (perhaps impossible, 
certainly complex) changes in order to be able to cover some of the options 
available to the user of the MCS code, such as different repair strategies and 
opportunistic maintenance. 
The flexibility of MCS as a means of modelling the application of TLD to systems was 
demonstrated by implementing some of the options open to the user of the TLD MCS 
code. This included demonstrating MEL and PIR maintenance, opportunistic 
maintenance, varying the operational lifetime of the system, viewing individual 
simulation output and calculating importance measures for system components and 
TLD faults. The TLD MCS code was seen to provide a powerful tool for the analysis of 
TLD. 
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Chapter 10 : Large Scale System TLD Modelling 
10.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters the examples covered looked at modelling TLD for simple 
systems. These examples served to demonstrate the flexibility of the TLD MCS code 
and its ability to model the application of TLD to those systems. Comparisons with a 
conventional Markov model solved using numerical integration procedures and the 
models recommended in SAE ARP 5107 [17], [18] showed greatest agreement between 
the results obtained using the TLD MCS code and the conventional Markov model. 
This suggests a greater degree of accuracy in these two models and, it is argued, 
particularly in the MCS model, since this is the model which can most closely represent 
the application of maintenance at the correct times within the operational lifetime of the 
system. The conventional Markov results are close to the MCS results since the models 
include all system states and because the systems are small any inaccuracies in the 
results caused by approximations of repair rates or repair times within the code are also 
small. The SAE models appear to produce the least accurate results for the examples 
considered, in part due to the approximations required in calculating failure rates for use 
in the models and in part due to the actual structures of the models. 
In the second example that was considered in the previous chapter the system that was 
modelled bore some features that might be expected of real aircraft systems. The faults 
that were included in the dispatch criteria did not correspond to basic events in the fault 
tree representation of the LOTC system failure mode. Instead, the faults included in .the 
dispatch criteria were represented by intermediate events in the fault tree. A structural 
dependency was also introduced between TLD faults by including a single component 
that performed a certain task in two separate functions. In this chapter a larger scale 
system is considered. The fault tree text file for the system is shown in Appendix 5. 
Also given in the appendix are the other text files provided to the TLD MCS code for 
this system, including that containing the failure rates relating to the basic events of the 
fault tree. Due to issues of commercial confidentiality the fault tree of a real aircraft 
system cannot be used. However, the fault tree contains features that are adapted from 
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that of a real aircraft system but no part of the fault tree used here is identical in any 
way to that of the real aircraft system. The basic event failure rates and other features 
are intended to be representative of the kinds of features that might occur when 
modelling a real aircraft system. As a result of the changes that are made in adapting the 
fault tree for use here the results produced are illustrative of those that would be 
expected or indeed obtained when modelling a real system. The results obtained in this 
_chapter will demonstrate that the TLD MCS code is capable of producing results for a 
large scale system. 
The system to be modelled has a number of structural dependencies that exist between 
the various functions that are performed by the system. These functions are intermediate 
events in the fault tree and must be included in the dispatch criteria. The dispatch 
criteria for the system are not known and are set automatically for the system using the 
TLD MCS code. These dispatch criteria are then used when the application of TLD to 
the system is analysed further. 
10.2 The System to be Modelled 
The text file for the fault tree of the system to be modelled is given in Appendix 5. This 
is the text file provided to the TLD MCS code and the fault tree has 142 gates and 81 
basic events. The input file containing the basic event failure distributions is also given 
in the appendix. The system for which the fault tree is drawn contains two channels that 
each perform 4 functions. Various combinations of the failures of these functions can 
cause the top event, LOTC, to occur. Each channel of the system is powered by a 
primary power source and in the case of failure of this power source a secondary power 
supply can be called upon to power the channel. The fault tree also contains a number 
of basic events that"correspond to HMU faults. In addition to this there are a number of 
dependencies which exist between functions and channels if certain basic events occur. 
If a certain function is known to have failed on a particular channel then that function is 
used from the other channel, if available, or a modelled function output can be used. 
The four functions on each channel can each fail in two ways - either invalid or 
erroneous. If the function fails invalid then it is known to have failed and these are the 
faults that will be included in the dispatch criteria. If the function fails erroneous then, 
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for the purpose of this example, it is assumed that the failure is effectively unrevealed 
and, as such, no action is taken as a direct result of a function failing erroneously. For 
example, consider the function FN I performed by channel A. The intermediate event 
representing it having failed invalid is G:FNI_INV _A and the intermediate event 
representing it having failed erroneous is G:FNI_ERR_A. As G:FNI_INV_A occurs 
the dispatch criteria will be checked to see what TLD restrictions should be applied. 
However; as G:FNI_ERR_A occurs the dispatch criteria will not be checked. When the 
faults are repaired all faults relating to the relevant function will be repaired. Thus, any 
faults relating to function I on channel A, including function I erroneous on channel A, 
would be repaired as the fault relating to function I failing invalid on channel A was 
repaired. The system will not be described here in any more detail than this. However, 
this is not considered to be detrimental to the analysis because it is not important for the 
task that is being conducted here, namely using the TLD MCS code to model a larger 
scale system containing features that could be encountered in a real system. 
The faults included in the TLD criteria are shown in Table 10.2.1. It is assumed that if 
the power supply to either channel is lost that the dispatch criteria applied will be DND, 
i.e. the loss of power to either channel requires that repairs must be carried out to the 
system as soon as the current flight ends. This takes advantage of one of the options 
available to the user when using the TLD MCS code to automatically set the dispatch 
criteria, namely that an initial set of required dispatch criteria can be supplied. Thus the 
initial TLD criteria supplied to the TLD MCS code are as given in Table 10.2.2. 
G:PWR:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:FNl_lNV _A 
G:FN2_1_lNV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN3_lNV_A 
G:FN4 INV A 
G:PWR:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:FNl_lNV_B 
G:FN2_1_lNV _B 
G:FN2_2_lNV _B 
G:FN3_lNV_B 
G:FN4 lNV B 
Table 10.2.1. The faults to be included in the dispatch criteria. 
G:PWR:A:LOSS DND 
G:PWR:B:LOSS DND 
Table 10.2.2. The initial TLD criteria supplied to the TLD 
MCScode. 
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As mentioned earlier, there are certain faults within the fault tree that will be repaired 
along with the TLD faults" at maintenance. The repair of these 'associated' faults was 
described in Section 6.7.6 and in Appendix 2, Section A2.2.ll. Table 10.2.3 shows the 
dispatchable TLD faults for the system and their associated faults that would be 
repaired along with them at maintenance. Repairing any of these intermediate events in 
the fault tree at maintenance involves restoring all gates and basic events below the 
intermediate events, and the intermediate events themselves, to their working status. In 
addition to these 'associated repairs' at maintenance there are other situations where 
extra repairs will be carried out as certain faults are repaired. This is in the case of the 
occurrence of the EEC and power loss faults that are included in the dispatch criteria. If 
any of these four faults are repaired then all of the faults that are present in the same 
channel as the fault being repaired are also cleared from the system. For example, if the 
fault G:PWR:A:LOSS is repaired then so are all faults that are present in channel A . 
TLDFault Associated Faults TLD Fault . Associated Faults 
G:FNl_INV_A G:FNl_ERR_A G:FNl_INV _B G:FNl_ERR_B 
E:FNl:CM]AULT_l E:FNl:CM]AULT_l 
E:FNl:A:FAULT E:FNl:B:FAULT 
G:COMMS CORRUPT A G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
G:FN2_1_INV_A G:FN2_1_ERR_A G:FN2_1_INV _B G:FN2_1_ERR_B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_ERR_A G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS CORRUPT A G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A G:FN2_2_ERR_A G:FN2_2_INV_B G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
G:FN2_1_1NV _A G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_ERR_A G:FN2_1_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS CORRUPT A G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN3_ERR_A G:FN3_INV_B G:FN3_ERR_B 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS CORRUPT A G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
G:FN4_INV_A G:FN4_ERR_A G:FN4_INV_B G:FN4_ERR_B 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l E:FN4:CM_FAULT_l 
G:COMMS CORRUPT A G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
Table 10.2.3. Selected TLD faults and the faults associated 
with them at maintenance. 
When modelling the system using the TLD MCS code the operational lifetime of the 
system was assumed to be 130 000 hours and the average length of a flight was 
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assumed to be 10 hours. The dispatch criteria are initially to be set automatically for the 
system when MEL maintenance is used to address both StD and L TD faults. The STD 
interval is to be varied from 500 to 2500 hours in steps of 500 hours and the L TD 
interval is to be varied from 2500 to 5000 hours in steps of 500 hours. The first check 
for convergence is made after 2 500 000 simulations and subsequent checks are made 
every 100 000 simulations. Convergence is required to 3 significant figures and 3 
consecutive values of LOTC rates are required to match for convergence to be assumed. 
Note that in some cases, for the results presented, the system LOTC rate was seen to 
rise above 10 failures per 106 flight hours and these results were recalculated to 4 
significant figures in order to examine the results in greater detail. Before any 
convergence checks are made for the LOTC rate a LOTC event must have occurred 
from the relevant dispatchable configuration a minimum of I 000 times. The dispatch 
criteria applied to the system is DND if more than 3 faults are present in the system at 
any time and the dispatch criteria are set for fault combinations up to order 3, i.e. for 
single, dual and triple dispatchable fault combinations. 
The four repair strategies that are available in the TLD MCS code are applied to the 
system. Note that the limit for the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC above which the 
DND category wiII be applied to faults is lowered (from lOO) to 34 failures per 106 
flight hours for this example and the limit above which the STD category wiIl be 
applied is lowered (from 75) to 17 failures per 106 flight hours. These changes were 
made because of the range of values taken by the instantaneous LOTC rates (when 
calculated) for the various dispatchable fault states of the system. Due to the complexity 
of the system it proved difficult to construct an example that produced instantaneous 
LOTC rates that led to the utilisation of all dispatch categories for the system. The fact 
that these limits have changed does not matter for this example, since the model is only 
being used to demonstrate that the TLD MCS code is capable of dealing with more 
complex systems with characteristics that might be encountered in real aircraft systems. 
The values of these limits do not affect how the TLD MCS code wiII be used. 
10.3 The Average System LOTe Rate 
The system was modelled according to the assumptions and initial conditions outlined 
above. For repair strategy 4, when al\ faults are cleared from the system at maintenance, 
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the average system LOTC rates obtained for the system when the dispatch criteria are 
automatically set using the TLD MCS code are shown in Table 10.3.1. The system 
LOTC rates behave in an expected manner in that the rate rises as either the STD or 
L TD interval is increased. The rates produced by the system do not rise to the level of 
10 failures per 106 flight hours. Thus, if this system were to be put through the 
certification process then any of the modelled values of TSTD and TLTD could be used. 
::: 
~ 
TLTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 7.42 7.56 7.70 7.82 7.94 
1000 7.49 7.63 7.76 7.88 8.01 
1500 7.54 7.68 7.81 7.95 8.07 
2000 7.59 7.73 7.87 7.99 8.13 
2500 7.65 7.78 7.91 8.05 8.18 
Table 10.3.1. The average system LOTC rates obtained when 
automatically setting dispatch criteria using the TLD MCS 
code for repair strategy 4 (no. offailures per \06 flt. hrs.). 
5000 
8.07 
8.13 
8.20 
8.25 
8.31 
Given in Table 10.3.2 are the average system LOTC rates obtained for the system when 
repair strategy I, where the last fault of the group causing the maintenance deadline to 
be applied, is used at maintenance and the dispatch criteria are set automatica\ly using 
the TLD MCS code. Note that the LOTC rates obtained using this strategy are above 10 
failures per 106 flight hours and because of this the rates displayed were calculated to 4 
significant figures. This aIlows the small increases in the LOTC rates observed as the 
dispatch intervals increase to be seen in detail, as was the case with the results for repair 
strategy 4. In effect all results are calculated to the same number of decimal places. We 
can see again that the system LOTC rates rise as the STD and L TD intervals increase. 
In general the system LOTC rate is about 3.5 failures per 106 flight hours higher for 
repair strategy I than for repair strategy 4. 
::: 
~ 
TLTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 10.94 11. 00 11.06 11.13 11.18 
1000 11. 04 11.10 11.16 11. 22 11.28 
1500 11.11 11.18 11.25 11.31 11.36 
2000 11.20 11.27 11.34 11. 40 11. 45 
2500 11.29 11. 35 11.42 11. 47 11.53 
Table 10.3.2. The average system LOTC rates obtained when 
automatically setting dispatch criteria using the TLD MCS 
code for repair strategy I (no. of failures per 106 flt. hrs.). 
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5000 
11. 23 
11. 32 
11. 41 
11. 49 
11. 57 
Table 10.3.3 shows the results obtained for the system when repair strategy 2, where all 
of the fault combination causing the dispatch deadline are repaired at maintenance, is 
used in the TLD MCS code and the dispatch criteria are set automatically. Again, the 
results shown are obtained to 4 significant figures. Note that the general trend is for the 
modelled system LOTC rate to be slightly lower than that obtained using repair strategy 
I but that, in general, there is little to choose between the results obtained. In some 
_cases the system LOTC rate obtained is identical to that obtained using repair strategy 
1. In reality there could be a slight difference but this might only be seen if the LOTC 
rate is calculated to a greater accuracy. However, there is also one value of system 
LOTC rate, obtained for a STD interval of 2500 hours and a L TD interval of 2500 
hours, which is greater, although the difference observed is only O.oI failures per 106 
flight hours. This result could be explained by the fact that the true value for the LOTC 
rates are close for the two repair strategies and the random nature of the MCS has led to 
results that are slightly above or below the true value for each strategy. 
~ ~ 
TLTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 10.93 10.98 11.03 11.09 11.16 
1000 11. 03 11. 09 11.14 11.19 11.25 
1500 11.11 11.19 11.24 11.30 11. 34 
2000 11.20 11.26 11.33 11.38 11. 43 
2500 11.30 11. 35 11.42 11. 47 11. 52 
Table 10.3.3. The average system LOTC rates obtained when 
automatically setting dispatch criteria using the TLD MCS 
code for repair strategy 2 (no. of failures per 106 flt. hrs.). 
5000 
11.19 
11.29 
11.37 
11.48 
11.55 
The LOTC rates obtained for the remaining repair strategy, strategy 3, where all faults 
from the TLD category of that causing the maintenance deadline are repaired at 
maintenance, are shown in Table 10.3.4 and are obtained after the dispatch criteria have 
been set automatically using the TLD MCS code. Again, as would be expected, the 
general trend is for the computed system LOTC rate to be slightly lower than that 
obtained using repair strategy 2, which was in turn slightly lower than that computed 
using repair strategy 1. However, there is clearly not a great deal of difference between 
these three sets of results. 
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~ Eo;. 
nTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 10.90 10.95 11. 01 11.06 11.10 
1000 10.99 11. 05 11.10 11.15 11.20 
1500 11. 08 11.14 11.20 11.25 11.29 
2000 11.16 11.23 11.28 11.33 11.37 
2500 11.25 11. 31 11.37 11. 41 11. 46 
Table 10.3.4. The average system LOTC rates obtained when 
automatically setting dispatch criteria using the TLD MCS 
code for repair strategy 3 (no. offailures per 106 flt. hrs.). 
5000 
11.12 
11. 23 
11. 33 
11.41 
11. 49 
Figure 10.3.1 shows a comparison of some of the results presented in Table 10.3.1, 
Table 10.3.2, Table 10.3.3 and Table 10.3.4, namely the ones obtained for a STD 
interval of 1000 hours. This serves to illustrate graphically the similarities in the results 
obtained using the repair strategies I, 2 and 3 and the differences between those results 
and the results obtained using repair strategy 4. The differences observed when 
modelling the system for repair strategies I, 2 and 3 are not very clear. Figure 10.3.2 
shows the same results with the results for strategy 4 omitted and this shows more 
clearly the subtle differences in the results obtained when these three repair strategies at 
maintenance are simulated. 
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Figure 10.3.1. The results obtained for the average system 
LOTC rate for repair strategies I to 4. STD and LTD faults are 
maintained using MEL maintenance. TSTD = 1000 hrs. 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results obtained for the system LOTC 
rates when using the different repair strategies. The first is that repair strategies 1, 2 and 
3 give similar results. This means that, for this system, there would not be much 
difference observed in the LOTC rates obtained when using these three repair strategies. 
If one considers why this is the case there is a clear reason why this could be so. Since 
the occurrence of TLD faults are relatively rare, the difference between these three 
repair strategies at maintenance is relatively small because tlie majority of times when 
TLD faults are repaired at maintenance there will be only one TLD fault present in the 
system. Thus the different repair strategies, which amount to repairing fault 
combinations in different ways, do not have a great effect on the calculated LOTC rates, 
although differences do exist. If one now compares repair strategy 4, where all faults are 
cleared from the system at maintenance, to the other three repair strategies it can be 
seen that the average system LOTC rates obtained are lower, as would be expected 
when such a stringent maintenance policy is applied. In this case, the repair strategy 
does affect the system LOTC rate by a relatively large amount in comparison to the 
other repair strategies because there are certain faults in the system that are unrevealed. 
In all repair strategies except repair strategy 4 these unrevealed faults will remain in the 
system until the relevant TLD faults arise and cause the unrevealed faults to be repaired 
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along with the TLD faults. This could explain at least a part of the differences observed 
here, although in reality one might still reasonably expect that repair strategy 4 would 
still produce a lower average system LOTe rate. In reality the failure rates for the 
unrevealed faults might take values lower than those considered here and this could 
account for some of the differences. However, it could also be the case that these 
unrevealed faults could be repaired periodically. This will be investigated later in 
Section 10.5. 
10.4 Instantaneous Failure Rates to LOTe 
The instantaneous failure rates to LOTC calculated for all of the dispatchable faults will 
not be presented here because of the large number of dispatchable fault states. However, 
to provide a flavour of the results obtained, the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC 
from the dispatchable single fault states are presented. These are given in Table 10.4.1, 
along with the associated dispatch category for the fault. The instantaneous LOTC rates 
for the dual fault combinations are given in Appendix 6, since these will be used in the 
application of the dual fault state Markov model for this system later. Recall that the 
dispatch categories are assigned according to the 17 and 34 failures per 106 hours limits 
for this example. The instantaneous failure rates to LOTe shown are the final group of 
those which were calculated when the process of automatically setting the dispatch 
criteria using the TLD MCS code was implemented. This means that these are the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC obtained for STD and LTD intervals of 2500 and 
5000 hours respectively. These rates will provide upper bounds for lower dispatch 
intervals. Indeed, the instantaneous LOTC rates could be calculated for lower dispatch 
intervals if required. In investigations the rates observed did not show a great deal of 
variation and so this avenue is not explored here. Also shown in this table are the 
computed values of the full-up failure rate to LOTC for the system. Note that, the way 
that the full-up failure rate is defined means that the failure rate shown is computed 
when there are no TLD faults present at dispatch. It can be seen that, as was the case for 
the average system LOTC rates obtained using the different methods, the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTe obtained for repair strategies 1 to 3 are roughly similar and the 
corresponding instantaneous LOTC rates for strategy 4 are approximately 3 failures per 
106 flight hours lower than for the other three strategies. 
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Fault reE I reE2 reE 3 reE4 
FULLUP 9.84 9.83 9.83 6.70 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 22.90 22.90 22.90 17.30 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 22.80 22.90 22.90 17.40 
G:FN3 INV A 14.60 14.80 14.90 12.10 
G:FN3 INV 8 14.70 14.70 15.00 12.10 
G:FN4 INV A 12.80 12.90 13 .10 9.64 
G:FN4 INV 8 12.80 12.80 12.20 9.65 
G:FN2 1 INV A 12.50 12.60 12.80 9.32 
G:FN2 1 INV 8 12.50 12.50 12.80 9.31 
G:FN2 2 INV A 12.70 12.70 12.90 9.38 
G:FN2 2 INV 8 12.60 12.70 12.90 9.39 
G:FNl INV A 15.30 15.10 15.20 12.40 
G:FNl INV 8 15.10 15.20 15.30 12.40 
Key: LTD STD 
Table 10.4.1. The instantaneous failure rates to LOTe for the 
dispatchable system faults and the associated TLD categories 
for repair strategies I to 4. 
Note that the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC and hence the dispatch categories 
applied to the dual and triple faults also exhibit similar behaviour, with the LOTC rates 
obtained when repair strategies I to 3 are used being very similar. The rates obtained for 
strategy 4 are similarly slightly lower, as has been observed for the single fault states. 
Indeed this results in a small number of the dispatch criteria that are applied for the dual 
and triple fault combinations being more restrictive for repair strategies I to 3 than they 
are for the same combinations in repair strategy 4. This result could be reasonably 
expected due to the nature of the repair strategies at maintenance and the more complete 
nature of repairs when strategy 4 is implemented. 
10.5 Varying the Operational Lifetime of the System 
Table 10.5.1 shows the LOTC rates obtained when repair strategy I and repair strategy 
4 are modelled for varying system operational lifetimes. The STD and L TO intervals 
are set at 500 and 2500 hours respectively. The dispatch criteria used in each case are 
the ones that were set for the relevant repair strategy using the TLD MCS code. Note 
how for each repair strategy, as one might expect, the computed LOTC rate is seen to 
rise as the operational lifetime of the system is increased. For each strategy the rate of 
change of the LOTC rate with respect to the operational lifetime of the system is seen to 
be steepest for the lower values of the operational lifetime modelled. 
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A feature of the results obtained is that for the lower values of the operational lifetime 
the system LOTC rate for the different repair strategies is seen to be most closely 
matched. As the operational lifetime increases there is little to choose between repair 
strategies I to 3 but repair strategy 4 diverges from these three sets of results. This is 
depicted in Figure 10.5.1, which shows the results obtained for repair strategy I and 
repair strategy 4. The explanation for this observed difference between the system 
LOTC rates obtained is the fact that a number of faults can occur within the system and 
essentially be unrevealed (the 'erroneous' faults mentioned earlier). For repair strategy 
I, the greater the operational lifetime of the system, the greater the chance that a higher 
number of these faults will be present within the system and contribute to the failure of 
the system. In the case of repair strategy 4 any of these unrevealed faults that are 
present will be cleared at every maintenance deadline. This means that these faults 
effectively have fewer opportunities to contribute to system failure. 
0Eerational Lifetime I 2 3 4 
5000 6.01 5.98 5.96 5.92 
10000 6.83 6.81 6.78 6.44 
15000 7.48 7.46 7.42 6.71 
20000 8.01 8.00 8.00 6.91 
25000 8.50 8.47 8.44 7.02 
30000 8.85 8.84 8.81 7.11 
35000 9.18 9.14 9.12 7.16 
40000 9.45 9.42 9.38 7.21 
45000 9.67 9.65 9.60 7.24 
50000 9.84 9.82 9.79 7.27 
55000 9.99 9.99 9.96 7.29 
60000 10.13 10.12 10.08 7.31 
65000 10.25 10.23 10.19 7.31 
70000 10.34 10.32 10.30 7.34 
75000 10.42 10.42 10.38 7.35 
80000 10.50 10.49 10.47 7.36 
85000 10.56 10.56 10.54 7.37 
90000 10.63 10.61 10.59 7.37 
95000 10.68 10.67 10.65 7.38 
100000 10.72 10.72 10.69 7.40 
Table 10.5.1. LOTC rates (failures per 106 fit. hrs.) obtained 
for each of the different repair strategies using the TLD MCS 
code for different system operational lifetimes. 
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Figure 10.5.1. LOTC rates obtained for repair strategies I and 
4 using the TLD MCS code for different system operational 
lifetimes. 
The results presented above suggest that repair strategies I, 2 and 3 could be improved 
for this system. It will clearly be of no benefit to allow the 'erroneous' faults to remain 
in the system for long periods of time. If faults such as these were observed in a real 
system it would likely be the case that they would lead to the system being serviced at 
certain points in its lifetime and returned to an 'as new' state, in a similar way to how 
-repairs are conducted for repair strategy 4. This would in effect be a periodic major 
service of the system that would occur at intervals throughout its lifetime. This kind of 
periodic major service can be modelled here by reducing the operational lifetime of the 
system to the length of the interval between the -services. This is because the system will 
effectively have a number of 'shorter lifetimes' that will occur throughout its entire 
operational lifetime. These shorter lifetimes will exhibit the same properties as the full 
operational lifetime in that they will involve the system initially containing no faults 
and being used for a certain length oftime, with TLD being applied during that time. 
Thus, for repair strategies I, 2 and 3, the system could be modelled with a shorter 
operational lifetime, representing the fact that a major service will be conducted on a 
regular basis. This might represent more closely the type of repair strategy that would 
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be applied in reality and might give results that are more favourably comparable to 
those obtained for the system when repair strategy 4 is used at maintenance. This 
technique is investigated in the following section. 
10.5.1 Simulating Major Maintenance Using Reduced Operational Lifetimes 
When repair strategy 4 is used all faults are cleared from the system at maintenance 
deadlines. This is not the case when the other three repair strategies are used. To cover 
for the fact that unrevealed faults, which will not be repaired as TLD faults are 
addressed, could be present in the system it could undergo major maintenance 
periodically. At these times all faults will be cleared from the system and it will be 
restored to a fully working state. As discussed at the end of the previous section, this 
could be modelled by simulating a reduced system operational lifetime equivalent to the 
interval between the major maintenance operations. This process was carried out for 
repair strategy I. Note that repair strategies 2 and 3 were not considered here because of 
the similarities of the results obtained so far with those obtained when repair strategy 1 
is implemented. Repair strategy 4 is not considered since this is returned to a fully 
working state after every TLD maintenance operation anyway and if this strategy was 
applied it is unlikely that a regular major maintenance operation would be carried out. 
The system operational lifetime was set to 10 000 hours, representing the fact that in the 
lifetime of the system (which will still be 130 000 hours) it will undergo major 
maintenance once every 10 000 hours. As this maintenance is implemented the system 
will be returned to a fully working state. The results obtained for the average system 
LOTe rates obtained are shown in Table 10.5.2. Figure 10.5.2 shows a plot of the 
results obtained for a STD interval of 1000 hours compared with the results that were 
obtained for repair strategy 4. 
Earlier we saw that the average system LOTe rates obtained for repair strategy I were 
higher than those obtained for repair strategy 4. However, as can be seen from Table 
10.5.2 and as is seen for a STD interval of 1000 hours in Figure 10.5.2, the average 
system LOTe rate obtained when repair strategy 1 is implemented and the system 
undergoes a major maintenance operation every 10000 hours is now lower. This shows 
that repair strategy 1 could be used to maintain the system, with the minimum amount 
of repairs possible being carried out, and that, as long as the system was cleared of all 
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faults regularly, the LOTC rate seen could be lower even than for repair strategy 4, 
where all faults are cleared from the system. The same would also be true for repair 
strategies 2 and 3. This would, in reality, perhaps be a more likely repair strategy to be 
applied than repair strategy 4 because it could be considered less likely to cause delays. 
This is because repair strategy 4 would always involve clearing all faults from the 
system at maintenance but this could bring with it a cost in terms of the time taken to 
repair all of the faults. If a strategy is adopted where just the final fault of the group 
causing the TLD deadline is repaired then delays could be less likely. If it is also known 
that the major repairs are to be carried out at regular intervals time could be allowed for 
these to take place that would ensure that delays are less likely to occur. Thus repair 
strategy I is not necessarily as bad a maintenance strategy as has been suggested thus 
far if it is married with a suitable periodic clearance of all faults in the system. This is a 
result of potentially great importance since this fact could also be used by the system 
manufacturer, if necessary, to gain certification for a system that might otherwise be 
considered to be uncertifiable by specifying a maintenance interval wherein all faults 
could be cleared from a system periodically. 
~ f.;. 
TLTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 6.83 6.91 6.97 7.06 7.12 
1000 6.89 6.99 7.05 7.14 7.18 
1500 6.96 7.05 7.13 7.20 7.26 
2000 7.01 7.10 7.17 7.24 7.32 
2500 7.07 7.14 7.24 7.33 7.38 
Table 10.5.2. Average system LOTC rates for an operational 
lifetime of 10 000 hours when repair strategy I is used at 
maintenance. 
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Figure 10.5.2. Plot of the average system LOTC rates for 
repair strategy I (with an operational lifetime of 10 000 hours) 
and repair strategy 4. TSTD = 1000 hours. 
10.6 Importance Measures for the System 
I+4l 
l±.!J 
Consider again the average system LOTC rates obtained originally for a system 
operational lifetime of 130 000 hours when repair strategies 1 to 3 are applied. These 
results were presented in Section 10.3. Here it was deduced that the unrevealed system 
faults (caused by the erroneous failures) were causing an increase in the LOTC rates. 
Rather than introducing major maintenance overhauls into the service strategy for the 
system it might be preferable to resolve this issue by replacing certain components with 
more reliable alternatives. However, before implementing this task it would be 
important to know where efforts should be aimed in order to achieve the best possible 
effect. Importance measures can help when attempting to do this. 
Shown in Table 10.6.1 and Table 10.6.2 are the importance measures calculated using 
the TLD MCS code for the single dispatchable TLD faults and the basic events of the 
system fault tree. The importance measures for the dispatchable TLD dual faults are 
given in Appendix 6. These importance measures were calculated for the system when 
repair strategy I was applied at maintenance. MEL maintenance was used to address 
both STD and L TD faults and the dispatch criteria applied to the system were those that 
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were obtained when dispatch criteria were automatically set using the TLD MCS code. 
The STD and L TD intervals were set at 2500 and 5000 hours respectively. 
The importance measures presented show that, of the single TLD faults the faults 
G:EEC:A:LOSS and G:EEC:B:LOSS are the most important. There are a number of 
basic events whose importance measures are greater than 0.1 and these are perhaps 
where the first improvements should be aimed at the system. The importance measures 
give a good ranking of the importance of the basic events and TLD faults. 
TLD fault Importance Measure 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 3.10% 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 3.10% 
G:FN3_INV _A 7.91% 
G:FN3_INV _B 7.93% 
G:FN4_INV _A 7.69% 
G:FN4_INV_B 7.69% 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 7.32% 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 7.33% 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 7.79% 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 7.78% 
G:FN1_INV_A 7.21% 
G:FNl INY B 7.40% 
Table 10.6.1. Importance measures calculated for the 
dispatchable TLD single faults using the TLD MCS code. 
204 
Basic event Importance Basic event Importance Measure Measure 
E:PWR1:A:FAULT_l 17 .5% E:FN4:B:FAULT_l 3.21% 
E:PWR1:CM]AULT_l 1. 94% E:FN4:B:FAULT_3 3.83% 
E:PWR1:A:FAULT_2 4.23% E:FN4_FN2:A:CM]AULT_2 0.355% 
E:PWR2:A:FAULT_l 17.7% E:FN4:A:FAULT_2 4.02% 
E:PWR2:CM]AULT_l 1. 94% E:FN4:A:FAULT_4 3.95% 
E:PWR2:A:FAULT_2 4.27% E:FN4_FN2:B:CM]AULT_2 0.346% 
E:PWR1:B:FAULT_l 16.8% E:FN4:B:FAULT_2 3.91% 
E:PWR1:B:FAULT_2 4.24% E:FN4:B:FAULT_ 4 3.93% 
E:PWR2:B:FAULT 1 17 .8% E:FN4:CM]AULT_l 3.00% 
E:!!WR2:B:FAULT) 4.32% E:FN2_1:CM]AULT_l 2.54% 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_3 2.47% E:FN2_1 :A:FAULT_l 2.37% 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_3 2.62% E:FN2_1:A:FAULT_3 3.06% 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_2 2.14% E:FN2_1:B:FAULT_l 2.54% 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_2 2.11% E:FN2_1:B:FAULT_3 3.29% 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_l 2.26% E:FN2_1:CM]AULT_2 2.27% 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_l 2.30% E:FN2_1:A:FAULT_2 2.40% 
E:FN1:A:FAULT 15.4% E:FN2 _1 :A:FAUL T _ 4 3.81% 
E:FN1:B:FAULT 15.4% E:FN2_1:B:FAULT_2 2.39% 
E:HMU:FAULT_l 8.63% E:FN2_1:B:FAULT_4 3.81% 
E:HMU:FAULT_2 8.63% E:FN2_2:CM]AULT_l 2.53% 
E:HMU:FAULT_3 8.63% E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_l 2.37% 
E:HMU:FAULT_ 4 8.63% E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_3 4.10% 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_3 8.50% E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_l 2.56% 
E:FN3_FN4:A:CM]AULT_l 1. 58% E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_3 4.40% 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_l 4.27% E:FN2_2:CM]AULT_2 2.35% 
E:FN3_FN4:CM]AULT_l 5.18% E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_2 2.44% 
E:FN3_FN4:B:CM]AULT_l 1. 60% E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_ 4 4.37% 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_l 4.30% E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_2 2.41% 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_3 8.39% E:FN2JB:FAULT_ 4 4.36% 
E:FN3_FN4:CM]AULT_2 8.19% E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 2.22% 
E:FN3_FN4:A:CM]AULT_2 1. 63% E:FN1:CM]AULT_l 3.60% 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_2 6.47% E:FN1:A:FAULT_l 5.52% 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_ 4 6.46% E:FNl :A:FAULT_3 6.64% 
E:FN3_FN4:B:CM]AULT_2 1. 62% E:FN1:B:FAULT_l 5.52% 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_2 6.52% E:FN1:B:FAULT_3 6.65% 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_4 6.49% E:FNl :A:FAULT_2 6.44% 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 3.56% E:FN1:A:FAULT_4 6.45% 
E:FN4_FN2:A:CM]AULT_l 1. 08% E:FN1:B:FAULT_2 6.54% 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_l 3.13% E:FN1:B:FAULT_ 4 6.53% 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_3 3.77% E:COMMS _CORRUPTED 6.16% 
E:FN4 FN2:B:CM FAULT 1 1.14% 
Table 10.6.2. Importance measures calculated for the system 
fault tree basic events using the TLD MCS code. 
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10.7 Other Models of the System 
So far in this chapter we have concentrated on the results obtained using the TLD MCS 
code. What follows is a brief discussion of two other methods - the reduced fault state 
Markov model and the conventional Markov model. 
10.7.1 The Conventional Markov Model 
The conventional Markov model gave results that best matched those obtained using the 
TLD MCS code for the eight component system considered in the last chapter. 
However, for this system a conventional Markov model is a non-starter, because there 
are 81 basic events in the system fault tree. This would lead to the generation of 281 
. system states in the code written to build the conventional Markov model. This is 
considered far too. large to be practical and, as such the conventional Markov model 
cannot be used to model this system. 
10.7.2 The Dual Fault State Markov Model 
Of the SAE techniques, the dual fault state Markov model is the most appropriate to 
model this system. Equation 5.5.30 !\ives the average system LOTC rate for a general 
dual fault state Markov model. This equation was used to calculate a solution for the 
system under consideration in this chapter. A number of failure rates must be calculated 
for use in the equation. The first of these is Ai, the failure rate ofTLD fault i. These are 
given in Table 10.7.1 and were estimated by calculating the probability of failure for 
fault i and dividing this by the length of a flight, the same method that was used for the 
previously modelled systems. The TLD faults G:EEC:A:LOSS and G:EEC:B:LOSS are 
gates in the fault tree that contain NOT logic. To calculate the probability of failure for 
these gates the coherent approximation was used, the negated event ignored. 
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TLD fault Ai 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 2.35 x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 2.35 x10-5 
G:FN3_INV _A 1. 88x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_B 1. 88 x10-5 
G:FN4_INV _A 1. 98 x10-5 
G:FN4_INV_B 1. 98x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 1. 90x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV_B 1. 90x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 2.00x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 2.00x10-5 
G:FN1_INV _A 1.60x10-5 
G:FNl INV B 1. 60x10-5 
Table 10.7.1. The failure rates for each of the TLD faults used 
in the dual fault state Markov model for the system. 
The other failure rates needed in the model were the instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC for the dispatchilble system faults. For these rates the values calculated using the 
TLD MCS code for repair strategy 4 were used. The values for the single fault states are 
shown in Table 10.4.1 and the values for the dual fault states are given in Appendix 6. 
Also, the system contains four basic events that represent hydromechanicall mechanical 
faults (E:HMU:FAULT_l, E:HMU:FAULT_2, E:HMU:FAULT_3 and E:HMU:FAULT_4). 
These are included in the model as recommended in SAE ARP 5107 [18] by assuming 
that they can cause LOTC from any of the dispatchable fault states and so the 
instantaneous failure rate to LOTC for each of the dispatchable fault states is increased 
by adding the sum of the failure rates for these components (4.0x lO-6). The results 
obtained using this dual fault state Markov model are shown in Table 10.7.2. 
~ &;. 
TrTD 
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 
500 9.26 9.52 9.76 9.96 10.15 
1000 9.55 9.80 10.03 10.22 10.40 
1500 9.82 10.06 10.28 10.47 10.64 
2000 10.07 10.31 10.52 10.70 10.87 
2500 10.31 10.55 10.75 10.92 11.08 
Table 10.7.2. Average system LOTC rates obtained using the 
dual fault state Markov model (failures per 106 flight hours). 
5000 
10.32 
10.56 
10.80 
11.02 
11. 23 
Figure 10.7.1 shows a comparison of the LOTC rates obtained when the system is 
modelJed using the dual fault state Markov model with the rates obtained when the TLD 
MCS code is used and repair strategies I and 4 are implemented. This figure illustrates 
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how the dual fault state Markov results lie between the results obtained using the TLD 
MCS code. Despite the fact that the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC obtained using 
the MCS code are used in the dual fault state Markov model the average system LOTC 
rate is overestimated. This suggests that the structure of the dual fault state Markov 
model does not represent the system sufficiently well enough to give accurate results, 
echoing what was seen for the small systems in the previous chapter. If approximations 
--- such as the failure probability divided by the flight time were used to find the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for the system then one could envisage a situation 
where even less faith should be held in the results obtained from the model. 
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Figure 10.7.1. A comparison of the system LOTC rates 
obtained for TSTD = 1000 hours using the TLD MCS code with 
repair strategy I and 4 and the dual fault state Markov model. 
10.8 Summary 
The first point made here is in regards to the time taken to perform the simulations of 
the system considered in this chapter. In order to obtain results for a table of average 
system LOTC rates as given, for example, in Table 10.3.1, Table 10.3.2, Table 10.3.3 
and Table 10.3.4 the simulations that took place generally took of the order of 5 minutes 
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on a 3.60Hz PC. When instantaneous LOTC rates were also calculated simulations 
took longer because of the greater amount of data that had to be recorded in order to 
perform the required calculations. For example, when calculating just the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTC for the dual fault combinations the calculations took of the order 
of 10 minutes and for the triple fault combinations calculations took of the order of 40 
minutes. This is not particularly excessive given the size of the system and indicates 
- that, were a real system to be modelled, the time taken to perform the simulations 
makes the method a practical proposition. 
The system considered in this chapter contained a number of features that were 
representative of those that might be seen on a real system to which TLD is to be 
applied. The system was modelled using the TLD MCS code and the code was used to 
automatically set dispatch criteria for the system for all four of the repair strategies that 
it is possible to include in the TLD MCS code. Repair strategy 4 was seen to offer clear 
benefits in terms of a lower average system LOTC rate than was obtained for the other 
three strategies. Importance measures were produced for the system that could be used 
to identifY where effort should be applied in improving system components and hence 
the system LOTC rate, if required. An argument was also presented wherein repair 
strategies I to 3 could be used to repair faults in the system at maintenance and the 
LOTC rate could be set to a level that is effectively selected by the user. This would be 
done by performing a major system maintenance operation at intervals throughout the 
operational lifetime of the system. All faults would be cleared from the system at these 
major maintenance operations. The fact that the LOTC rate rises with the operational 
lifetime of the system could be used to help decide the length of the interval between 
these major maintenance operations. 
A thorough review has been conducted of results obtained for the system using the TLD 
MCS code and, in particular, how these results can be interpreted. The results obtained 
using the TLD MCS code in this chapter demonstrate its flexibility and ability to deal 
with larger systems in reasonable lengths of time. Monte Carlo simulation has been 
demonstrated as a powerful tool to use for the analysis ofTLD. 
The other methods considered were a conventional Markov technique and a dual fault 
state Markov model. The conventional Markov technique could not be applied because 
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of the huge number of states in the system model and results were obtained for the dual 
fault state Markov model using the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC calculated using 
the TLD MCS code. The results did not compare favourably with those of the TLD 
MCS code. The differences in the results obtained suggested that less confidence could 
be held in results for which the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for the dual fault 
state Markov model were approximated by a failure probability divided by a flight time. 
The TLD MCS code offers a far greater choice ofTLD scenarios than can be modelled 
using the dual fault state Markov model. The dual fault state Markov model is inflexible 
in comparison, modelling only one situation of maintenance and, even then, not 
modelling that scenario particularly accurately when compared to the TLD MCS code. 
There is no suggestion that the dual fault state Markov model could offer accurate 
results. The one saving grace for the dual fault state Markov model here was that it 
produced results for the system LOTC rate that were overestimates of the values 
obtained using the TLD MCS code when repair strategy 4 is applied. However, when 
one considers that the results for the other three repair strategies at maintenance give 
greater LOTC rates than the dual fault state Markov model then this does not seem such 
a benefit. Perhaps the main weakness of the dual fault state Markov model is the way in 
which it is used. Values are inserted into the model and a system LOTC rate is 
produced. There is no obvious way to see why the system LOTC rate produced takes 
the value that it does. In comparison the TLD MCS code is far more accountable. The 
different repair strategies can be evaluated and the system operational lifetime can also 
be seen to have an effect on the system LOTC rate obtained. This is something which is 
impossible to study using the dual fault state Markov model. From results obtained for 
the system modelled here and also those modelled in the previous chapter, the 
implication is that the TLD MCS code provides a better way to model the application of 
TLD to a system than the currently recommended methods. 
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Chapter 11 : TLD System Optimisation 
11.1 Introduction 
Monte Carlo simulation provides a powerful tool for use in the modelling of TLD. The 
TLD MCS code will calculate the LOTC rate of a system given a system fault tree and 
dispatch criteria. The code also allows the calculation of instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC from the various dispatchable system configurations so that the dispatch 
categories applied to these configurations may be verified. In addition to this, a method 
for automatically setting dispatch criteria for a given system has been demonstrated, in 
which the dispatch criteria for a given system are assigned in an iterative process. 
However, it would also be useful at the design stage to be able to investigate how 
different system structures or designs would affect the application of TLD to systems. 
This would allow TLD to, be integrated into the design process of a system, rather than 
being something that is checked for compliance with regulations after the system has 
been designed. Advantages could be gained if a system were optimised with regard to 
factors that are currently considered in system design, such as cost, weight and 
reliability and also include the application ofTLD. 
This chapter contains a methodology and hypothetical example of how the application 
of TLD could be included in the optimisation of a system at the design stage. A simple 
genetic algorithm technique is applied to optimise a system, the TLD MCS code being 
embedded within the algorithm to carry out calculations relating to the application of 
TLD to the system. Genetic algorithms are briefly introduced and then a simple 
example is studied. 
11.2 Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic algorithms provide a method of optimisation formed on a basis of natural 
selection techniques. In the field of system design a population of string structures is 
used to represent different system configurations and designs to which a fitness is 
associated. Initially, this population of strings is chosen at random. Then, in a process 
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analogous to natural reproduction, the fitter strings are mated to give a new population 
of strings that will each represent new system configurations, each of which will be 
evaluated for fitness before the mating procedure begins again. In every population, the 
fitter strings have a greater chance of reproduction (compare with the Darwinian idea of 
'the survival of the fittest'). This process will hopefully lead to the production of fitter 
offspring to be included in future populations. Genetic algorithms are relatively simple 
and merely involve string manipulation processes. Genetic algorithms are described. in 
more detail in [23] and a brief summary is given here. A simple genetic algorithm is 
composed of three simple operations: 
1. Reproduction 
2. Crossover 
3. Mutation 
The first of these, reproduction, is, as described above, in some way analogous to a way 
of allowing the fittest of a population of strings to progress to the next generation. The 
fitter a string, the more likely it is that the string will progress to the point of mating in 
order to produce the next generation of strings. Thus, depending on the fitness of the 
strings, a number of parents will be chosen to take part in mating. The other two 
operations, crossover and mutation, make up the mating process between the selected 
fitter strings from the parent population. 
Crossover involves taking two parent strings and, at some point in them, selecting a 
crossing site and swapping all characters between that crossover site and the end of the 
string. In this way a string produced for the next generation may develop beneficial 
characteristics that will incorporate good points from each of the parents of that string. 
Figure 11.2.1 shows an example of the crossover operator as performed on two parent 
strings, shown in the left of the diagram. The first step of the crossover process is to 
choose a crossover site at random within the string. In the example depicted the 
crossover site is marked with a dashed line. The next step is to swap in the two parent 
strings the bits that occur after the crossing site. This gives two new strings for the next 
generation. These are shown on the right of the diagram. 
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Crossing site 
, 
, 
, 
, 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1:0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
, 
, 
• , 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1:1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Before Crossover After Crossover 
_ Figure 11.2.1. An example of the crossover operation. Parent 
strings are on the left. 
The final operation, mutation, involves randomly changing individual bits within a 
population of strings. Mutation takes place at a relatively low rate so that useful genetic 
material (or string information) is generally not lost from one generation to the next. 
However, it takes place since the small change that does occur might have a beneficial 
effect on string fitness and, if this is the case, the characteristic would have a higher 
probability of being passed on to future generations. If the mutation had a bad effect on 
fitness the string would be less likely to be involved in producing the next population of 
strings. Figure 11.2.2 shows an example of mutation on a population of four strings. 
One mutation has taken place and the point of the mutation is chosen randomly within 
the population. When mutation takes place a 1 is changed to a 0 or vice versa. The 
number of mutations taking place in any generation is randomly chosen according to 
some low mutation rate. These processes of crossover and mutation mirror the natural 
processes involved in producing offspring, where each parent passes a certain amount 
of genetic material to offspring and a certain amount of mutation within the genetic 
material will also take place. 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
• llWO 0 1 1 1 1 o 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 000 1 0 1 1 
Before Mutation After Mutation 
Figure 11.2.2. An example of the mutation operation. The 
population on the right has undergone one mutation from the 
initial population on the left. 
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The genetic algorithms involved in this chapter and the C++ computer code used to 
implement these algorithms were based on the simple genetic algorithm (SGA) Pascal 
code given in [23]. The TLD MCS code was embedded within this since it was used in 
part to measure the string fitness. 
11.3 An Example System 
In order to illustrate an optimisation process involving TLD the genetic algorithm 
technique is applied to an example system similar in principle to that given in [22] and 
Chapter 9. Here a system to which TLD will be applied is constructed along with a 
number of performance constraints, such as the profit that can be made on such a 
system and the LOTC rate. An aircraft system is to be designed for sale to a customer, 
who will be charged for the system initially, generating revenue for the manufacturer, 
and then the manufacturer, who has designed and supplied the system, will maintain the 
system throughout its specified lifetime with no further cost incurred by the customer 
and all costs incurred by the manufacturer. This is similar to a 'power by the hour' deal 
that some aircraft engine manufacturers are beginning to use. The manufacturer wishes 
to supply a demonstrably good system to the customer, meeting requirements for TLD, 
minimising delays and minimising weight whilst also maximising profit. 
11.3.1 The System Design 
There are a number of options open to the system designers who must decide, for 
example, on the number of channels to be used in the system, the configuration of the 
functions within the system and the quality of components to be used. The completed 
system will consist of two or three channels that are configured as shown in Figure 
11.3.1. Each channel of the system performs two functions, FI and F2, which are 
performed in a series configuration as shown in Figure 11.3.2 for an individual channel 
N. 
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Figure 11.3.1. Possible system configurations - 2 channels (I) 
and 3 channels (r). 
Channel N 
r----------------------I I H Function F,N H Function F2N H 
, _____________________ 2 
Figure 11.3.2. The configuration of a channel, N, ofthe 
system. 
Function FI for each channel N is configured in such a way that two components, AN 
and BN, act in parallel, as shown in Figure 11.3.3. Function F2 for each charmel N can 
be configured in either one of two ways, with the proviso that whichever configuration 
is used for one charmel is also used for the remaining charmels in the system. In this 
way the function F2 for each channel N can take one of the two forms also shown in 
Figure 11.3.3. The first of these involves components eN and DN in a series 
configuration and the second allows the system designer to add a further component, 
EN, in parallel with these components. 
Function F,N Function F2N Function F2N 
,--------, ,--------, ,--------, 
I , , I , , 
I , I , 
~
I , 
, , 
, , 
~-------- .. ~-------- .. .._------_ .. 
Figure 11.3.3. The sole configuration of function FIN for each 
channel and the two possible configurations for function F2N. 
The system may also be constructed in such a way that there is sharing of information 
between charmels. This means that if a function is lost on one (or more) channels that 
the corresponding function from another channel can be used to take its place. Figure 
11.3.4 shows the layout ofa two channel system constructed in this way. 
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Channel X 
r---------------------. , , 
r+ Function F,X r Function F2X I-'-, , , , L __________ 
-----------I Comms I 
,---------- -----------, , , 
'-!- Function F, Y f-L... Function F2 Y fT , , , L _____________________ _ 
Channel Y 
Figure 11.3.4. System layout for a 2 channel system with 
cross-channel communication (comms). 
11.3.2 System Components 
Other options available to the designer include using a single component A for function 
PI for each channel of the system, introducing a structural dependency between the 
channels, or using a separate, identical component A for each of the channels. There are 
two possible versions of each system component that may be used, each having 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of cost, weight and reliability. The designer can 
choose whether to include component E in the system or not for each channel, which 
will bring with it certain advantages or disadvantages. Table 11.3.1 shows a list of 
possible components that can be used in the system, along with their failure rates, 
weight, initial cost and also the maintenance cost and time. 
Note that the components Acommon and ~iffers represent the components that are 
available when A is used as a single component across all channels (Acommon) or as a 
separate component for each channel (AJiffers). The maintenance time shown for each 
component is the time taken to repair that component. The initial cost is the price that 
can be charged by the manufacturer for the specific component within a complete 
system and the maintenance cost is the cost to the manufacturer to repair the component 
when it fails within a system. 
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Component Failure rate Weight Initial Maint. Maint. ~failures l2er hourl Cost Cost Time 
Acommon 
8.5x10-5 80 200 25 2.0 
7.5x10-5 40 300 50 
Adiffers 
8.5x10-5 40 150 50 2.0 
7.5x10-5 20 250 85 
4.0x10-5 25 125 30 2.5 B 
3.6x10-5 35 175 30 
C 3.0x10-
5 25 125 25 2.0 
2.7x10-5 35 175 30 
D 2.0x10-
5 25 125 25 2.0 
1.8x10-5 35 175 30 
E 3.5x10-
5 60 175 40 2.5 
2.5x10-5 80 275 70 
Comms 2.5x10-
5 50 150 40 3.0 
2.0x10-5 25 225 80 
Table I 1.3. I. System components, their failure rates, weights, 
initial costs, costs incurred during maintenance and 
maintenance times. 
The total initial revenue generated by the sale of a system is calculated by adding the 
initial costs of the individual components of the system and adding this to a fixed price 
that the customer will be charged. This fixed cost to the customer is set at 20 000 units. 
For components B, C, D, E and A.!iffers calculating the additional cost to the customer 
means multiplying the number of channels by the initial cost of a single component, as 
shown in Table I 1.3. I. When a single component A is used across all the channels in a 
system, i.e. Aoommon is used, the cost of just one component is added to the system, no 
matter how many channels the system has. When the cross-channel communications 
component, comms, is used in a system the cost added to the total is the initial cost for 
comms multiplied by the number of channels minus one. 
The total weight of a system is calculated in a similar way. For components B, C, D, E, 
and A.tiffers the weight added to the total for the system is obtained by multiplying the 
number of channels by the weight of a single component. When Aoommon is used the 
weight of just one component is added to the total for the system. When the cross-
channel communications component, comms, is used the total cost is increased by the 
weight of just a single component, no matter how many channels the system has. 
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11.3.3 System Maintenance 
The system designer may also choose between two repair strategies at maintenance, 
clearing all faults in the group that caused the maintenance deadline or clearing all 
faults from the system. These correspond to repair strategies 2 and 4 respectively in the 
TLD MCS code. There will be an associated cost for each maintenance event, 
calculated using the values given for the maintenance cost in Table 11.3.1. As a 
component is repaired the total maintenance cost increases by the maintenance cost of 
the component. This total cost is calculated over the course of the system lifetime and 
an average maintenance cost per system lifetime is calculated, which is checked for 
. convergence as the simulations take place. 
Also calculated at maintenance is the total time taken for the maintenance to take place. 
This is calculated by adding the maintenance times for the individual components being 
repaired. The designer requires that delays are kept to a minimum and assumes that 
there will be a delay if the total maintenance time for the system exceeds 4.5 hours. If 
this is the case then a delay is noted and the total number of delays is recorded. The 
average number of delays per system lifetime is calculated using this information. This 
value is checked for convergence as simulations take place. 
11.4 Genetic Algorithm Strings 
In order to incorporate the design process into a genetic algorithm a mapping must be 
developed between the various system design options and the strings to be used in the 
genetic algorithm. For this system I I bit binary strings are used, each string 
representing a different system design and each bit of a string representing a particular 
option to the designer. Whether an individual bit is 0 or I will decide which options the 
designer includes in the system. Table 11.4.1 shows what each of the bits in the string 
represents in terms of the design options. 
For example, consider the string 11100101000 (where the lef'tmost bit represents bit 
o and the rightmost bit represents bit 10). This system will have a different component 
A for each channel (I) each of which has a failure rate of7.5xlO-s (I). Component B 
will have a failure rate of 3.6x 10-5 (I), component C will have a failure rate of 3.0x 10-5 
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(0) and component D will have a failure rate of 2.0x 10.5 (0). Component E will be 
included in the system (1) and will have a failure rate of 3.5xI0·5 (0). Cross channel 
communications will also be included in the system (1) and will have a failure rate of 
2.5x 10-5 (0). The system will be maintained using repair strategy 2 (0) and will have 2 
channels (0). 
Bit 0 1 
0 A common to all channels Different A for each channel 
1 AA = 8.5x 10'5 AA = 7.5xlO'5 
2 AB = 4.0x 10'5 As = 3.6x1O'5 
3 .le = 3.0x lO'5 .le = 2.7xlO'5 
4 AD = 2.0x 10'5 AD = 1.8x 10'5 
5 E not included in system E included in system 
6 AE = 3.5x 10'5 AE = 2.5x1O,5 
7 comms not included in system comms included in system 
8 ,,"omm. = 2.5 x 10'5 ,,"omm. = 2.5x I 0'5 
9 Repair strategy 2 Repair strategy 4 
10 System has 2 channels System has 3 channels 
Table 11.4.1. Interpretation of the bits in the system strings 
used in the genetic algorithm. 
Now consider the same string, 11100101000 as an example for calculating the initial 
revenue and weight of the system. The system has two channels. Therefore the variable 
cost to the customer and the weight of the system will add up as follows: 
• Since there is a different component A for each channel the cost for these will 
be 2x300 = 600 (2 being the number of channels and 300 being the cost of the 
version of component A with the lower failure rate). The weight will be 
2x40= 80. 
• The version of component B with the lower failure rate is also used and the cost 
will be 2x 175 = 350. The weight will be 2x35 = 70. 
• The version of component C with the higher failure rate is used and the cost of 
this will be 2x 125 = 250. The weight will be 2x25 = 50. 
• The version of component D with the higher failure rate is used and the cost of 
this will be 2xl25 = 250. The weight will be 2x25 = 50. 
• The version of component E with the higher failure rate is used and the cost of 
this will be 2x 175 = 350. The weight will be 2x60 = 120. 
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• The version of the cross-channel communications with the higher failure rate is 
used and the cost will be (2-I)xI50 = 150. The weight will be (2-I)x50 = 50. 
Thus the total weight of this system will be 80+70+50+50+120+50 = 420 and the total 
initial revenue will be the fixed revenue of 20 000 units added to the variable revenue 
calculated above which is 600+350+250+250+350+150 = I 950 units. Therefore the 
total initial revenue is 21 950 units. 
11.5 Evaluating String Fitness 
For every system configuration there will be a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. These must be taken into account when calculating a fitness value for a 
string (and hence system configuration). These advantages and disadvantages will come 
in terms of the initial cost, maintenance cost and weight of the system, the number of 
. delays due to the overrun of maintenance operations and, since TLD will be applied to 
the system, the system LOTC rate. It is assumed that the system can be configured in a 
number of ways as detailed in the previous sections and has an operational lifetime of 
130 000 hours, flight length of 10 hours. Both STD and L TD faults are to be maintained 
using MEL maintenance and STD and LTD intervals are fixed at 500 and 2500 flight 
hours respectively. Instead of using the usual limits for deciding STD and L TD 
category faults, these are conservatively set at 80% of their original values, i.e. a new 
limit of 60 failures per 106 flight hours for L TD faults and a limit of 80 failures per 106 
flight hours for STD faults. This was done in order that the TLD categories applied to 
the system were spread from DND through STD to LTD. It proved difficult to set up a 
simple example where the instantaneous LOTC rates observed for the example systems 
were such that they allowed the setting of the various dispatch categories for different 
faults. 
String fitness is evaluated by considering the total profit that will be generated for the 
manufacturer. This is calculated by subtracting the maintenance costs incurred by the 
manufacturer from the total initial revenue gained from the sale of the system to the 
customer. However, since the weight of the system, the system LOTC rate and the 
number of delays experienced during the operational lifetime of the system due to 
maintenance activities are also important, these quantities must be taken into account 
when calculating the fitness of strings. Penalties are added to the profit whenever the 
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weight, LOTe rate and number of delays exceed certain amounts. These penalties 
increase in magnitude the more the value desired by the designer is exceeded. Thus the 
fitness is given in terms of a penalised profit function, given by: 
where: 
Ppen =P-Wpen -Lpen -Dpen ' 11.5.1 
P pen is the penalised profit, 
P is the unpenalised profit calculated by subtracting maintenance costs from the 
initial revenue, 
Wpen is the penalty exerted due to excess weight, 
Lpen is the penalty exerted due to excess system LOTe rate, 
Dpen is the penalty exerted due to excess delays. 
The penalty formulae for weight, LOTe rate and delays take forms similar to that given 
in [24] for a cost penalty function. The weight penalty for a system is given by: 
11.5.2 
where W is the weight calculated for the system, Wmax is the desired value of the weight 
above which penalties are incurred by the system and WI and W2 are constants. Wc is a 
constant given in terms of units of cost that is used to equate the excess weight of the 
system to a reduction in the profits gained. It reflects the fact that a customer using the 
system will incur extra costs due to the extra weight that must be carried throughout the 
operational lifetime of the system and that this will in turn reduce the amount that the 
customer is willing to pay for the system initially. 
The delay penalty for a system is given by: 
11.5.3 
where D is the number of delays experienced during the operational lifetime of the 
system, Dmax is the maximum value of the number of delays above which penalties will 
begin to be incurred by the system and d l and d2 are constants. Dc is a constant given in 
terms of units of cost that is used to equate the excess delays incurred during the 
operational lifetime of the system to a reduction in the profits gained. It reflects the fact 
that a customer using the system will incur extra costs whenever delays imposed on 
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their passengers force them to provide monetary compensation to those passengers. As 
was the case when the weight of the system increased above a certain level, the amount 
that the customer is willing to pay the manufacturer for the system will fall as the 
expected number of delays rises. 
The final penalty is for the system LOTe rate and this is constructed in the same 
~ --manner as the penalties for excess weight and number of delays. The LOTe penalty for 
the system is given by: 
II.5,4 
where L is the calculated LOTe rate, Lmax is the value of the LOTe rate above which 
penalties will begin to be incurred by the system and hand h are constants. Le is a 
. constant given in terms of units of cost that is used to equate the excess LOTe rate to a 
reduction in the profits gained. In this case the reduction in profits is mostly made to 
penalise the system for not complying with the certification requirement that the 
average system LOTe rate must not exceed 10 failures per 106 flight hours. Whilst this 
penalty function might not be ideal (a step function would be better, where as soon as 
the limit Lmax is breached, the penalty steps from zero to a large value) it has been used 
here because of the difficulty encountered in constructing a simple example to be 
analysed using this GA methodology. It does, however, still punish higher LOTe rates 
very severely. 
The constants used in each of the above equations for the penalties imposed on the 
systems are given in Table I 1.5. I. The penalties are structured in such a way that small 
increases in the weight, number of delays or LOTe rate are tolerated more readily than 
larger increases in these variables. In order to explain the constants, consider the weight 
penalty function. The desired value of the weight above which penalties will be 
incurred is Wmax = 450 units. WI = 20 implies that a 20% increase in the weight above 
Wm,x will be tolerated before the penalty imposed rises above that which would be 
imposed if a linear penalty function was used. W2 = 1.5 denotes that the penalty imposed 
will rise in line with a power of 1.5. We = 1000 means that a 20% increase in weight 
above W max will lead to a penalty of 1000 units of cost being imposed on the system. 
The values of variables for delays and LOTe rate are explained in the same way. In 
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order to visualise the meaning of the constants used in relation to the penalties imposed 
consider Figure 11.5.1, Figure 11.5.2 and Figure 11.5.3, which show plots of the Wpen, 
Dpen and Lpen for a range of weights, delays and average system LOTC rates 
respectively. Note how the penalties begin to be imposed as the variable increases 
above the desired value and are initially relatively small but that, further increases are 
punished more severely, seen from the increasing gradient plotted curves. Note how, for 
the system LOTC rate, the penalty imposed is relatively huge in comparison to the 
penalties for the other two variables. This reflects the fact that any increase of the 
LOTC rate above a value of Lmax = 7.5 is less-readily tolerated. 
J 
7000 
6000 
Constant Value Constant Value Constant Value 
Wmax 450 Dmax 5 Lmax 7.5 
WI 20 DI 25 h 10 
W2 1.5 D2 1.25 h 2 
Wc 1000 Dc 500 Le 1000 
Table 11.5.1. The values of constants used in the penalty 
functions. 
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Figure 11.5.1. A graph of the penalty imposed on the profit for 
different system weights. 
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Figure 11.5.2. A graph of the penalty imposed on the profit 
for different expected numbers of delays experienced in the 
system lifetime. 
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Figure 11.5.3. A graph ofthe penalty imposed on the profit for 
different values of the average system LOTe rate. 
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11.5.1 Calculating String Fitness 
The string fitness for a system is calculated as the penalised system profit, as shown in 
equation 11.5.1. Calculating string fitness for each system first involves calculating the 
unpenalised profit and the total number of delays, the weight and the average system 
LOTC rate for that system. These latter three values are then used to calculate penalties 
to the system profit by substituting these values into equation 11.5.2, 11.5.3 or 11.5.4 as 
appropriate. The total profit gained by the manufacturer for the system will depend 
upon both the initial cost of the system to the customer and the maintenance costs 
incurred over the operational lifetime of the system by the manufacturer. The initial cost 
of the system, like the total weight of the system, is calculated knowing the system 
configuration and the weights and initial costs of the components as shown in Table 
11.3.1. During the implementation of the genetic algorithm these two values (initial cost 
and weight) are calculated using the information contained in the strings relating to the 
various system configurations. The maintenance costs for the system are calculated 
using the TLD MCS code, which computes the average maintenance cost over a system 
lifetime. This then allows the calculation of the unpenalised profit. Similarly, the 
number of delays is computed using the ILD MCS code, which works out the length of 
maintenance operations using the values in Table 11.3.1 and calculates how many of 
these exceed 4.5 hours. This number is averaged over the simulations carried out to give 
a number of delays per system lifetime which can then be used to calculate a delay 
penalty in the genetic algorithm. The LOTC rate is also calculated using the TLD MCS 
code. 
In order for the TLD MCS code to be called by the genetic algorithm code the relevant 
inputs for the system (fault tree, basic event failure rates, etc.) are provided to the TLD 
MCS code by the genetic algorithm code according to the string under consideration. 
The TLD MCS code is then used to automatically set dispatch criteria for the system for 
a STD interval of 500 hours and a LID interval of 2500 hours and the system LOTC 
rate is obtained for these values of STD and L TD interval. 
Whilst calculating penalties for the different variables, it is important to note that the 
penalties for system weight, number of delays and average system LOTC rate should 
only be calculated if W max. Dmax or Lmax are exceeded. 
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11.6 Reproduction Probabilities 
When the genetic algorithm is started a population of individual strings are constructed 
and the fitness of those strings is evaluated. The next step in the process is to select the 
strings such that the fitter strings have a greater chance of reproducing offspring to 
make up the next generation of individual strings. The probability of a string being 
selected for reproduction will depend on its fitness. The measure of fitness here is the 
penalised profit and fitter strings will have a higher penalised profit value. [23] 
describes a method of selection wherein strings are allocated a certain percentage of a 
hypothetical roulette wheel according to their fitness. Then, a number of random 
numbers are generated and these are used to identify the individuals which will be 
chosen from this 'weighted roulette wheel.' 
To illustrate such a weighted roulette wheel consider a simple example where 4 
individual strings are to be selected for breeding for the next generation and that the 
four individuals, i, have fitness values,f;, as shown in Table 11.6.1. 
i fi 
1 50 
2 1020 
3 710 
4 500 
Table 11.6.1. Four individuals, i, and their fitness values,f;. 
Figure 11.6.1 shows the roulette wheel representation for these individuals, with the 
entire wheel representing the total fitness of the population, i.e. the sum of the f;'s 
(2280). Each individual is then allocated a segment of the roulette wheel representing its 
own proportion of the total fitness of the population. In order to select an individual 
form the population a random number between 0 and 1 is generated and, with the entire 
roulette wheel representing 1, a position on the wheel is chosen. This position will then 
relate to one of the individuals. Considering this example, individual 2 has the greatest 
probability of being selected, as would be desired since 2 is the fittest of the individuals, 
because it occupies the largest segment of the roulette wheel. Similarly, individual 1 has 
the lowest probability of being selected due to its small proportion of the roulette wheel. 
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1 
4 
2 
3 
Figure 11.6.1. A representation of the 'roulette wheel' for the 
four individuals. 
However, the method used to allocate a proportion of the roulette wheel for individual 
strings in this example does not rely solely on the penalised profit value for individual 
strings. Instead, a method similar to that used in [24] is applied wherein the fitness of a 
string means that it is assigned to a certain category. There are 9 categories to which a 
string can be assigned and each of these has a certain weight associated with it. This 
method is used because it copes with the diverse range of penalised profits possible. It 
also shows a high degree of sensitivity to fitter strings, due to the weighting applied to 
the fitter strings. The categories are given in Table 11.6.2, along with the associated 
range of penalised profit value and the weighting applied to the category. 
UEEerLimit Catel:\0!1 Lower Limit Wei~t 
2000 <! 1 no lower limit 1 
6000 <! 2 > 2000 22 
10000 <! 3 > 6000 32 
12000 <! 4 > 10000 42 
14000 <! 5 > 12000 52 
16000 <! 6 > 14000 62 
17000 <! 7 > 16000 72 
18000 <! 8 > 17000 82 
no upper limit 9 > 18000 92 
Table 11.6.2. The nine fitness categories used in the genetic 
algorithm, their associated upper and lower limits of penalised 
profit and weightings. 
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This allows all of the system strings in a population to be assigned to a category. The 
penalised profit for each string is multiplied by the weight of its associated category. 
These values are added for each category. These sums are then used to determine the 
proportion of the roulette wheel that will be assigned to each category. It then remains 
to allocate a certain proportion of this for each string in each category. Whilst doing this 
it is important that strings in the higher categories are allocated higher proportions than 
those in lower categories. This is ensured by working through the categories from the 
lowest to the highest in the following way. The average percentage allocated to each 
string in the previous non-empty category is calculated, then this percentage is equally 
distributed throughout the strings of the category currently under consideration. This 
leaves a certain excess that is then distributed between the strings in the current 
category according to the ratio of their fitness values. Note that if the string relates to a 
system that returns a loss rather than a profit there will be a negative value for the 
fitness value. To overcome this a fitness of 1000 is assigned throughout the process of 
these calculations for any string whose penalised profit is less than 1000. This has the 
effect of applying a higher percentage than would normally be applied for some 
systems. However, this is considered appropriate since it maintains an element of 
diversity within the gene pool. 
11.7 Results 
Results were obtained using the genetic algorithm code over 20 successive generations 
of individual system strings (plus one generation chosen at random to start off the 
genetic algorithm process). Each generation contained a population of 10 individual 
strings. As mentioned earlier, the options used in the TLD MCS code were for a flight 
length of 10 hours, a system operational lifetime of 130000 hours and both STD and 
LTD faults were to be maintained using MEL maintenance. The STD and LID dispatch 
intervals were set at 500 and 2500 hours respectively. The first check for convergence 
was performed after 500 000 simulations and subsequent checks were performed every 
10 000 simulations. Convergence of LOTC rates was assumed after 3 consecutive 
values were seen to match to 3 s.£ The number of delays and maintenance cost per 
system lifetime were assumed to converge when matches between consecutive values 
were seen to 2 decimal places. 
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The results obtained from the genetic algorithm code are shown in Appendix 7. It can 
be seen from these results that the general trend is, as would be hoped, for the fitness of 
successive generations to improve. This can be confirmed by considering Figure 11.7.1, 
which shows the sum of the penalised profits for all individuals in the generation for all 
21 generations considered. It can be seen that the overall fitness tends to rise, 
particularly after generation I. Note that occasional falls in the sum total fitness for a 
generation will be due to the random effects of the genetic algorithm process, i.e. results 
of mutation or crossover as reproduction occurs. 
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Figure 11.7.1. The sum of penalised profits for the generations 
of individual strings in the genetic algorithm code. 
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The overall fittest individual found was recorded in the genetic algorithm code after 
every generation. Figure 11.7.2 shows a graph of the value of the penalised profit 
obtained for the fittest individual after each generation. Note that this is not necessarily 
the fittest individual in each generation. By generation 3 the best penalised profit 
obtained had risen to 17482.47, which wasn't bettered until generation 9, when an 
individual was generated with fitness 17584.06. A fitter individual was not discovered 
throughout the remainder of the generations. 
In total there were 5 changes of fittest individual identified throughout the course of 
completion of the genetic algorithm. These individuals were identified in generations 0, 
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1, 2, 3 and 9. The data gathered for these individuals during the genetic algorithm is 
shown in Table 11.7.1. 
18000 
16000 
-g 
~ 14000 
~ 1·2000 
e 
a. 10000 
-g 
.~ 
ro 8000 c: 
" a. 
1n 6000 
" ca 
4000 
2000 
0 
0 
String 
00001000011 
11101001011 
10110111101 
11110111101 
11100101111 
-- --------------
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Generation 
Figure 11.7.2. The penalised profit of the fittest individual 
discovered after each generation. 
LOTC Delays Revenue Maint. Weight 
rate Costs 
8.98 6.99 22950 10111. 27 335.0 
1. 50 13.20 24950 7575.34 395.0 
0.32 10.90 26300 3341.17 670.0 
0.28 10.60 26900 3788.29 610.0 
0.32 11.20 26000 4028.98 520.0 
Table 11.7.1. The fittest individual strings identified 
throughout the genetic algorithm process and associated 
variables. 
18 20 
Penalised 
Profit 
9997.58 
12125.38 
15658.47 
17482.47 
17584.06 
The fittest individual identified throughout the course of the entire genetic algorithm 
process is represented by string 11100 I 0 1111. The system represented by this string can 
be decoded using the information shown in Table 11.4.1. It has 3 channels, with a 
separate component A used in function F, of each channel. Function F2 of each channel 
is constructed in a parallel configuration, with component E included along with 
components C and D. The component representing communication between the 
channels, comms, is also included. Figure 11.7.3 shows the system layout. The failure 
rates for the individual components are as shown in Table 11.7.2. The final piece of 
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information contained in the string for this individual is for the repair strategy at 
maintenance. This is repair strategy 4, i.e. all faults are cleared from the system at 
maintenance. When the dispatch criteria were automatically set for this system (for all 
single, dual and triple fault combinations) they were all seen to be LTD. The LOTC rate 
of the system is 0.32 failures per 106 flight hours and there will be 11.2 delays on 
average in a system lifetime. The weight of the system is 520 units and the initial 
revenue generated from the system sale is 26000. The cost of maintenance throughout 
the system lifetime is 4028.98, giving a profit of 21071.02. However, the penalised 
profit was 17584.06. 
Component 
Actiffers 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Comms 
Failure rate 
(failures per hour) 
7.5xlO-5 
3.6xlO-5 
3.0xlO-5 
2. OxlO-5 . 
3.5xlO-5 
2.5xlO-5 
Table 11.7.2. The component failure rates for the optimal 
system. 
Function F,X Function F2X 
,--------, ,--------, 
, , , , 
, , , , 
.. _------_ .. .. _------_ .. 
Function F, Y Function F2 Y 
r--------, ,--------, , , I I , , I I 
."-------_ .. .._------_ .. 
Function F,Z Function F2Z 
,--------, r--------, , , I I , , I I 
1.._------- .. .._------_ .. 
Figure 11.7.3. The layout of the optimal system obtained using 
the genetic algorithm code. 
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11.8 Summary 
The TLD MCS code was embedded within further code written to perform a genetic 
algorithm optimisation procedure. A simple example was constructed which was then 
used to demonstrate a potential application of such a tool. The optimal configuration of 
the system design was achieved relative to certain constraints in order to maximise the 
profit obtained from the sale of such a system. The code written was used to find an 
optimal solution to the problem. Although the example is a simple one it nonetheless 
demonstrates the potential benefits that are available when using MCS to model TLD. 
The MCS can be used to obtain more information about the system and its operation 
during its operational lifetime. For instance, in the simple example considered here, the 
number of expected delays experienced by an airline operator in the system operational 
lifetime and the total cost to the system supplier of maintaining the system were 
calculated along with the system LOTC rate. This process was carried out in addition to 
the automatic setting of dispatch criteria for each system considered. The methods used 
to calculate such values were rudimentary for this simple system but, clearly, if such a 
process were to be implemented for a real system then the methods used could be 
applied as desired by constructing the algorithms for use in the code in the appropriate 
way. 
The use of such a tool, which utilises MCS within a genetic algorithm environment, 
could conceivably be of great value during the design process of a real F ADEC system. 
It could be used during the design phases to show that the FADEC system being 
considered met with the relevant certification requirements whilst also providing 
information that could assist in the choice of components used or the system 
architecture. The use of MCS to model the application of TLD would also allow the 
dispatch criteria for any systems to be set to automatically meet the certification 
requirements. 
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Chapter 12 : Conclusions and Future Work 
12.1 Summary of Work 
Time-Limited Dispatch (TLD) allows the dispatch of aircraft with known faults present 
in the engine control systems. In order to be able to apply TLD to a system the 
compliance of the system with certification regulations must be demonstrated. To show 
the certification requirements are being met and that the levels of system safety are 
sufficient a good mathematical model must be constructed. This must be able to deal 
with the mechanics of the TLD processes. 
Fault tree analysis was discussed but this has a number of shortcomings when 
considered in relation to modelling TLD. The size of systems to which TLD is applied 
results in large fault trees that wiII require approximations to be carried out in order to 
perform any quantitative or qualitative systems analysis. The basic events of a fault tree 
must be statistically independent in order for analyses to be carried out. This is not the 
case for systems to which TLD is being applied. Aircraft operating procedures 
introduce dependencies and also maintenance and repair operations will introduce 
further dependencies. For these reasons fault tree analysis is unsuitable as a method of 
modelling TLD. 
Markov analysis is capable of dealing with the dependencies that prevent the 
application of fault tree analysis to the application of TLD. However, Markov analysis 
requires that the system should be stationary, i.e. that the rates within the model are 
constant with time. This might be a reasonable assumption for systems to which TLD 
will be applied. However, it could be the case that certain system components have non-
constant failure or repair rates. For example, a component could have a failure 
probability that follows a Weibull distribution. Perhaps the most important aspect of 
Markov models that makes them unsuitable for modelling TLD is their size. Markov 
models grow exponentially with the system size and, as such, problems of a state space 
explosion are possible on real, large aircraft systems. 
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Monte Carlo simulation was presented as a suitable technique for the modelling of 
TLD. It is simple, based on logical rules and capable of dealing with the problems that 
affect fault tree analysis and Markov analysis such as dependencies or large system 
sizes. Information can potentially be found when performing a Monte Carlo simulation 
that would be difficult or impossible to obtain using any other techniques. Monte Carlo 
simulations can use a fault tree representation of the system, which is a structured, 
--- logical method of representing a system. This is a good characteristic for the Monte 
Carlo simulation to use from fault tree analysis. Perhaps the main potential negative 
point of Monte Carlo simulation is the large amount of time needed for simulations to 
take place. However, the fast speed of modem digital computers and the potential for 
Monte Carlo simulation codes to be parallelised should take away the concerns 
associated with this problem. 
Currently recommended techniques for modelling TLD were introduced. These involve 
a number of simplifYing assumptions and require the calculation of the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTC of the system. However, the method of calculating these rates is 
not a simple task, and would presumably require the use of fault tree analysis or 
Markov analysis. The recommended method involves using fault tree analysis to 
compute an approximation for the failure probability of the system and dividing this by 
an average flight time. This approximation wiII not necessarily be a good one. Each one 
of the recommended models involves a vast reduction in the number of system states 
and, as such, may not represent the system characteristics in an accurate way. The MEL 
maintenance technique is said to be inherently modelled by these methods. 
A C+t- code (TLD MCS) was developed that allows TLD analysis to be performed 
using Monte Carlo simulation. The TLD MCS code was capable of modelling many of 
the different maintenance options that are possible when implementing TLD, such as 
MEL maintenance, PIR maintenance and opportunistic maintenance. Four different 
repair strategies are possible at maintenance, each of which represents carrying out 
various amounts of repair work to the system at maintenance, from the minimum 
amount possible to the maximum amount possible. Many other options are available to 
the user of the TLD MCS code, including options such as convergence criteria, the 
system operational lifetime and flight length. The output produced can include files 
containing the events that occur within simulations, the average system LOTC rates, the 
234 
instantaneous system LOTC rates and the dispatch criteria that can be applied to the 
system in order to satisfY the requirements for the instantaneous system LOTC rates. 
Methods of calculating importance measures for the system fault tree basic events and 
the TLD faults were also developed. 
Transient methods of solution for Markov models were introduced and a C++ code was 
developed that could be used to solve a Markov model in this way for a system. The 
numerical integration procedures within the code were implemented using a 4th order 
Runge-Kutta method. Different methods of including repairs within the Markov models 
were described, one of which involved the inclusion of repairs in the model as repair 
rates within the transition rate matrix for the system. The second method involved 
carrying out repairs at discrete points within the numerical integration procedure by 
shifting the values of the appropriate state probabilities. The importance of the ordering 
of the shifting of these probabilities was discussed in relation to carrying out the repairs 
in the required manner. Similarities were noted between the different methods of 
including repairs in the transient Markov models and the MEL and PIR maintenance 
approaches. However repairs are included, the maintenance approach will not exactly 
match the approach that is used in reality in the way that is possible when using Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
Two simple systems were modelled using the different recommended methods just 
described, the transient Markov model code and the TLD MCS code. The Time-
Weighted Averages (TWA) approach gave inaccurate results even for the small two 
component system whereas the results obtained using the dual fault state Markov model 
and the two other methods were in reasonable agreement. This backs up the claim that 
the reduced fault state Markov approach is the better of the recommended methods [1]. 
The method of approximating instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for the SAE methods 
by dividing a probability by a flight time was seen to be potentially inaccurate when the 
rates were compared to those obtained using the TLD MCS code. A problem associated 
with this for the dual fault state Markov models was that the models were shown to be 
heavily dependent upon rates used within them. This would be a potential source of 
problems if the failure rates in the models could themselves be inaccurate. The structure 
of the reduced fault state Markov models was called into question because of the fact 
that the results obtained using the model were seen to be optimistic in comparison to the 
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TLD MCS code when failure rates from the MCS were substituted into the reduced 
fault state Markov model. The MCS code's potential flexibility was demonstrated by 
modelling many different maintenance options for the simple system models. 
Comparisons could be made between the results obtained using the different 
maintenance techniques. The process of automatically setting dispatch criteria was 
demonstrated on a system and shown to produce good quality results. It was argued that 
---the TLD MCS code produced the more accurate results due to the way that the TLD 
process was more accurately represented within it. The results obtained for the transient 
Markov model were in reasonable agreement with the TLD MCS code. However, the 
TLD MCS code is still considered to produce the more accurate results of the two 
techniques due to its accurate portrayal ofTLD. 
A large scale system was modelled, the fault tree of which contained features that were 
representative of a real aircraft system. This countered one of the earlier concerns about 
Monte Carlo simulation, namely that simulations could take a long time to perform to 
obtain results to the required levels of system convergence. Simulations for the system 
were seen to produce results converged to 3 significant figures in times of around 40 
minutes. The TLD MCS code was used to set dispatch criteria for the system that would 
satisty an adjusted set of requirements for the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for 
the system. Importance measures were produced, which could be used to identity where 
attention should be focussed in order to improve the system performance. The option in 
the TLD MCS code allowing dependencies between basic event repairs to be modeIled 
was used. This specified 'associated' repairs that ensured that certain faults would be 
cleared from the system whenever certain TLD faults were repaired. An argument was 
also presented wherein a shorter operational lifetime would be modelled that could be 
used to represent a major maintenance operation taking place at regular intervals 
throughout a system lifetime. Clearing all faults from the system at these major 
maintenance operations would allow the less rigorous repair strategies to be used while 
still allowing the system LOTC rates obtained to match those obtained using the more 
rigorous repair strategies. The conventional Markov model was too large to consider for 
the large scale system, the state space explosion problems coming to light here. Results 
were obtained for the dual fault state Markov model using instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC calculated using the TLD MCS code. However, even with these rates included in 
the model, which are considered to be accurate, the dual fault state Markov model did 
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not produce similar results. If the decision had been taken to approximate the failure 
rates using the probability over flight time technique it is likely that the results obtained 
would be worse still. The dual fault state Markov model was seen to be inflexible in 
comparison to the TLD MCS code, which could model more situations applicable to 
TLD and was more accountable in the way the results were obtained. 
-Finally, a technique of system design optimisation was demonstrated for a simple 
example. The TLD MCS code was embedded within a genetic algorithm code and this 
was used to choose an optimal design for a system given a number of constraints. The 
TLD MCS code and the simulation technique in general demonstrated more flexibility 
and uses here by not only performing the automatic setting of dispatch criteria for 
various systems but also producing more information about the system, namely 
measures of the number of delays expected in a system lifetime and also the expected 
maintenance cost per system lifetime. This serves to demonstrate that the potential uses 
for a Monte Carlo simulation technique are potentially widely varied. 
12.2 Conclusions 
• Recommended methods of modelling fault tree analysis use certain assumptions 
and approximations that reduce their accuracy in modelling the TLD of aircraft 
systems: 
o The vastly reduced number of system states provides a poor 
representation of the system structure, 
o The technique of dividing a failure probability by a flight time to 
approximate the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for dispatchable 
system faults is open to doubt as to its accuracy, 
o Even when instantaneous failure rates to LOTC that were considered 
accurate were used in the system the computed average system LOTC 
rate did not agree with those obtained using other techniques. 
• The results obtained using the transient Markov model for the eight component 
system back up the suggestion that Monte Carlo simulation provides an accurate 
set of results for a system. The transient Markov model offers a full Markov 
model solution to the TLD problem, with repairs included in two different ways 
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conceptually similar to MEL and PIR maintenance. The agreement between the 
MCS and transient Markov model results reinforce the suggestion of inaccuracy 
in the recommended techniques. 
• Monte Carlo simulation provides a flexible, accountable means of modelling the 
application of TLD to a system. 
o Great use can be made of the fact that dispatch criteria for the system 
can be iteratively set using a simulation technique, thus aliowing the 
dispatch criteria for the system to be set according to the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTC of the dispatchable fault states whilst assuring that 
targets for the system LOTC are met, 
o Many maintenance options can be modelled, which is potentially of 
great importance when TLD will be applied, since advantage should be 
taken of the option to use TLD to schedule maintenance operations in 
order that disruptions be minimised. 
• As regards the time taken to perform a Monte Carlo simulation analysis of a 
system, the time taken to model a large scale system displaying properties 
similar to those that might be seen on a real aircraft was reasonably short. 
However, even ifsimulations were seen to take times of the order of days to run 
this would not be unacceptable when weighed against the length of time taken 
in designing and certifying an aircraft engine. 
• When implementing TLD it could be prudent to perform a major maintenance 
operation regularly in order to clear all faults from the system at maintenance. 
This conclusion was reached after considering the results obtained from 
modelling various system operational lifetimes and observing that the lower the 
operational lifetime, the lower the system LOTe rate. This then led to the idea 
of using a lower operational lifetime to model a regular major maintenance 
operation. 
• Basic event and TLD fault importance measures were produced which enable 
weaknesses within the system under consideration to be modelled. 
• Monte Carlo simulation of TLD can be used within a genetic algorithm 
optimisation procedure in order to assist in the design of a system subject to 
certain constraints. Monte Carlo simulation can be used in such circumstances 
to obtain more information about the system than just the various LOTC rates 
238 
associated with the system. Examples were given for the calculation of expected 
delays and expected maintenance cost over the lifetime of the system. 
12.3 Future Work 
The TLD MCS code provides the basis for a tool that could be used for the system 
safety analysis of aircraft systems. Potential future work could look at the speed and 
efficiency of the code. In particular, the opportunity exists to parallelise the code, which 
could offer great benefits in terms of the speed of the simulation procedures. The same 
parallelisation procedure could also be applied to a genetic algorithm technique such as 
that presented in Chapter 11. Such increases in efficiency would be of most use when 
real, large aircraft systems were modelled. 
Another option that might be worthy of investigation when considering TLD is a more 
flexible method of applying dispatch categories to faults. The potential exists for a 
sliding scale of dispatch categories, allowing different lengths of dispatch depending 
upon the LOTC rate of the system. For example, instead of just two dispatchable 
categories, STD and LTD, perhaps the system could be dispatched with a fault present 
for a time interval that was more directly related to that fault's instantaneous failure rate 
to LOTC. This could mean that the dispatchable range of LOTC rates for faults (up to 
100 failures per 106 flight hours) could be split into a greater number of intervals, thus 
offering a number of grades of dispatch. Another alternative is that the dispatch interval 
for a fault could be in some way directly proportional to its instantaneous failure rate to 
LOTC. 
The most obvious work for the future would be the modelling of a real aircraft system. 
This would provide the ultimate test and validation of the techniques used and could 
potentially provide further information as to what other information of interest could be 
extracted using Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Appendix 1. User Options File For the TLD MCS Code 
User Options File for TLD MCS Code 
################################################################# 
############################# times ############################# 
################################################################# 
AUTO_SET_TLD_CRITERIA false # 
################################################################# 
# # 
FLIGHT_LENGTH 10 # 
SYSTEM_OPERATIONAL_LIFE 130000 # 
# # 
VARY_OPERATIONAL_LIFE false # 
LOWER OPERATIONAL LIFE 1000 # 
- -UPPER_OPERATIONAL_LIFE 100000 # 
STEP OPERATIONAL LIFE 1000 # 
- -# # 
################################################################# 
##################### maintenance approaches #################### 
# # 
STD MAINTENANCE APPROACH mel # 
- -LTD_MAINTENANCE_APPROACH mel # 
# # 
VARY_MAINTENANCE_APPROACH false # 
# # 
################################################################# 
####### ratio of inspection interval to dispatch interval ####### 
# # 
PIR_LOWER 1.5 # 
PIR UPPER 1.75 # 
PIR STEP 0.25 # 
# # 
VARY PIR RATIO false # 
# # 
################################################################# 
################ repair strategies at maintenance ############### 
# # 
OPPORTUNISTIC MAINTENANCE false # 
# # 
OPPORTUNISTIC TIME 250 # 
# # 
REPAIR STRATEGY 2 # 
# # 
VARY_REPAIR_STRATEGY false # 
# # 
################################################################# 
####################### dispatch intervals ###################### 
# # 
STD_DISP_LOWER 500 # 
STD_DISP_UPPER 1000 # 
STD_DISP_STEP 500 # 
# # 
LTD_DISP_LOWER 1000 # 
LTD_DISP_UPPER 2500 # 
LTD_DISP_STEP 500 # 
# # 
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User Options File for TLD MCS Code 
VARY_DISPATCH_INTERVALS true # 
# # 
SHIFT_DEADLINE TO START_OR_END end # 
# # 
################################################################# 
################# maximum number of simulations ################# 
# # 
NUMBER OF SIMULATIONS 100000000 # 
# # 
################################################################# 
###################### convergence options ###################### 
# # 
FIRST CHECK 1000000 # 
CHECK_EVERY 50000 # 
SIG FIG 3 # 
CON SEC VALS 3 # 
MINIMUMJAILURES 1000 # 
# # 
################################################################# 
###################### generation of output ##################### 
# # 
PRINT false # 
PRINT EVERY 10 # 
# # 
################################################################# 
################ instantaneous LOTC rate options ################ 
# # 
CHECK_INSTANTANEOUS_LOTC_RATE false # 
UNORDERED true # 
# # 
################################################################# 
################### importance measure option ################### 
# # 
CALCULATE_IMPORTANCE_MEASURES false # 
# # 
################################################################# 
#################### random number generator #################### 
# # 
SEED AT RANDOM true # 
# # 
################################################################# 
#### system non-dispatchable with more than'n faults present #### 
# # 
DND above 3 # 
# # 
################################################################# 
# test the instantaneous LOTC rates for faults up to this order # 
# # 
TEST_ORDER 2 # 
# # 
################################################################# 
# calculate the full-up instantaneous LOTC rate for the system # 
# # 
CALC FU RATE false # 
# # 
################################################################# 
# file names / folders 
# 
TREE FILE 
F R FILE 
C:\path\system fault tree.txt 
C:\path\system-failure rates.txt 
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TLD FILE 
NEW TLD FILE 
FAULT_LIST 
RELATED REPAIRS 
OUTPUT FOLDER 
~ 
C:\path\system initial tld criteria.txt 
C:\path\system-updated-tld-criteria 
C:\path\system-fault list.txt 
C:\path\system-related repairs.txt 
C:\path\results -
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Appendix 2. TLD MCS Code Details 
A2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6 an outline of the methodology developed for the MCS modelling of TLD 
is presented. Appendix 2 looks at the options that are provided to the TLD MCS code in 
an input data file and the main modules of the TLD MCS code and the tasks that they 
perform. 
A2.2 Simulation Options 
The user of the TLD MCS code must specify a number of criteria prior to using the 
simulation code. These criteria are used to determine the way that the code is 
implemented lengths of dispatch and inspection intervals, and to how many significant 
figures the LOTC rates should be obtained. The text file also contains information that 
'turns on' or 'turns off' certain features within the code. This information is provided to 
the code in the form of a text file the name of which is passed to the TLD MCS code by 
the user. An example of such a text file is given in Appendix I. An overview of a1l of 
the options and of their effects on the ensuing simulations is given here, along with a 
brief description of other information required by the code. 
A2.2.] Specific Monte Carlo Simulation Options 
The first of these is an option that determines whether or not the random number 
generator used should be seeded with a random number or not. If the random number 
generator is started from the same point at the beginning of different code 
implementations it allows the exact reproduction of a set of results. If the random 
number generator is to be seeded with a random value this random value is generated 
using the current time obtained from the computer. 
The second of these options specifies the maximum number of simulations that are to 
be carried out when computing the appropriate LOTC rates (system LOTC rate and, in 
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some cases, instantaneous LOTe rates from dispatchable system configurations) and 
importance measures. This is used so that, should all of these values not have converged 
after this number of simulations, the simulations will stop. 
A2.2.2 Flight Length Option 
The length of a flight (in hours) is specified and this is used throughout all of the 
simulations. The flight length cannot be varied while simulations are in progress. Thus, 
throughout the course of the simulations the flights are of constant length. This is 
considered to be a reasonable assumption. 
A2.2.3 Operating Life Options 
There are a number of options available regarding the operating life of the system. The 
operating life is defined as the length of time that the system will be in service on an 
aircraft, or the length of time that the system will be in service before being returned to 
a guaranteed fully-up state, if it is possible to do so. The operating life is entered in 
flight hours. Each individual simulation will model the system throughout the operating 
life. There is also an option to obtain results for different lengths of operating life. 
In the case where the operating life of the system is not varied one value is specified, 
which will be used in all of the simulations, as was the case with the flight length. 
When the operating life of the system is to be varied a lower operating life, an upper 
operating life and a step length are specified. Simulations are implemented and a LOTe 
rate calculated for all operating lives specified. This option was included to investigate 
how the LOTe rate ofthe system varies with differing operating lives. 
A2.2.4 Repair Strategy Options 
The repair strategy to be employed at maintenance deadlines can be specified. Anyone 
of four strategies may be specified or the results can be produced for all four of the 
strategies. The four strategies represent different levels of maintenance being applied to 
the system at maintenance deadlines, ranging from the very least amount of work that 
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may be carried out to allow further dispatch to the maximum amount of work that can 
be undertaken. The four different strategies are as follows: 
I. Repair the last fault of the group that caused the current maintenance deadline, 
2. Repair all faults in the group causing the current maintenance deadline, 
3. Repair all faults in the same category as the group causing the current deadline, 
4. Repair all faults present in the system. 
There is one further option that may be specified, called opportunistic maintenance. If 
this is chosen to be implemented then the user must specify a time in hours that shall be 
called here the opportunistic maintenance window. If, at a maintenance deadline, any 
further maintenance deadlines are due to take place within this opportunistic 
maintenance window then the repairs that would take place at these deadlines will also 
be carried out. The four repair strategies listed above and opportunistic maintenance are 
described in more detail in Section 6.7. 
A2.2.5 Maintenance Approach Options 
These options specify the maintenance approaches to be used at STD and L TD 
deadlines or, alternatively, specify that simulations should be implemented for all 
possible combinations of the maintenance approaches. 
Three options of maintenance approaches are considered. Both STD andLTD faults can 
be addressed using the MEL maintenance approach, both can be addressed using the 
PIR maintenance approach or, finally, STD faults can be addressed using the MEL 
approach and LTD faults addressed using the PIR approach. The final combination, 
where STD faults could be maintained using the PIR approach and L TD using the MEL 
approach was considered to be unrealistic. However, it is possible to specify any of the 
maintenance approaches for STD and L TD faults. 
Note that the maintenance approaches cannot be varied when varying the operating life 
of the system being modelled. This restriction is made purely to allow manageable 
output of results. 
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A2.2.6 Dispatch Interval Options 
This option detennines for which value/s of dispatch interval results must be obtained. 
As was the case with the operating life of the system, the dispatch intervals may be set 
to a specific value and LOTC rates obtained from the TLD MCS code. Alternatively, as 
was also the case with the operating life, results may be obtained over a range of values 
for each of the STD and LTD intervals at a given step length. The dispatch intervals that 
are specified by the user are given in flight hours. An option also exists to specify that, 
should a maintenance deadline be due to faH mid-flight, it can be shifted to either the 
beginning or the end of the flight in which it is due to fall. This is explained further in 
Sections 6.8.2 and 6.8.3. 
The dispatch intervals cannot be varied when varying the system operating life. This 
enables manageable output of results. 
A2.2. 7 Periodic Inspection Interval Options 
If PIR maintenance is to be used during the simulations perfonned by the TLD MCS 
code the length of the inspection interval can be specified. Alternatively the user may 
specify a range of values of the inspection interval that are to be used to obtain results 
for the system. In this case, however, the inspection intervals are not given in tenns of 
flight hours but by defining the ratio that the inspection interval wi1\ take to the dispatch 
interval. For example, the inspection intervals could be set at 1.S times the size of the 
dispatch intervals used in the simulations. When a range of values are specified in the 
input file a step length is again supplied to increment between the lower and upper 
value. 
When varying the operating life of the system the user may not specifY that the 
inspection intervals are to vary. This is, again, to allow manageable output of results 
when the operating life is varied. 
248 
A2.2.8 Dispatchable Configuration Options 
Options in this category specify whether the LOTC rates from individual system 
dispatchable configurations or importance measures are to be calculated. Basic event 
importance measures would be calculated in this case, along with importance measures 
for the system's dispatchable configurations. If LOTC rates and importance measures 
are to be calculated for the dispatchable configurations then it must be specified how the 
. --values will be calculated - for ordered combinations of faults or for unordered 
combinations of faults. If the ordering of faults is specified to be important the times 
spent dispatching from the dispatchable system configurations and the number of 
failures from those configurations is calculated for specific fault orders. If not the times 
and number of failures are calculated given that the faults are present in the system. 
This is perhaps easiest to explain given an example. Consider two faults, A and B, that 
may occur within a system and that instantaneous failure rates to LOTC must be 
calculated for this system. If the ordering of the faults is specified to be of importance 
LOTC rates will be calculated for the following dispatchable configurations; A, B, AB 
and BA. If the ordering of faults is not specified as important then the LOTC rates will 
be calculated for the following dispatchable system configurations; A, B and AB, 
where, in this case, AB describes the system configuration where A and B are present in 
the system in either order AB or BA. 
This option was included in the TLD MCS code to optimise, when appropriate (i.e. 
when fault ordering is unimportant), the perfonnance of the code when the 
instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system configurations and importance 
measures are to be calculated. This optimisation occurs because of the large reduction 
in the amount of bookkeeping that occurs during the implementation of simulations. 
Also, when fault ordering is taken into account the time spent dispatching from certain 
system configurations and the number of failures from those configurations can require 
a large number of simulations to reach levels where convergence can be verified. This is 
particularly true for rare configurations and higher order fault combinations. When fault 
ordering is not taken into account the number of simulations required before 
convergence is achieved is lower. 
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A2.2.9 Convergence Options 
When obtaining results for the LOTC rate of the system a value for this rate is 
calculated after every x simulations. If y consecutive values match to z significant 
figures the LOTC rate is deemed to have converged. The values of x, y and z may be 
specified along with after how many simulations these checks must begin. This allows 
for some settling of the LOTC rate before the values are to be calculated and compared. 
This is of particular use when calculating the instantaneous LOTC rates from the 
dispatchable system configurations in addition to the system LOTC rate, since the 
calculation and comparison of a large number of LOTC rates could take a significant 
processing effort. If the rates are unlikely to have converged there is little point in 
calculating them every x simulations. These values of x, y and z are also used when 
calculating importance measures. 
A2.2.10 Output Options 
This final option specified decides whether or not an output file should be produced 
showing the processes involved in applying the maintenance procedures specified by 
the user to a series of n individual simulations, where n may be specified by the user. 
This file can then be checked to see an example of how TLO will be applied to a system 
during its lifetime. It will show in chronological order, for each of the n simulations, 
times of fault occurrences and any subsequent TLO deadlines that are applied, what 
faults will be repaired at maintenance deadlines and whether the system fails before the 
maximum operating life is reached. This option was of particular use when debugging 
the code. 
A2.2.11 Other Information Required 
The only other information that must be supplied to the TLO MCS code relates to the 
files containing information about the system to be modelled. There are five that are 
required. Examples of such files are given in Appendix I and Appendix 5. The first file 
required contains a text representation of the system fault tree, in terms of a list of the 
gate names in the tree, along with their type and their inputs. The second file provided is 
also a text file, and lists all of the basic events in the fault tree, along with their failure 
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distributions and associated parameters. The TLD MCS code accepts the normal, 
exponential and Weibull failure time distributions, but could easily be adapted to accept 
other distributions if necessary. The third file required lists all of the basic or 
intermediate events from the system fault tree that will be considered as the faults to be 
included in a TLD analysis of the system. These are the faults that appear in the 
dispatch criteria. This is of particular importance when the code automatically sets 
dispatch criteria for the system but is also useful as it provides a means of verifying the 
faults that have been included in the dispatch criteria file. This dispatch criteria file is 
another text file that contains a complete list of the dispatch criteria that will be applied 
to the system. This must be given in terms of ordered combinations of the basic events 
from the fault tree along with an identifier (DND, STD or LTD) to define the TLD 
category that will be applied to the system when that combination is present. If the the 
dispatch criteria must be set automatically by the code then it is not necessary for a 
complete list of dispatch criteria to be supplied. In this situation any dispatch criteria for 
faults/fault combinations supplied in the text file will be held constant (or reduced if 
necessary) while dispatch criteria for other faults/fault combinations may be amended 
by the code. See Section A2.3.!3 for more detail. 
The final text file supplied to the code contains a list of faults (basic and intermediate 
events from the system fault tree) that must be repaired as particular faults within the 
dispatch criteria are repaired. Here, they will be called 'associated' faults. For instance, 
it may be the case that, when a certain fault from the dispatch criteria is cleared from the 
system, another fault from another part of the fault tree should also be repaired. This 
process is explained further in Section 6.7.6. The process itself will account for some of 
the dependencies that may be present within the system due to the maintenance 
procedures (the same dependencies that make the application of conventional Fault 
Tree analysis to the TLD problem unsuitable). 
A number of faults above which the dispatch category applied to the system will be 
DND can be specified. This represents the assumption that, once the system has 
degraded to such an extent that there are a certain number ofTLD faults present, further 
dispatch will be forbidden. If there are more faults than the number specified as the 
maximum allowed when maintenance takes place the system will be returned to an 'as-
new' state. 
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In addition to the aforementioned text files, a folder to which files containing the results 
and output from the simulations will be sent and a filename to which the applied 
dispatch criteria will be sent when simulations are performed for a system are specified. 
This is of particular importance when the code is used to automatically set the dispatch 
criteria and these criteria are changed by the code. Before the dispatch criteria are 
output to file a numerical identifier is appended to the filename in order to relate it to 
the change of dispatch criteria. A similar process occurs for the other results output 
from the code, see Section 6.9. 
A2.3 General Descriptions ofTLD MCS Code Modules 
A2.3.1 The 'main 'Module 
This is the main driver program used in the TLD MCS code. A general algorithm is 
shown in Figure AI. Prompts are issued for the name of the text file containing the 
options that will dictate how the simulations are carried out. Checks are made at this 
point on the validity of the data supplied. The system fault tree is then input, along with 
the failure time distributions for basic events. The system fault tree structure and failure 
data are stored in dynamically allocated arrays within the TLD MCS code. This allows 
memory resources to be used efficiently and also allows large structures to be defined 
(relating to the large number of basic events that could potentially be involved). An 
initialisation procedure is then carried out to the relevant arrays and structures at this 
starting point. What happens next depends on whether the dispatch criteria for the 
system are to be automatically set by the code or not. If they are to be set automatically 
then the auto_set_tld_criteria module is called to perform this task, from which 
control_sims is ultimately called to perform the necessary simulations. If not then the 
dispatch criteria supplied are input from file and stored in dynamically allocated arrays. 
Storing these dispatch criteria in an efficient manner is one of the crucial parts of the 
TLD MCS code. As a fault occurs within the system it must be possible to check the 
dispatch criteria in an efficient manner. The method used to store the dispatch criteria 
and the reasons for this particular choice of method are described in Section 6.5. If the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are to be found for the system then 
dispatch_configuration is called in order to identify the dispatchable system 
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configurations and allocate memory for the structures used to store data for these 
configurations. At this stage control_sims is called to handle the necessary simulations. 
( START) 
If 
Input and check user 
options. Input fault tree 
data. initialisation. 
Input TLD criteria as 
specified by the user. 
Carry out the 
simulations required: 
controesims. 
C,--_E_ND~) 
Y Automatically set 
dispatch criteria: 
auto_set _tld _criteria. 
Y IdentifY dispatchable 
system configurations: 
dispatchJonjiguration. 
Figure A 1. A general algorithm for the main module of the 
TLD MCS code. 
A2.3.2 The 'control sims' Module 
This module of the code ensures that the simulations are carried out for the correct 
values or sets of values of the variables used within the code. The vary_user _options 
module is chosen to control the values of relevant variables. For instance, if STD 
intervals have been specified by the user to vary between 50 and 200 in steps of 50, this 
module will set the STD interval to 50, 100, ISO and 200 and ensure simulations are 
carried out using these values. The simulations module is called to carry out the 
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simulations with variables specified according to the user options by the contro(sims 
module. 
A2.3.3 The 'dispatch_configuration' Module 
This module is used by the TLD MCS code only in the case when the user requires the 
LOTC rates, A;,L, from the dispatchable system configurations, i, to be calculated. This 
is one of the options provided in the option data file supplied to the code. The role of 
the dispatch_configuration module is to find which system configurations are actually 
dispatchable. The general algorithm is outlined in Figure A2. 
• 
The first step is to recognise that the full-up dispatchable configuration (Le. that with no 
faults present) is dispatchable. The relevant structures are updated to hold the data for 
this dispatchable configuration. Next the module goes through a looping process, 
constructing systeI:J1 configurations (basically groups of faults) and testing to see 
whether these configurations are dispatchable. First of all the module checks for system 
failure with these faults present. If the system doesn't fail the TLD criteria being 
applied to the system are checked to see if this configuration is dispatchable. In the case 
that the group of faults does not cause system failure and is not a DND category fault 
group this particular fault configuration is dispatchable. In this case the relevant 
structures are updated to hold the data for this configuration. Whether or not the system 
configuration just tested is dispatchable, the module then generates another system 
configuration, if any exist, and tests its dispatchability. Note that the dispatchable 
system configurations can be ordered or unordered, as specified in the options data file 
(see Section A2.2.8). 
Amongst the data that is stored in the structures made by this module for each 
dispatchable configuration is the total time spent in that dispatchable configuration and 
the total number of system failures when dispatching from that configuration. These are 
used to calculate the instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable configurations. 
The remaining data structures made by this module for each dispatchable configuration 
are used to check for convergence of the LOTC rates calculated from each 
configuration. Similar data is stored for the dispatchable configurations for the 
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calculation of the importance measures that relate to the dispatchable faults. The 
calculation of importance measures is also explained in Section 6.9.1.3. The processes 
of calculating the LOTC rates and importance measures are explained in Section 6.9.1 
and checking for convergence is described in Section A2.3.12. 
y 
( START) 
f 
Store the full-up 
configuration as a 
dispatchahle configuration. 
Construct another 
system configuration 
(group of faults). 
Store the configuration as 
a dispatchahle one in the 
relevant structure. 
C ____ E_ND ___ )
N 
N 
Figure A2. A general algorithm for the dispatch_configuration 
module of the TLD MCS code. 
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A2.3.4 The 'vary_user_options' Module 
This module is used to vary parameters used by the TLD MCS code, if required. These 
variations, specified in the user options file, are discussed in Section A2.2 and include 
quantities such as the STD and L TD intervals, the periodic inspection intervals, the 
maintenance approaches and repair strategies to be applied and the operating life of the 
system. The vary_user _options module allocates values to the appropriate variables 
within the TLD MCS code to be passed to the simulations module, where a group of 
simulations is implemented using these variables. The simulations module is described 
in Section A2.3.6, where the term 'group of simulations' is explained. 
A2.3.5 The 'initialisation' Modules 
These modules are used to initialise data structures at various points in the TLD MCS 
code. An example of one of these initialisation modules is the process after a single 
simulation, when the system is returned to an 'as new' state. Another example of an 
initialisation process occurs after the system LOTC rate has been found for certain 
lengths of STD and L TD intervals. If the system LOTC rate is to be found for other 
STD and LTD intervals it (and the values used to calculate it) must be reset to zero 
before carrying out further simulations. 
A2.3.6 The 'simulations'Module 
This algorithm is used by the TLD MCS code to implement a group of simulations. The 
group of simulations will be carried out for certain values of STD and L TD intervals, 
and for specific values of other quantities that may be varied, such as the maintenance 
approaches, repair strategies or operating life of the system. These latter quantities are 
set to vary in the user options file. Thus the simulations module implements a number 
of simulations (referred to here as a group). This number is not predefined, simulations 
are implemented until the required data (LOTC rate/s and importance measures) has 
converged to a specified accuracy (described in Section A2.2). There is one exception 
to this. This exception occurs when the data does not converge within a specified 
number of simulations. If this number of simulations is exceeded the group of 
simulations is stopped. This provides a method of halting simulations in a controlled 
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manner if convergence is not achieved within a certain period. Note that the simulations 
algorithm shown in Figure A3 does not include this test, which is a trivial addition to 
the algorithm. The algorithm depicted also does not include the initialisations that occur 
before the group of simulations has begun. 
The initial task in the simulations algorithm is to zero the time (in flight hours) elapsed 
and initialise variables for the individual simulation (i.e. one simulation of the lifetime 
of the system). During this initialisation of variables the initial time of each fault within 
the system will be produced (using the relevant failure distributions) and added to the 
schedule that is used to deal with the events that occur during the system lifetime. This 
schedule is described in more detail in Section 6.4. 
The individual simulation begins by advancing the simulation time (i.e. time the system 
has been in service) to the time of the first fault, chronologically, from the schedule. If 
the fault time is less than the system lifetime the fault is propagated up through the 
system fault tree using the failure_update module. If the system doesn't fail the TLD 
criteria for the system are checked using the TLD _check module to see if any TLD 
maintenance deadlines should be added to the schedule. The simulation then continues. 
The same procedure is carried out for any further faults. If a maintenance deadline is 
removed from the schedule the TLD _maintenance module is called to clear the 
appropriate faults from the system (according to the user options regarding 
maintenance). This TLD _maintenance module calls the repair _update module to 
propagate repairs through the fault tree as required. If opportunistic maintenance is to be 
implemented then any maintenance operations scheduled to occur within the 
opportunistic maintenance window of the current time will be carried out now also, see 
Section 6.7.5. Any remaining future scheduled maintenance deadlines are checked to 
see if they will still occur in view of the repairs that have just been carried out, as 
described in Section 6.8.8. When system failure occurs in a simulation all faults are 
cleared from the system at the end of the flight in which the failure occurs, before 
simulations continue in the same manner. This models the situation that would most 
likely occur in a real-life scenario, wherein the FADEC unit of an engine on a multi-
engined aircraft would be replaced or repaired before the next time the aircraft was 
used. 
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C~_S~TA_RT ___ )
f 
initialisation for one 
simulation. Simulation 
time (sim_tim) = O. 
Advance sim _ tim to time 
of next event in schedule. 
Use schedule module. 
N 
Simulation ends. Check 
or convergence of LOT 
rate/so Use convergence. 
C,-_E_ND_) 
y 
Use failure_update to 
propagate the fault up 
through the fault tree. 
initialisation carried out 
as though new system 
or all faults cleared. 
N 
N 
The next event was a 
maintenance deadline. 
Repair faults, add new 
fault times to schedule. 
Use TLD _maintenance. 
Carry out opp. maint., if 
necessary. Check future 
deadlines still exist. 
Check TLD criteria. Add 
a deadline to schedule, if 
needed. Use TLD _check. 
Figure A3. A general algorithm for the simulations module of 
the TLD MCS code. 
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The simulation continues with faults occurring, maintenance deadlines being initiated 
and faults being repaired until the operating life of the system is reached. At this point 
the simulations algorithm shown in Figure A3 is again simplified somewhat. The 
algorithm states that the convergence module is used to verify whether or not the 
required LOTC rates have converged (system LOTC rate and perhaps instantaneous 
LOTC rates from dispatchable system configurations). Also at this point the importance 
measures would be checked for convergence, if they are to be calculated. In reality what 
happens within the TLD MCS code, rather than checking for convergence after every 
simulation, is that a specified number of simulations (specified in the user options file) 
will be carried out before the first calculation of the LOTC rates and importance 
measures, after which tests of these values are performed every x simulations (where x 
is also specified in the user options file, see Section A2.2.9). The calculation of the 
LOTC rates and importance measures is described later in Section 6.9.1. 
Simulation after simulation within this group is carried out in this manner. Once all of 
the required LOTC rates (system and perhaps dispatchable configurations) and 
importance measures have converged the group of simulations ends and the simulations 
module is exited, control returning to the control_sims module. 
A2.3.7 The 'failure_update' Module 
The failure_update module is called from the simulations module. Its role is to update 
the status of the relevant basic events and gates within the fault tree as faults occur 
during the system simulations. It propagates faults up through the fault tree structure by 
recursive calls to itself. This will be explained shortly. An algorithm for the 
failure_update module is shown in Figure A4. There is one important input to the 
module, which is shown in the algorithm diagram as input. 
Upon the initial call to failure _update from simulations input will refer to the basic 
event within the system fault tree that corresponds to the fault that has just occurred. 
Firstly, input's status is updated to failed. Then the failure time of input is logged - this 
will be of importance if a parent gate of input is a priority AND gate (to determine 
basic event ordering) or if the instantaneous LOTC rates from dispatchable system 
configurations and importance measures are to be calculated (See Section A2.3.11). The 
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failure_update function then loops through the parent gates of input, checking to see if 
any of them fail due to the failure of input. If the parent gate fails it is then passed to the 
failure_update module, where the gate's status is updated to failed and then it's own 
parent gates are checked to see if they have failed and the process repeats itself. This 
continues until all of the parent gates' statuses have been updated accordingly. If the 
parent gate that fails is that related to the fault tree top event the system fails and the 
failure_update module ends, passing control back through all the calls to failure_update 
until control once again returns to the simulations module. 
The failure_update module has to be able check the five different types of gate allowed 
as inputs to the TLD MCS code. These are OR gates, AND gates, priority AND gates, 
kin voting gates and NOT gates. The process of checking whether these gate types have 
failed is straightforward (see Section 2.2). OR gates fail if anyone of their inputs fail, 
AND gates fail if all of their inputs fail, priority AND gates fail if all of their inputs fail 
in the required order, kin voting gates fail if k of the n inputs to the gate fail and NOT 
gates fail if their single input is not failed. Note that, for clarity, the situation that arises 
if the input to a NOT gate fails is not shown in Figure A4. Since the failure of an input 
to a NOT gate means the NOT gate takes the opposite status, the NOT gate is 
effectively repaired if its input fails. For this reason, if the input to a NOT gate fails the 
repair_update module is called for the NOT gate in order to propagate the appropriate 
logic through the fault tree structure. 
Note that null gates are also allowed in the code. These gates do not alter the flow of 
logic through the fault tree at all and might be included in the fault tree purely to assist 
in expressing the logic development in the fault tree. Null gates wiIJ have only one input 
and will exhibit identical failure logic to that input. 
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y 
y 
( START) 
'I' 
Update the status 
ofthe input to failed. 
Log the failure time of 
input. Start to loop through 
input's parent gates. 
Call failure_update 
for this parent gate, 
which will be new input. 
C~_E_ND--,) 
y 
N 
Figure A4. A general algorithm for the failure_update module 
of the TLD MCS code. 
A2.3.8 The 'TLD check'Module 
This module is called from the simulations module of the TLD MCS code after a fault 
has occurred during a system simulation. It is used to check the faults present in the 
261 
system to see whether, given the order in which the faults occurred, a TLD maintenance 
deadline should be added to the schedule. The way in which the module works varies 
depending on the maintenance approach being applied to the system and the repair 
strategy that is being used at maintenance deadlines. However, the general function of 
the module is very similar no matter what the maintenance approach and repair strategy 
being used. This general function of the module is shown in the algorithm given in 
Figure AS. 
(~_S_T.,..AR_T ___ )
t 
Identity the fault that 
has just occurred. 
Add appropriate deadline!s 
to the schedule, according 
to the repair strategy. 
( END ) 
N 
Figure AS. A general algorithm for the TLD _check module of 
the TLD MCS code. 
After a fault has been occurred in the simulations module of the code it is passed to the 
TLD _check module. The TLD criteria are then checked for this fault (see Section 6.5 to 
see how this is done) to see if the system may be dispatched with this fault present. As 
these TLD criteria are checked the relevant maintenance deadlines are added to the 
schedule of events to occur. Which maintenance deadlines are added to the schedule 
and the times at which these deadlines will occur is decided by the maintenance 
approach and repair strategy being used to repair faults at the deadlines. The repair 
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strategies were described in Sections 6.7 and 6.8, along with how they affect the 
addition of maintenance deadlines to the schedule as faults occur. Also, depending on 
the maintenance approach and the repair strategy being employed at maintenance, the 
faults that must be repaired at the maintenance deadlines are also recorded. This results 
in maintenance operations (within the TLD MCS code at least) that are well organised, 
with all relevant faults being repaired as and when is necessary. 
As an illustration of how the TLD _check module works, consider for now that all faults 
present will be cleared from the system at maintenance deadlines. If a fault occurs one 
need only add to the schedule the maintenance deadline associated with this fault that 
will occur soonest, since all faults will be cleared at this deadline. 
A2.3.9 The 'TLD maintenance'Module 
This module of the TLD MCS code is called from the simulations module when a TLD 
maintenance deadline has occurred (i.e. has been removed from the schedule). It is used 
to implement the correct maintenance at TLD deadlines based on the maintenance 
approach that is being applied and the repair strategy that is being used at maintenance 
deadlines. As was the case with the TLD _check module, the details of how faults are 
repaired differs according to the maintenance approach and repair strategy. See Sections 
6.7 and 6.8 for details. 
The TLD _maintenance module uses the component Jepair module to update the status 
of faults within the system and generate a new time at which the fault will occur. The 
component Jepair module in turn calls the repair_update module to propagate fault 
repairs through the system fault tree as necessary, see Section A2.3.l O. 
A2.3.10 The 'repair_update 'Module 
This module is called from the componentJepair module of the TLD MCS code 
(which is, in turn, called from the TLD_maintenance module). It is used, in a similar 
manner to the failure_update module, to propagate fault repairs through the fault tree 
structure using recursive calls to itself. The algorithm used in the repair _update module 
is shown in Figure A6. 
263 
The initial call to the repair_update module is made from the componentJepair 
module after a fault has been repaired. The parent gates of the repaired fault are passed 
in turn to the repair_update module. The repair_update module then checks to see if 
the parent gate, shown in as gate, is failed. If gate is not failed there is no more work to 
be carried out and the module is exited. This is because the repair of a gate's input will 
have no effect on the status of the gate if the gate works anyway. 
C~_S--:TTA:-RT ___ )
'I' 
gate passed to this function 
from component Jepair 
or repair_update. 
Update gate status. Loop 
through its parent gates, 
passing to repair_update. 
C'-_E_ND _____ ) 
N 
N 
Figure A6. A general algorithm for the repair_update module 
of the TLD MCS code. 
However, if gate is failed (i.e. was failed before the repair of its input) the status of gate 
is checked to see if the repair of its input has caused it to work again. If this is the case 
the repair_update module loops through the parent gates of gate and passes them to the 
repair_update module so that their status can be updated if necessary. The process just 
described continues until the statuses of all parent gates related to the initial fault that 
was repaired have been checked and updated where appropriate. 
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Note that, as was the case with the failure_update module, the algorithm shown for 
repair _update has been simplified by disregarding the case when the parent gate is a 
NOT gate. In this case, the repair of the input requires that the NOT gate will then fail, 
thus failure_update would be called to propagate this failure logic through the fault tree 
structure. 
A2.3.1l The 'LOTCJ Module 
The LaTe _i module is used to update and amend the data that is used to calculate 
instantaneous LOTC rates from the dispatchable system configurations and is also used 
to calculate importance measures. It is called, when the user options file has indicated 
that LOTC rates and importance measures must be calculated, from four positions 
within the simulations module. These are: 
I. Before maintenance takes place at a deadline, 
2. After maintenance has taken place at a deadline, 
3. When the system maximum lifetime (as specified by the user) has been reached 
in an individual simulation, 
4. When the system fails during an individual simulation. 
The reason for the calls at these times will be explained in more detail in Section 
6.9.1.2, which details the methods used to obtain the LOTC rates from the system 
dispatchable configurations and the importance measures. In calculating these values 
one must calculate the time spent dispatching from each of the dispatchable system 
configurations and the number of system failures from these dispatchable system 
configurations: This is also explained in Section 6.9.1.2. The LOTC_i module updates 
these times and failure counts as required throughout the running of the TLD MCS 
code. 
A2.3.12 The 'convergence 'Modules 
The convergence modules, LOTC _convergence and IMP_convergence, are used to 
check for convergence of the LOTC rate/s and importance measures that the user 
wishes to be output from the TLD MCS code. The modules are called from the 
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simulations module of the code after the completion of a certain number of individual 
simulations. There are a number of user options that decide exactly when the 
convergence modules are called, see Section A2.2.9. The first checks for convergence 
of the relevant LOTe rate/s and importance measures are conducted after a number of 
simulations specified in the user options file, then subsequent checks for convergence 
are conducted every time a further number of simulations (again specified in the options 
text file) are completed. Each of these checks involves a separate call to the 
convergence modules. 
The algorithm used in the LOTe Jonvergence module is depicted in Figure A 7 and the 
algorithm for the IMP_convergence module is similar to this, except for the fact that 
more than one set of importance measures is calculated, see Section 6.9.1.3. The 
following discussion is relevant to the LOTe_convergence module although the same 
basic procedure takes place for the importance measures in the IMP_convergence 
module. The LOTe _convergence module works in the same way for each LOTC rate to 
be calculated (e.g. system LOTe rate or instantaneous LOTe rate from a certain 
dispatchable system configuration). When called it works through all of the LOTC rates 
to be calculated. If the rate has not already converged, it calculates the current value of 
the LOTe rate and compares it to the previous value of the LOTe rate calculated. If the 
two values are equal (to the number of significant figures specified by the user) a 
counter is incremented for this LOTe rate. This counter is reset to zero if the values do 
not match. Once the counter has reached a total specified by the user the LOTe rate is 
deemed to have converged. If a specific LOTe rate converges it is not calculated again 
at the time of the next call to LOTe _convergence since there is no need to check for 
convergence again. 
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( START) 
t 
Work through LOrC rates 
to be calculated (system! 
dispatchable configurations) 
Calculate the LOTC 
rate at this time. 
y 
N Zero the consecutive value :>-~--l counter for this LOTC rate. 
Add one to the 
consecutive value counter 
for this LOTC rate. 
C~_E_ND----,) 
N Note that this LOTC 
rate has converged. 
Figure A7. A general algorithm for the LOTCJonvergence 
module of the TLD MCS code. 
A2.3.13 The 'auto _set_tld_criteria' Module 
This module is called by the code when the dispatch criteria for a system must be set 
automatically by the code. The call to this module comes from the main module. In 
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setting the dispatch criteria an iterative technique is used to build up a set of dispatch 
criteria for the system up to an order of faults specified in the input data. The 
instantaneous LOTe rates of the system from the various system configurations are 
checked against the allowed limits for the different categories of faults. If the 
instantaneous failure rate to LOTe for any of the faults doesn't agree with the TLD 
category to which that fault has been assigned then the category for that fault must be 
adjllsted accordingly. A general algorithm for the auto_set_tld_criteria module is given 
in Figure A8. 
When it has been selected that the code will automatically set dispatch criteria for a 
system it is still possible to specify certain dispatch criteria. For instance, there may be 
certain faults that could occur within the system that must be specified as DND, perhaps 
because of the nature of the faults or previous experience of this type of faults on 
previous applications. For this reason a list ofTLD criteria can be specified. This list of 
criteria will then be used by the code to provide a maximum allowed dispatch category 
for each of the faults and fault combinations in the list. For example, consider a case 
where it is specified in the input file for the TLD criteria that a fault A should initially 
be assigned to the STD category. The code will assign that category to fault A as 
required. Then, as the TLD category for fault A is checked against its instantaneous 
failure rate to LOTe, the TLD category could be reduced to a DND category but would 
never be extended to a LID category, even if the instantaneous failure rate to LOTe for 
fault A would allow this. This gives some degree of control over the dispatch criteria 
despite the fact that they are to be set automatically. The first step in this module is to 
allocate an initial set of dispatch criteria for the system. The faults are provided to the 
code in the text file that lists all of the faults to be included in the TLD analysis of the 
system. If some of the dispatch criteria are specified, as described above, they will be 
allocated to the relevant faults. Any faults for which no dispatch criteria are allocated 
(this could be all of the faults, if required) are assigned to the LTD category. The 
dispatch category can then be reassigned and further restricted as necessary as 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTe are calculated. 
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( START) 
if 
Assign any initial TLD 
criteria specified by the 
user. 
Identify dispatchable 
system configurations: 
dispatch_configuration. 
Order offaults to be 
tested, order, = O. 
order = order + I 
Find A,.L's for fault 
groups up to size order. 
Use control sirns. 
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for TLD criteria. Reassign 
criteria as appropriate. 
y 
Calculate system LOTC 
rate for varying STD and 
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(~E_ND~) 
y 
Figure A8. A general algorithm for the auto set tld criteria 
- - -
module ofthe TLD MCS code. 
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After a set of initial dispatch criteria have been allocated for the system the 
dispatch_configuration module is called to identify the dispatchable system 
configurations. Once this action is completed the iterative process used to set the 
dispatch criteria for the system is started. As is the case when it is required to calculate 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC when supplying a full set of dispatch criteria for the 
system, a maximum fault order is specified above which the instantaneous failure rates 
to LOTC of the system will not be calculated. It is possible to specify that all faults 
above a certain order will be categorised as DND faults. 
It is possible, while TLD criteria are assigned using this iterative process, for the TLD 
criteria for certain faults or fault combinations to be on the border between fault 
categories. For instance, a dual fault combination have an instantaneous failure rate to 
LOTC that is very close to the limit for L TD category faults and STD category faults. In 
this case the automatic setting of TLD criteria within the code might cycle between 
applying a STD category to the fault combination and a L TD category to the fault 
combination. As an example, imagine that the faults are categorised initially as L TD 
and initial tests show that they must next be classified as STD because the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTC dictate that this should be the case. The TLD criteria are set and 
the system is simulated again. This time, because the exposure to the fault combination 
has reduced (from the LTD interval to the STD interval) the instantaneous failure rates 
to LOTC actually decrease back just below the limit for L TD faults and, as such, may 
be reclassified as LTD faults. This reclassification as L TD, in the absence of other 
changes to the TLD criteria, then leads to the requirement for an STD category to be 
applied, which then leads again to an L TD category to be applied and this cycle will 
continue ad infinitum if left unchecked. For this reason, in the TLD MCS code checks 
are carried out for this type of behaviour. If all TLD criteria remain unchanged apart 
from a number which cycle between categories and this behaviour continues for 3 
successive cycles then the process is brought to a halt within the code by applying the 
tighter of the dispatch criteria to the relevant fault combinations and ending the iterative 
process of automatically setting dispatch criteria. In the case that this occurs it is a 
conservative way of setting dispatch criteria for a system. It is, of course, also possible 
that the dispatch criteria might cycle in a more complex pattern than that just described. 
For this reason if more than 10 iterations are performed by the TLD MCS code when 
270 
automatically setting dispatch criteria, the dispatch criteria for faults are set io the most 
restrictive of those that have been applied in the previous 5 simulations. 
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Appendix 3. TLD MCS Code Input Files for the 8 Component System 
Fault Tree File for Eight Component Example System 
G:LOTC 
G:GATE_l 
G:GATE_2 
G:GATE_3 
G:GATE_4 
G:Fl_X]AILS 
G:Fl_Y]AILS 
G:F2_X]AILS 
G:F2_Y]AILS 
endoftree 
OR 
AND 
AND 
AND 
AND 
AND 
AND 
OR 
OR 
G:GATE_l G:GATE_2 G:GATE_3 G:GATE_4 
G:Fl_X]AILS G:Fl_Y]AILS 
G:F2_X]AILS G:F2_Y]AILS 
E:H G:Fl_X]AILS G:F2_Y]AILS 
E:H G:F2_X]AILS G:Fl_Y]AILS 
E:A E:B 
E:A E:E 
E:C E:D 
E:F E:G 
Failure Rate File for Eight Component Example System 
E:A FAIL EXP 0.000075 
E:B FAIL EXP 0.00004 
E:C FAIL EXP 0.00003 
E:D FAIL EXP 0.00002 
E:E FAIL EXP 0.00004 
E:F FAIL EXP 0.00003 
E:G FAIL EXP 0.00002 
E:H FAIL EXP 0.00002 
ENDOFDATA 
Fault List File for Eight Component Example Sy§tem 
E:H 
G:Fl_X_FAILS 
G:Fl_Y]AILS 
G:F2_X]AILS 
G:F2 Y FAILS 
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SYstem LOTC Rate Outout File for Ei!!ht Component Example System 
flight length: 10.000000 
System is in service for 130000.000000 hours in each simulation 
Maintenance strategy: 4. repair ALL failures present in system 
First check of rates after 1000000 simulations 
Rates checked every 50000 simulations thereafter 
Convergence required to 3 significant figures (sig_fig) 
Convergence assumed after 3 identical rates at checks (consec_vals) 
STD/LTD 
250.0 
375.0 
500.0 
500.0 1000.0 1500.0 2000.0 2500.0 
5.67e-06 S.15e-06 1.03e-05 1.23e-05 1.41e-05 
5.66e-06 S.17e-06 1.04e-05 1.23e-05 1.41e-05 
5.6S~-06 S.17e-06 1.04e-05 1.24e-05 1.41e-05 
Instantaneous LOTC Rates Outout File for Eight Component Example System 
flight length: 10.000000 
System is in service for 130000.000000 hours in each simulation 
Maintenance strategy: 4. repair ALL failures present in system 
First check of rates after 1000000 simulations 
Rates checked every 50000 simulations thereafter 
Convergence required to 3 significant figures (sig_fig) 
Convergence assumed after 3 identical rates at checks (consec_vals) 
STD 500.0 LTD 2500.0 
E:H,2.02e-05 
G:Fl X FAILS,4.95e-05 
G:Fl=Y=FAILs,4.95e-05 
G:F2_X_FAILS,5.62e-05 
G:F2 Y FAILS,5.62e-05 
E:H G:Fl_X_FAILs,S.96e-05 
E:H G:Fl Y FAILS,S.9Se-05 
E:H G:F2=X=FAILS,7.27e-05 
E:H G:F2_Y_FAILS,7.26e-05 
G:Fl X FAILS E:H,S.96e-05 
G:Fl X FAILS G:F2_X_FAILS,9.01e-05 
G:Fl X FAILS G:F2_Y_FAILS,1.10e-04 
G:Fl Y FAILS E:H,S.9Se-05 
G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2_X_FAILS,1.10e-04 
G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2 Y FAILS,9.00e-05 
G:F2 X FAILS E:H,7.27e-05 
G:F2 X FAILS G:Fl_X_FAILS,9.01e-05 
G:F2 X FAILS G:Fl Y FAILS,1.10e-04 
G:F2 Y FAILS E:H,7.26e-05 
G:F2 Y FAILS G:Fl_X_FAILS,1.10e-04 
G:F2_Y_FAILS G:Fl_Y_FAILS,9.00e-05 
E:H G:Fl_X_FAILS G:F2_X_FAILS,S.9ge-05 
E:H G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2_Y_FAILS,S.96e-05 
E:H G:F2 X FAILS G:Fl_X_FAILS,S.9ge-05 
E:H G:F2 Y FAILS G:Fl_Y_FAILS,S.96e-05 
G:Fl_X_FAILS G:F2_X_FAILS E:H,S.9ge-05 
G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2 Y FAILS E:H,8.96e-05 
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E:H LTD 
G:Fl X FAILS LTD 
G:Fl Y FAILS LTD 
G:F2 X FAILS LTD 
G:F2 Y FAILS LTD 
E:H G:Fl X FAILS STD 
E:H G:Fl Y FAILS STD 
E:H G:F2 X FAILS STD 
E:H G:F2 Y FAILS STD 
G:Fl X FAILS G:F2 X FAILS STD 
- - - -G:Fl_X_FAILS G:F2_Y_FAILS DND 
G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2 X FAILS DND 
G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2 Y FAILS STD 
E:H G:Fl X FAILS G:F2 X FAILS STD 
E:H G:Fl Y FAILS G:F2 Y FAILS STD 
endofdata 
Sample Simulation Output for Eight Component Example System 
3083.40 * E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G: F2 X FAILS fails - -
'" Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 4090.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_2, AND gate 
'" G:GATE_2 works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
4090.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 46788.16 
5627.39 
TLD faults present: 
6112.40 
TLD faults present: 
'" E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
'" E:8 fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_X_FAILS works 
8706.50 * E:H fails 
E:B is also failed 
E:E is also failed 
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 9710.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE_3 works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: E:H 
9710.00 I *** Maintenance *** 
12405.77 
TLD faults present: 
13183.33 
* E:A fails 
checking new status of parent G:F1_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1 X FAILS works 
-checking new status of parent G:F1_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1_Y_FAILS works 
* E:G fails 
E:A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2_Y_FAILS, OR gate 
* G:F2 Y FAILS fails 
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I • Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 14190.00 
I checking new status of parent G:GATE_2, AND gate 
I * G:GATE_2 works 
I checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
I * G:GATE_3 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_Y_FAILS 
14190.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_Y_FAILS now works 
I E:G 
21305.73 
TLD faults present: 
23079.31 
* E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_¥_FAILS works 
* E:A fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* ~:Fl_X_FAILS works 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl Y FAILS fails 
* Adding-70DOD to the schedule, time: 24080.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 1, AND gate 
G:GATE 1 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
G: GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F1_Y_FAILS 
24080.00 
24732.65 
TLD faults present: 
26268.15 
*** Maintenance *** 
G:Fl_Y_FAILS now works 
E:A next failure: 
E:E next failure: 
* E:A fails 
24732.65 
26268.15 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_X_FAILS works 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
* E:E fails 
E:A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS fails 
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 27270.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 1, AND gate 
* G:GATE 1 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F1_Y_FAILS 
27270.00 
28195.17 
TLD faults present: 
*** Maintenance *** 
G:Fl_Y_FAILS now works 
E:A next failure: 
E:E next failure: 
* E:B fails 
33310.13 
35576.63 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_X_FAILS works 
33310.13 * E:A fails 
E:8 is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl X FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1 X FAILS fails - -
* Adding-7DDOD to the schedule, time: 34320.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 1, AND gate 
* G: GATE_l works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE_3 works 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1 Y FAILS works 
TLD faults present: G:F1_X:FAILS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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34320.00 I 
35576.63 
I 
I 
I 
*** Maintenance *** 
G:Fl_X_FAILS now works 
E:A next failure: 
E:B next failure: 
1< E:E fails 
60383.08 
46801. 94 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
1< G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLD faults present: 
36432.00 * E:F fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2 Y FAILS, OR gate 
1< G:F2 Y FAILS fails - -
1< Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 37440.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
1< G:GATE 2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
1< G:GATE_3 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_Y_FAILS 
37440.00 
39242.24 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_Y_FAILS now works 
I E:F next failure: 174658.50 
* E:H fails 
Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 40250.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 3, AND gate 
* G:GATE_3 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: E:H 
40250.00 I *** Maintenance *** 
46788.16 E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G:F2 X FAILS fails - -
* Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 47790.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE 2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
46801. 94 * E:B fails 
E:C is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl X FAILS works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X:FAILS 
47790.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 55054.54 
55054.54 * E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G: F2 X FAILS fails - -
* Adding-70DDD to the schedule, time: 56060.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE_2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
56060.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2 X FAILS now works 
I E:C - - next failure: 86524.42 
60383.08 * E:A fails 
checking new status of parent G: Fl_X_FAILS, AND 
* G:Fl X FAILS works 
-checking new status of parent G: Fl_Y_FAILS, AND 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLD faults present: 
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64612.43 "" E:G fails 
E:A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2 Y FAILS, OR gate 
G: F2 Y FAILS fails - -
* Adding-70DOD to the schedule, time: 65620.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_2, AND gate 
* G:GATE_2 works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE_3 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_Y_FAILS 
65620.00 
72819.00 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_Y_FAILS now works 
I E:G 
* E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLD faults present: 
81087.83 * E:D fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G: F2_X_FAILS fails - -
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 82090.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE 2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
82090.00 
82143.80 
.** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:D next failure: 82143.80 
* E: D fails 
'checking new status of parent G: F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G: F2_X_FAILS fails - -
* Adding 70000 to the schedule, time: 83150.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
• G:GATE_2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
• G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
--------------------------~-----------------------------------------------------
83150.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:D next failure: 116530.56 
86524.42 • E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
• G:F2 X FAILS fails - -
* Addiog-70000 to the schedule, time: 87530.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G: GATE_2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
87530.00 ••• Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 93377.03 
93377.03 * E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
• G:F2 X FAILS fails - -
• Addiog-70000 to the schedule, time: 94380.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE 2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G: GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
94128.89 I • E:B fails 
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I E:C is also failed 
I 
I 
checking new status 
* G:Fl X FAILS works 
of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
TLO faults present: G: F2_X:::FAILS 
94360.00 
95195.51 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 110712.60 
* E:A fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl X FAILS works 
-checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLO faults present: 
110712.60 * E:C fails 
E:A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:F2_X_FAILS, OR gate 
* G:F2 X FAILS fails 
* Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 111720.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE_2 works -
I TLD faults present~ 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE 4 works 
G: F2_X_FAILS 
111720.00 *** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 126723.97 
116530.56 1 * E:D fails 
1 checking new status of parent G:F2_X_FAILS, OR gate 
I. * G:F2 X FAILS fails 
1 * Adding-7000D to the schedule, time: 117540.00 
1 checking new status of parent G:GATE_2, AND gate 
1 * G:GATE 2 works 
1 checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
1 * G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
117540.00 *** Maintenance *** 
1 G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
1 E:D next failure: 152843.21 
120142.06 
TLD faults present: 
120329.54 
* E:E fails 
checking new status of parent G:F1_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
* E:A fails 
E:E is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1_X_FAILS works 
checking new status of parent G:F1_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl Y FAILS fails 
* Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 121330.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_1, AND gate 
* G:GATE_l works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE_4 works 
TLD faults present: G:Fl_Y_FAILS 
121330.00 
121696.03 
TLD faults present: 
*** Maintenance *** 
G:Fl_Y_FAILS now works 
E:A next failure: 
E:E next failure: 
• E:A fails 
checking new status of parent 
* G: Fl X FAILS works 
checking new status of parent 
* G: Fl_Y_ FAILS works 
121696.03 
152060.83 
G: Fl_X_FAILS, 
G: Fl_Y_FAILS, 
AND gate 
AND gate 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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124812.23 * E:8 fails 
E~A is also failed 
checking new status of parent G:Fl X FAILS, AND gate 
* G:F1 X fAILS fails - -
* Adding-70000 to the schedule, time: 125820.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_l, AND gate 
* G:GATE 1 works 
checking new status of parent G:GATE_3, AND gate 
* G:GATE 3 works 
TLD faults present: G:Fl_X_FAILS 
125820.00 *** Maintenance *** 
G:Fl_X_FAILS now works 
E:A next failure: 
E:B next failure: 
129281. 37 
141845.97 
126723.97 * E:C fails 
checking new status of parent G:F2 X FAILS, OR gate 
* G: F2 X FAILS fails - -
* Adding-70DOD to the schedule, time: 127730.00 
checking new status of parent G:GATE 2, AND gate 
* G:GATE_2 works -
checking new status of parent G:GATE_4, AND gate 
* G:GATE 4 works 
TLD faults present: G:F2_X_FAILS 
127730.00 
129281. 37 
*** Maintenance *** 
I G:F2_X_FAILS now works 
I E:C next failure: 136445.89 
* E:A fails 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_X_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_X_FAILS works 
checking new status of parent G:Fl_Y_FAILS, AND gate 
* G:Fl_Y_FAILS works 
TLD faults present: 
Simulation over 
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System Fault Tree Input File 
G:PWR:A:LOSS AND G:PWR1:A:LOSS G:PWR2:A:LOSS 
G:PWR1:A:LQSS OR E:PWR1:A:FAULT 1 E:PWR1:CM_FAULT_l 
G:PWR2:A:LOSS OR E:PWR2:A:FAULT:l E:PWR2:CM FAULT_l 
G:A:UNAVAIL OR G:PWR:A:LOSS G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:PWR:B:LOSS AND G:PWR1:B:LOSS G:PWR2:B:LOSS 
G:PWR1:B:LOSS OR E:PWR1:CM FAULT 1 E:PWR1:B:FAULT 1 
G:PWR2:B:LOSS OR E:PWR2:CM:FAULT:l E:PWR2:B:FAULT=1 
G:B:UNAVAIL OR G:PWR:B:LOSS G:EEC:8:LOSS 
G:EEC_FD_WORKS_A NOT E:EEC:A:FAULT 3 
G:EEC_FD_WORKS_B NOT E:EEC:B:FAULT-3 
G:EEC_INDET_A AND E:EEC:A:FAULT 2 - E:EEC:A:FAULT 3 
G:EEC_INDET_B AND E:EEC:B:FAULT-2 E:EEC:B:FAULT-3 
G:EEC:A:LOSS OR G:FAULT DET A- E:EEC:A:FAULT 1 -
G:EEC:B:LOSS OR G:FAULT=OET=B E:EEC:B:FAULT=l 
G:LOTC:CAUSE_l:FADEC AND G:A:UNAVAIL G:B:UNAVAIL 
G:FAULT_DET_A AND E:EEC:A:FAULT_2 G:EEC_FO_WORKS_A 
G:FAULT_OET_B AND E:EEC:B:FAULT 2 G:EEC FO WORKS B 
G:LOTC:CAUSE 2:5 AND E:FNl:A:FAULT G:LOTC:CAUSE 2:7 
G:LOTC:CAUSE=2:6 AND E:FNl:B:FAULT G:LOTC:CAUSE-2:8 
G:LOTC:CAUSE 2:7 OR G:FN4 VALIDATED ERRONEOUS A-
G: FN2- VALIDATED ERRONEOUS A - - -
G: LOTC: CAUSE]!: 8 OR G: FN4_VALIDATED_ERRONEOUS_B 
G:FN2 VALIDATED ERRONEOUS B 
G:LOTC:CAUSE2:2 AND G:FN3 VALIDATED ERRONEOUS A 
G: FN3 VALIDATED ERRONEOUS B - - -
E:PWRl:A:FAULT 2 
E:PWR2:A:FAULT:2 
E:PWRl:B:FAULT 2 
E:PWR2:B:FAULT:2 
G:LOTC:CAUSE2:1 OR G:LOTC:CAUSE 2:3 G:LOTC:CAUSE_2:4 
G: LOTC: CAUSE -2: 3 OR G: FNl VALI DATED ERRONEOUS A G: LOTC: CAUSE 2: 5 
G:LOTC:CAUSE=2:4 OR G:FNl=VALIDATEo=erroneOUS=B G:LOTC:CAUSE-2:6 
G:LOTC:CAUSE 3:HMU OR E:HMU:FAuLT 1 E:HMU:FAULT 2 E:HMU:fAULT_3 
E:HMU:FAULT 4 - -
G:LOTC OR G: LO-TC:CAUSE_l: FADEC G:LOTC:CAUSE 2:FN G:LOTC:CAUSE 3:HMU 
G:LOTC:CAUSE_2:FN OR G:LOTC:CAUSE_2:1 - G:LOTC:CAUSE_2:2 -
G:FN3 A ERR FROM B OR G:FN3 ERR A G:COMMS ERR A 
G:FN3=A=UNAVAILiINV OR G:FN3-INV-A G:COMMS-ERR/LOST A 
G:FN3_AVE_ERR_A AND G:FN3=ERR=A G:FN3 B-ERR FROM-A 
G:FN3_AVE_ERR_B AND G:FN3 A ERR FROM B - G:FN-3 ERR-B 
G:FN3 B ERR FROM A OR G:FN3-ERR B- G:COMMS ERR 8 -
G:FN3=B=UNAVAIL/INV OR G:FN3-INV-B G:COMMS-ERR/LOST B 
G:FN3 ERR A OR E:FN3:A:FAULT-:"3 - E:FN3_FN4:A:CM_FAULT_lE:FN3:A:FAULT_l 
- E:-FN3 FN4 :CM FAULT_l 
G:FN3_ERR_B - OR - E:FN3_FN4:CM_FAULT_l 
E:FN3:B:FAULT 3 
G:FN3 INV A OR - E:FN3 FN4:CM FAULT 2 
- E:-FN3:A:FAULT 4 - - -
G:FN3 INV B OR - E:FN3 FN4:CM FAULT 2 
- E:-FN3:B:FAULT_4 - - -
G:FN3_MOD_ERR_A AND G:FN3 MOD SEL A E:FN3:CM FAULT 1 
G:FN3_MOD_ERR_B AND G:FN3-MOO-SEL-B E:FN3:CM-FAULT-l 
G:FN3_MOO_SEL_A AND G:FN3-B UNAVAIL/INV G:FN3 INV A -
G:FN3_MOO_SEL_B AND G:FN3-A-UNAVAIL/INV G:FN3=INV=B 
G:FN3_0TH_ERR_A AND G:FN3-INV A G:FN3 B_ERR_FROM_A 
G:FN3_0TH_ERR_B AND G:FN3-A ERR FROM B - G:FN3 INV B 
G:FN3_0WN_ERR_A AND G:FN3-B-UNAVAIL/INV G:FN3-ERR-A 
G: FN3_0WN_ERR_B AND G: FN3=A=UNAVAIL/INV G: FN3-ERR-B 
G:FN3_VALIDATED_ERRONEOUS A OR G:FN3 AVE ERR A - G:FN3_0WN ERR A 
G:FN3 OTH ERR A G:FN3_MOD_ERR_A - -
G:FN3 VALIDAT-ED E-RRON-EOUS B OR G:FN3 AVE ERR B 
- G:FN3_0TH_ERR_B - G:FN3_MOD_ER~B - -
G:FN4 A ERR FROM B OR G:COMMS_ERR_A G:FN4_ERR_A 
G:FN4:A:UNAVAIL/INV OR G:COMMS ERR/LOST A G:FN4 INV A 
G:FN4_AVE_ERR_A AND G:FN4 ERR A G:FN4 B ERR FROM-A 
G:FN4_AVE_ERR_B AND G:FN4-A ERR FROM B - -G:FN4 ERRS 
G:FN4 B ERR FROM A OR G:FN4-ERR S- G:COMMS ERR B -
G:FN4:B:UNAVAILiiNV OR G:FN4-INV-B G:COMMS-ERR7LOST B 
G:FN4_ERR_A OR E:FN3 FN4:CM-FAUL-T 1 E:FN3 FN4:A:CM FAULT 1 
E:FN4 FN2:A:CM FAULT-l E:FN4:A:FAU-LT 1 - E:FN4:A:FAULT- 3 
G:FN4 ERR B - OR -E:FN3-FN4:CM FAULT 1 E:FN3 FN4:B:CM FAULTl 
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E:FN4 FN2:B:CM FAULT lE:FN4:B:FAULT 1 E:FN4:B:FAULT_3 
G:FN4 INV A - OR -E:FN3-FN4:CM FAULT 2- E:FN3 FN4:A:CM_FAULT_2 
- E:-FN4 FN2:A:CM FAULT-2 E:FN4:A:FAU-LT 2 E:FN4:A:FAULT 4 
G:FN4 INV B - OR -E:FN3-FN4:CM FAULT 2- E:FN3 FN4:B:CM FAULT-2 
- E:-FN4 FN2:B:CM FAULT-Z E:FN4:B:FAU-LT 2 - E:FN4:e-:FAULT- 4 
G:FN4 MOD ERRA -AND - G:FN4 MOD SEL-A E:FN4:CM FAULT 1 
G:FN4-MOO-ERR-e AND G:FN4-MOO-SEL-S E:FN4:CM-FAULT-l 
G:FN4-MOO-SEL-A AND G:FN4-S UNAVAIL/INV G:FN4 INV A -
G: FN4=MOO=SEL:e AND G: FN4:A=UNAVAIL!INV G: FN()NV:8 
G:FN4 OTH ERR A AND G:FN4 INV A G:FN4 B ERR FROM A 
G:FN4-0TH-ERR-e AND G:FN4-A ERR FROM B - -G:FN4 INVe 
G:FN4-0WN-ERR-A AND G:FN4-e-UNAVAIL/INV G:FN4-ERR-A 
G: FN4=OWN:ERR:S AND G: FN4:A:UNAVAIL/INV G: FN4:ERR:B 
G:FN4_VALIDATED_ERRONEOUS_A OR G:FN4_AVE_ERR_A G:FN4_0WN_ERR_A 
G: FN4_0TH_ERR_A G: FN4_MOD_ERR_A 
G:FN4_VALIDATED_ERRONEOUS_B OR G:FN4_AVE_ERR_B 
G: FN4_0TH_ERR_B G: FN4_MOD_ERR_B 
G: FN2 _1_ A_ERR _FROM _ B OR G: COMMS _ERR _A G: FN2 _1_ ERR _A 
G:FN2 1 AVE ERR A AND G:FN2 1 ERR A G:FN2 1 B ERR FROM A 
G:FN2-1-AVE-ERR-B AND G:FN2-1-A ERR FROM B- -G:-FN2 -1 ERR-B 
G:FN2-1-S ERR FROM A OR G:FN2-1-ERR S- G:COMMS ERR 8- - -
G:FN2-1-ERR A- OR - E:FN4 FN2:A:CM-FAULT 1 E:FN2 1:CM FAULT 1 
- -E:FN2 1:A:FAULT 3 - - - - - -
G:FN2 1 ERR B- OR E:FN4 FN2:B:CM FAULT 1 E:FN2 1:CM FAULT 1 
- -E:FN2 1:B:FAULT 3 - - - - - -
G: FN2_1_INV _A OR E: FN4_FN2 :A:CM_FAULT_2 E: FN2_1: CM_FAULT_2 
E:FN2_1:A:FAULT_4 
G:FN2 1 INV B OR E:FN4 FN2:B:CM FAULT 2 E:FN2 1:CM FAULT 2 
- -E:FN-2_1:B:FAULT_4 - .- - - - -
G: FN2 10TH ERR A AND G: FN2 1 INV A G: FN2 1 8 ERR FROM A 
G:FN2:1:0TH:ERR:B AND G:FN2-1-A ERR E"ROM B- -G:-FN2 -1 INV-B 
G:FN2_1_0WN_ERR_A AND G:FN2-1-ERR A- G:FN2 1 UNAVAIL-B -
G:FN2_1_0WN_ERR_B AND G:FNZ-1-UNAVAIL A - -G:FNZ 1 -ERR B 
G:FN2_1_UNAVAIL_A OR G:COMMS-ERR/LOST A G:FNZ-1-INV-A 
G:FN2 1 UNAVAIL B OR G:FN2_1:INV_B G:COMMS_ERR/LOST_B-
G:FNZ-1-UNAVAIL-TO A AND G:FN2 1 INV A G:FN2 1 UNAVAIL B 
G:FN2-1-UNAVAIL-TO-S AND G:fN2-1-UNAVAIL A - G:fN2 1 -INV 8 
G:FN2-Z-A ERR FROM-B OR G:COMMS-ERR A G:FN2 2 ERR A - -
G:FN2:Z:AVE_ERR_A - AND G:FNZ 2-B ERR FROM A- G:FN2 2 ERR A 
G:FN2_2_AVE_ERR_B AND G:FN2:2:A:ERR:FROM:B G:FN2:2:ERR:B 
G:FN2 2 B ERR FROM A OR G:FN2_2_ERR_B G:COMMS_ERR_B 
G:FN2-2-ERR A- OR - E:FN4_FN2:A:CM_FAULT_1 E:FN2_2:CM_FAULT_l 
- -E:fNZ 2:A:fAULT 3 
G:FN2 2 ERR B OR E:FN4 FNZ:B:CM FAULT 1 E:FN2 2:CM FAULT 1 
- -E:FN2 Z:B:FAULT 3 - - - - -
G:FNZ Z INV A- OR E:FN4 FN2:A:CM FAULT 2 E:FN2 2:CM FAULT 2 
- -E:FN2 2:A:FAULT 4 - - - - - -
G: FN2_Z_INV _B OR E: FN4_FN2: B: CM_FAULT_2 E: FN2_2: CM_FAULT_2 
E:FN2 2:B:FAULT 4 
G: FN2_2_0TH_ERR_A AND 
G:FN2_2_0TH_ERR_B AND 
G: FN2_2_0WN_ERR_A AND 
G: FN2_2_0WN_ERR_B AND 
G: FN2 2 UNAVAIL A OR 
G:FN2-2-UNAVAIL-S OR 
G:FN2-Z-UNAVAIL-TO A AND 
G:FNZ-Z-UNAVAIL-TO-e AND 
G:FNZ-EITHER ERR A- OR 
G:FNZ-EITHER-ERR-B OR 
G:FNZ-MOD ERR A - AND 
G: rN2:MOD:ERR:B AND 
G: FN2_MOD_SEL_A AND 
G:FN2_MOD_SEL_B AND 
G: FN2_0TH_ERR_A OR 
G:FN2_0TH_ERR_B OR 
G:FN2_0WN_ERR_A OR 
G:FN2_0WN_ERR_B OR 
G:FN2_VALIDATED_ERRONEOUS_A 
G:FN2_0TH_ERR_A 
G:FN2 VALIDATED ERRONEOUS S 
- G: FN2_0T-H_ERR_B -
G:FN1 A ERR FROM B OR 
G:FN1:A:UNAVAIL/INV OR 
G:FN1_AVE_ERR_A AND 
G: FN1 AVE ERR B AND 
G:FN2_2_INV_A G:FN2_2_B_ERR FROM A 
G: FN2 2 A ERR FROM B G: FN2 2 INV B 
G: FN2:2=ERR_A- G: FN2_2_UNAVA-IL~B -
G:FN2 2 UNAVAIL A G:FN2 2 ERR B 
G:FN2-2-INV A G:COMMS ERR/COST A-
G:fN2-2-INV-S G:COMMS-ERR/LOST-S 
G:FNZ-Z-UNAVAIL B G:FN2 2 I"NV A 
G:FN2:2:UNAVAIL:A G:FN2:2:INV:B 
G:FN2 1 AVE ERR A G:FNZ 2 AVE ERR A 
G:FN2-1-AVE-ERR-B G:FN2-2-AVE-ERR-B 
G:FN2-MOD SEL A- E:FN2:CM FAULT l' 
G:FN2-MOD-SEL-B E:FNZ:CM-FAULT-l 
G:FNZ-1 UNAVAIL TO A G:FNZ 2 UNAVAIL TO A 
G: FNZ-1-UNAVAIL -TO - B G: FNZ-2-UNAVAIL - TO - B 
G:FN2-1-0TH ERR-A - G:FNZ-2-0TH ERR-A -
G:FNZ-1-0TH-ERR-B G:FNZ-2-0TH-ERR-B 
G:FN2-1-0WN-ERR-A G:FN2-2-0WN-ERR-A 
G:FN2-1-0WN-ERR-B G:FN2-2-0WN-ERR-B 
OR - -G:FN2 EI-THER ERR A - G:FN-2 OW-N ERR A 
G: FNZ MOD ERR A - - - - -
OR - G:-FNZ -EITHER ERR B G: FN2 OWN ERR B 
G: FN2_MOD_ERR:,.S - - - - -
G:COMMS ERR A G:FNl ERR A 
G:COMMS-ERR7LOST A - G:-FN1 INV A 
G:FN1 ERR A G:FNl B ERR FROM-A 
G:FN1-A ERR FROM B - -G:FNi ERRB 
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Svstem Fault Tree Input File 
G:FNl B ERR FROM A OR G:FNl_ERR_B G:COMMS_ERR_B 
G:FN(::S=UNAVAIL/INV OR G:FNl INV B G:COMMS ERR/LOST 8 
G:FNl MOD ERR A AND G:FNI-MOO-SEL A -E:FNl:CM_-FAULT_l 
G:FNI-MOO-ERR-e AND G:FNI-MOO-SEL-a E:FNl:CM FAULT 1 
G:FNl:=MOO=SEL:A AND G:FNI-INV-A - G:FNl B UNAVAILTINV -
G:FNl_MOD_SEL_B AND G:FNI-A UNAVAIL/INV - -G:FNl INV B 
G:FNl_OTH_POS_ERR_A AND G:FNI-INV A G:FNl B ERR FROMA 
G:FNl OTH ERR BAND G:FNI-A ERR FROM B - G:FNl INv-e 
G: FNl-OWN-ERR - A AND G: FNl-B - UNAVAIL/INV G: FNl-ERR -A 
G:FNI-OWN-ERR-e AND G:FNI-A-UNAVAIL/INV G:FNI-ERR-e 
G:FNI-ERR-A - OR E:FNl:A:FAULT-l E:FNl:A:FAULT-3 -
G:FNl=ERR=:e OR 'E:FNl:B:FAULT-l E:FNl:B:FAULT-3 
G:FNl_INV_A OR E:FNl:A:FAULT-2 E:FNl:A:FAULT-4 
G:FNl INV B OR E:FNl:B:FAULT-2 E:FN1:B:FAULT-4 
G-:FN1-VALIDATED ERRONEOUS A OR - G:FNl AVE ERR A - G:FNl OWN ERR A 
- G:FNl OTH POS ERRA G:FNl MOD ERR-A - - - - -
G:FNl VALIDATED e-rron-eous-B OR - G:-FNl -AVE ERR B G:FN1_OWN_ERR_B 
- G:FN1_OTH_ERR_B - G:FN1_MOD_ERR:,.B - -
G:COMMS_AVAIL_A NOT G:COMMS_LOST_A 
G:COMMS_AVAIL_B NOT G:COMMS_LOST_B 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A OR G:EEC_INDET_A E:COMMS_CORRUPTED 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B OR E:COMMS CORRUPTED G:EEC INDET B 
G:COMMS_ERR_A AND G:COMMS_AVAIL_A G:COMMS_CORRU-PT_A -
G:COMMS ERR BAND G:COMMS_AVAIL_B G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
G:COMMS-ERR/LOST A OR G:COMMS_ERR_A G:COMMS_LOST_A 
G:COMM()RR/LOST=:B OR G:COMMS_ERR_B G:COMMS_LOST_B 
G:COMMS_LOST_A NULL G: PWR:A:LOSS 
G:COMMS_LOST_B NULL G:PWR:B:LOSS 
endofdata 
Basic event failure distribution input file 
E:FN3]N4:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000006 
E:FN3_FN4:A:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN3_FN4:B:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN3_FN4:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.0000008 
E:FN3_FN4:A:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:FN3_FN4:B:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:PWRl:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:PWR2:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN4]N2:A:CM]AULT_l , FAIL EXP 0.0000005 
E:FN4]N2:B:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000005 
E:FN4]N2:A:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN4]N2:B:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN2_1:CM_FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN2_1:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.'000005 
E:FN2_2:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN2_2:CM]AULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000003 
E:FN4:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000003 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN4:B:FAULT_ 4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FNI:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FNl:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FNl:A:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FNl:B:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN2_1:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000003 
E:FN2_1:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000003 
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Basic event failure distribution input file 
E:FN2_I:A:FAULT_ 4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN2_l :B:FAULT_ 4 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000004 
E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_ 4 FAIL EXP 0.000009 
E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000009 
E:PWRl:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:PWRl:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:PWR2:A:FAUL T _2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
---- E:PWR2:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.0000035 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.0000035 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000022 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.0000022 
E:EEC:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:EEC:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000002 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000002 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000002 
E:FN3:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN3:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000025 
E:FN4:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000025 
E:FN4:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN4:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FN2_I:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000023 
E:FN2_I:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000023 
E:FN2_I:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FN2_I:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000023 
E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_I FAIL EXP 0.00000023 
E:FN2_2:A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FN2_2:B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FNl :B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000025 
E:FNl :A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.00000025 
E:FNl :A:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:FNl :B:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000008 
E:HMU:FAULT_2 FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:HMU:FAULT_3 FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:HMU:FAULT_4 FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:HMU:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:PWRl:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000009 -
E:PWRl:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000009 
E:PWR2:A:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000095 
E:PWR2:B:FAULT_l FAIL EXP 0.0000095 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:FNl:A:FAULT FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FNl :B:FAULT FAIL EXP 0.000005 
E:FNl:CM]AULT_l FAIL EXP 0.000001 
E:COMMS _CORRUPTED FAIL EXP 0.0000016 
Endofdata 
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System Fault List File 
G:CH_A]WR_LOSS 
G:CH_B]WR_LOSS 
G:EEC_LOSS_A 
G:EEC_LOSS_B 
G:vSV]OS_INV_A 
G:vSV]OS_INV_B 
G:OILP _INV_A 
G:OILP_INV_B 
G:SPEED_INV_A 
G:SPEED_INV_B 
G:TEMP_l_INV_A 
G:TEMP _1_INV_B 
G:TEMP _2_INV_A 
G:TEMP_2_INV_B 
endofdata 
System Fault Tree' Associated' Repairs File 
G:FNl_INV_A 
G:FNl_ERR_A 
E:FNl:CM]AULT_l 
E:FNl:A:FAULT 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A 
endforfault 
G:FNl_INV_B 
G:FNl_ERR_B 
E:FNl:CM]AULT_l 
E:FNl:B:FAULT 
G:COMMS CORRUPT B 
- -
endforfault 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_ERR_A 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A 
endforfault 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_ERR_B 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_ERR_A 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A 
endforfault 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN4_ERR_B 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_ERR_A 
G:FN2_2_INV_A 
G:FN2_2_ERR_A 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A 
endforfault 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2 I ERR B' 
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System Fault Tree 'Associated' Repairs File 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AVLT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_ERR_A 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_ERR_A 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_ CORRUPT _ A 
endforfault 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
G:FN2_1_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
G:PWR:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:FNl_INV_A 
G:FNl_ERR_A 
E:FNl:CM]AVLT_l 
E:FNl:A:FAULT 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_ERR_A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_ERR_A 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN3_INV _A 
G:FN3_ERR_A 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN4_INV _A 
G:FN4_ERR_A 
E:FN4:CM]AVLT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_A 
endforfault 
G:PWR:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:FNl_INV_B 
G:FNl_ERR_B 
E:FNl:CM]AVLT_l 
E:FNl:B:FAULT 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_ERR_B 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_ERR_B 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN4_ERR_B 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:PWR:A:LOSS 
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System Fault Tree' Associated' Repairs File 
G:FN1_INV _A 
G:FN1_ERR_A 
E:FN1:CM]AULT_l 
E:FN1:A:FAULT 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_ERR_A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_ERR_A 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_ERR_A 
E:FN3:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_ERR_A 
E:FN4:CM]AVLT_l 
G:COMMS_ CORRUPT..cA 
endforfault 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:PWR:B:LOSS 
G:FN1_INV_B 
G:FN1_ERR_B 
E:FN1:CM]AVLT_l 
E:FN1:B:FAULT 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_ERR_B 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_ERR_B 
E:FN2:CM]AULT_l 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_ERR_B 
E:FN3:CM]AVLT_l 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN4_ERR_B 
E:FN4:CM]AULT_l 
G:COMMS_CORRUPT_B 
endforfault 
endofdata 
System Initial TLD Criteria File 
G:PWR:A:LOSS DND 
G:PWR:B:LOSS DND 
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Appendix 6. Results For the Large Scale System 
Importance Measures for dual fault dispatchable combinations for STD MEL 2500, 
L TD MEL 5000, repair strategy 1 
Dual Fault Combination 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:A:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:EEC:B:LOSS 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV _A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV _A 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_INV_B 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_INV_B 
G:FN3_INV_B 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV _A 
G:FN4_INV _A 
G:FN4_INV _A 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_A 
G:FN3_INV_B 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN1_INV _A 
G:FN1_INV_B 
G:FN3_INV _A 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN1_INV _A 
G:FN1_INV _B 
G:FN3_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN1_INV _A 
G:FN1_INV_B 
G:FN4_INV_A 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN1_INV_A 
G:FN1_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_INV_A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN1_INV _A 
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Importance 
Measure 
2.04 x10-3 
2.02x10-3 
2.05 x10-3 
2.03 x10-3 
1. 88 x10-3 
1. 87 x 10-3 
2.00x10- 3 
1.99 x10-3 
1. 86 x 10-3 
1. 95x10-3 
2.02x10-3 
2.01 x10-3 
2.07x10-3 
2.03 x10-3 
1. 85 x 10-3 
1. 87x10-3 
1. 99x 10-3 
1. 99x 10-3 
1. 88x10-3 
1. 89 x 10-3 
4.68 x10-3 
1.24x10-2 
5.07x10-3 
4.67 x10-3 
4.65 x10-3 
5.14 x10-3 
5. 06x 10-3 
4.08 x10-3 
4.17 x10-3 
5.22x10-3 
1.24x10-2 
4.71 x10-3 
4.77x10- 3 
5.10x10-3 
5.08 x10-3 
4.11x10-3 
4.17x10-3 
5.28x10-3 
6.44 x10-3 
4.40 x10-3 
6.78 x10-3 
4.70 x10-3 
4.06 x10-3 
Dual Fault Combination 
G:FN4_INV _A 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV_B 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN4_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FNl_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FNl_INV _A 
G:FNl_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FNl_INV_A 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FNl_INV_B 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_1_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FNl INV A 
G:FN2_2_INV _A 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FNl_INV _A 
G:FNl_INV _B 
G:FN2_2_INV _B 
G:FNl_INV _A 
G:FNl_INV _B 
G:FNl_INV _A 
G:FNl_INV _B 
G:FNl INV B 
Importance 
Measure 
4.84x10-3 
4.36x10-3 
6.39x10-3 
4.71x10- 3 
6.70x10- 3 
4.84x10- 3 
4.94x10- 3 
2.07x10-2 
6.33x10- 3 
4.21x10- 3 
4.47x10-3 
4.59x10- 3 
4.25 x10-3 
6.28x10-3 
4.44x10-3 
4.56x10- 3 
2.11x10-2 
4.78x10-3 
4.91x10-3 
4.82x10-3 
4.91x10-3 
3.79x10-3 
Instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the dual fault states for repair strategy 4 -
used in the dual fault state Markov model for the system 
Dual Fault Combination, i Aj,L 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN3_INV _A 2.08x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN3_INV_B 2.07x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN4_INV _A 1. 84x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN4_INV _B 1. 83x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN2_1_INV _A 1. 79x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN2_1_INV _B 1. 78x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN2_2_INV _A 1. 82x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FN2_2_INV _B 1. 80x10-5 
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FNl INV_A 2.09x10-5 
-
G:EEC:A:LOSS G:FNl_INV _B 2.13x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN3_INV_A 2.10x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN3_INV_B 2.05x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN4_INV _A 1. 85x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN4_INV _B 1. 82x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN2 _1_INV_A 1. 79x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN2_1_INV _B 1. 80x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN2_2_INV _A 1. 81x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FN2_2_INV _B 1. 81x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FNl_INV _A 2.12x10-5 
G:EEC:B:LOSS G:FNl_INV_B 2.10x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN3_INV_B 1.72x10-5 
G:FN3_INV _A G:FN4_INV_A 1. 23x 10-5 
G:FN3_INV _A G:FN4_INV_B 1.26x10-5 
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Dual Fault Combination, i Ai.!:. 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN2_1_INV _A 1. 22x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN2_1_INV _B 1. 21x10-5 
G:FN3_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _A 1.24x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN2_2_INV _B 1.24x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN1_INV_A 1. 53x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_A G:FN1_INV _B 1. 53x 10-5 
G:FN3_INV _B G:FN4_INV _A 1.29x10-5 
G:FN3 _ INV _B G:FN4_INV _B 1.22x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_B G:FN2_1_ INV_A 1.23x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_B G:FN2_1_ INV_B 1.23x10-5 
G:FN3_INV _B G:FN2_2_INV _A 1.25x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_B G:FN2_2_INV _B 1.25x10-5 
G:FN3_INV_B G:FN1_INV _A 1.52x10-5 
G:FN3_INV _B G:FN1_INV _B 1. 52x10-5 
G:FN4_INV _A G:FN4_INV _B 1.07x10-5 
G:FN4_INV_A G:FN2_1_INV _A 9.30x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _A G:FN2_1_ INV B 9.70x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _A 9.36x10-6 
G:FN4_INV_A G:FN2_2_INV _B 9.84x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _A G:FN1_INV_A 1.33x10-5 
G:FN4_INV _A G:FN1_INV_B 1.30x10-5 
G:FN4_INV_B G:FN2_1_INV _A 9.68x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _B G:FN2_1_INV _B 9.22x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _B G:FN2_2_INV _A 9.70x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _B G:FN2_2_INV _B 9.29x10-6 
G:FN4_INV _B G:FN1_INV _A 1. 29x10-5 
G:FN4_INV _B G:FN1_INV _B 1.32x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FN2_1_INV_B 9.52x10-6 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _A 9.13x10-6 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _B 9.53x10-6 
G:FN2_1_INV _A G:FN1_INV _A 1.25x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV_A G:FN1_INV _B 1.26x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV_B G:FN2_2_INV _A 9.47x10-6 
G:FN2_1_INV_B G:FN2_2_INV _B 9.13x10-6 
G:FN2_1_INV_B G:FN1_INV _A 1.25x10-5 
G:FN2_1_INV _B G:FN1_INV _B 1.25x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _A G:FN2_2_INV _B 9.45x10-6 
G:FN2_2_INV _A G:FN1_INV _A 1. 26x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _A G:FN1_INV _B 1. 27x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _B G:FN1_INV _A 1.27x10-5 
G:FN2_2_INV _B G:FN1_INV _B 1.27x10-5 
G:FNl INV A G:FNl INV B 1. 61x10-5 
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Appendix 7. The Results Obtained Using the Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic Algorithm Results File 
I Generation 0 
I Individual I String I WTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------1------------------------ ---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I • 0 I o 0 1 0 1 1 10101 7.74 I 12.60 I 24900,00 I 10190.85 I 605.00 I 6666.64 I 
I 1 I 00100001010 13.40 I 7.32 I 22400.00 I 13587.67 I 300.00 I -23213.05 I 
I 2 I o 0 0 0 1 1 o 0 0 0 1 9.73 I 14 .20 I 24000,00 I 12311.40 I 515.00 I 593.15 I 
I 3 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 111 1 0 10.30 I 8.79 I 22950.00 I 11937.09 I 295.00 I 2043.55 I 
I • I o 1 1 1 0 0 010 1 0 12.40 I 7.12 I 22800.00 I 13391.41 I 280.00 I -12901.36 I I 5 I o 0 1 1 0 1 101 o 1 7.72 I 12.80 I 24900.00 I 10770.14 I 605.00 I 6895.53 I 
I 6 I 1 0 0 0 1 1 000 o 0 12.80 I 10.20 I 23000.00 I 14148.73 I 370.00 I -19088.17 I 
I 7 I o 0 0 0 1 0 000 1 1 8.98 I 6.99 I 22950.00 I 10111.27 I 335.00 I 9997.58 I 
I 8 I o 1 0 0 0 1 101 o 0 15.50 I 7.56 I 23200.00 I 17089.58 I 350.00 I -52003.46 I 
I 9 I 1 1 1 1 1 0 110 o 0 9.49 I 8.61 I 23400.00 I 11972.99 I 300.00 I 6024.50 I 
1 Overall fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 0 
7 1 0 0 001 0 0 0 0 1 1 8.98 1 6.99 1 22950.00 I 10111.27 1 335.00 1 9997.58 1 
1 Generation 1 
1 Individual I String I LOTC I Delays 1 Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight 1 fitness 1 
------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
o I 1 1 1 0 1 001 0 1 1 1 1.50 I 13.20 1 24950.00 I 7575.34 I 395.00 1 12125.38 1 
1 1 0 0101 1 000 1 12.80 1 7.09 1 22800.00 1 38657.71 I 280.00 1 -41777.23 1 
2 1 1 11000101 1 3.11 1 9.75 1 24650.00 1 11606.93 I 375.00 I 10390.301 
3 I 01 10100000 1 15.20 I 8.18 1 23200.00 1 46524.65 I 350.00 1-77633.32 1 
4 1 00010110101 1 9.16 I 12.70 1 24600.00 I 30130.46 I 575.00 1 -14468.98 1 
5 I 00 1 1 000001 1 1 8.63 I 6.64 1 23250.00 I 26891.48 I 365.00 I -5478.58 1 
6 1 00001 00001 1 9.73 I 14.20 1 24000.00 1 12311.40 I 515.00 1 593.15 1 
7 1 10100 10000 1 10.10 1 9.33 1 23400.00 1 31525.74 I 410.00 1-16497.51 1 
8 1 00 101 0001 1 7.72 1 12.80 1 24900.00 1 10770.14 I 605.00 I 6895.53 1 
9 1 00 001 1 1 0 1 I 2.26 t 10.00 I 25500.00 I BB64.20 I 600.00 I 11655.72 I 
1 Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 
o 111101001011 1. 50 1 13.20 1 24950.00 1 7575.34 1 395.00 I 12125.38 1 
1 Generation 2 
1 Individual 1 String 1 LOTC 1 Delays I Revenue 1 Mt Cost 1 Weight 1 Fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.48 1 13.00 I 25250.00 1 7641.06 1 370.00 1 12519.21 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 , 10.40 1 8.64 1 23200.00 1 33102.03 1 280.00 1 -19279.58 1 
1 2 1 00 1 1 011 1 I 2.14 1 10.50 1 25500.00 I 8614.65 1 600.00 1 11547.40 1 
1 3 1 1 1 01 100 1 1 I 1.75 J 17.10 1 26000.00 1 7618.91 1 585.00 1 8006.80 1 
1 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.32 1 10.90 1 26300.00 1 3341.17 1 670.00 1 15658.47 1 
1 5 1 0 00 1 0 1 I 1.50 1 13.20 1 24950.00 1 7575.34 1 395.00 1 12125.38 1 
1 6 1 0 00 0 I 1.48 1 13.00 1 25250.00 1 7643.06 I 370.00 1 12517.21 1 
1 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 I 3.10 I 9.75 1 24650.00 I 11575.46 1 375.00 1 10421.77 1 
I 8 1 01 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 3.42 I 10.00 1 23750.00 I 11846.03 1 405.00 1 9075.54 1 
I 9 1 100100010 I 3.72 I 10.40 1 24050.00 I 13317.16 1 315.00 1 7618.79 1 
1 Overall fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 2 
I 1 0 1 101 1 1 1 0 1 0.32 1 10.90 I 26300.00 1 3341.17 I 670.00 I 15658.47 I 
1 Generation 3 
1 Individual I String I LOTe I Delays 1 Revenue 1 Mt Cost 1 Weight 1 Fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 I 1.48 1 13.00 1 25250.00 1 7641.06 1 370.00 1 1:2519.21 1 
1 1 1 1 1111010111 I 3.10 I 9.75 1 24650.00 1 11575.46 1 375.00 1 10421.77 1 
I 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2.14 I 10.50 1 25500.00 I 8614.65 1 600.00 1 11547.40 1 
I 3 1 01 1 0 1 10 0 1 1.81 1 17.40 1 25400.00 1 7332.68 1 645.00 1 6075.50 1 
I I 1001000 0 1 3.72 I 10.40 1 24050.00 I 13317.16 I 315.00 1 7618.79 1 
1 5 I 1 1 01 1 1 1 0 1 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 1 3788.29 I 610.00 1 17482.47 I 
I 6 I 010101101 1 1.52 1 13.70 I 24350.00 6904.56 I 455.00 1 11779.97 I 
1 7 I 000100010 1 3.85 1 10.70 I 23450.00 13079.14 I 375.00 I 7039.08 I 
1 8 1 1 1 010 1 1 0 1 1.48 1 13.00 I 25250.00 7643.06 I 370.00 I 12517.21 I 
1 1 0 1 0 1 10 1 1 0.31 1 11.10 1 26000.00 3260.45 1 695.00 I 14621.55 1 
1 Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 
5 111110111101 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 I 3788.29 1 610.00 1 17482.47 1 
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Genetic Algorithm Results File 
I Generation 11 
I Individual I String I LOTe I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1--------- 1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 I 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3788.29 I 610.00 I 17482.47 I 
I 1 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 I 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3788.29 I 610.00 I 17482.47 I 
I 2 I 1 01 1 0 1 1 001 I 1.82 I 17.40 I 25400.00 I 7360.28 I 645.00 I 6047,90 I 
I 3 I 0 00 1 1 1 1 01 1 I 2.Bl I 10.30 I 25500.00 I 10669.59 I 655.00 I 8350.59 I 
I 4 I 0 0 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 I 2.31 I 10.50 I 24450.00 I 8542.87 I 420.00 I 12720.83 I 
I 5 I 1 01 1 0 1 0 1 01 0 I 4.15 I 9.25 I 23500.00 I 1'1099.1'7 I 440.00 I 7092.39 I 
I 6 I 10001000001 I 3.85 I 10.70 I 23450.00 I 13079.14 I 375,00 I 70]9.08 I 
I I 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1.48 1 13.00 1 25250.00 1 7641.06 I 370.00 1 12519.21 t 
I 1 110 00001 1 3.41 1 9.72 1 24350.00 1 12412.63 I 345.00 1 9305.521 
1 9 1 11 00111 1 1.27 1 12.80 1 25550.00 1 7008.70 I 400.00 1 13610.121 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 
5 111110111101 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 1 17482.47 I 
I Generation 5 
I Individual I String I LOTe I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------
I 0 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 000 I 3.49 I 8.64 I 24300.00 I 12719.99 I 440.00 I 9678.01 
I 1 I 1 1 1 1 0 o 1 0 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 I 7414.05 I 370.00 I 12825.62 
I 2 I 1 1 1 0 0 o 0 1 I 1.63 I 13.10 I 24950.00 I 8036.25 I 340.00 I 11744.37 
I 3 I 1 1 1 0 1 I 0.28 I 10.50 I 27200.00 I 3809.51 I 640.00 I 17136.82 
I 4 I 1 0 0 1 1 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 I 7400.55 I 370.00 I 12839.12 
I 5 I 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3795.42 I 610.00 I 17475.34 
I 6 I 1 0 1 o 0 I 0.28 I 10.90 I 26600.00 I 3711.10 I 635.00 I 16463.26 
I 7 I 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 I 1. 45 I 13.40 I 24650.00 I 6789.85 I 430.00 I 12450.35 
I 8 I 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 I 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3788.29 I 610.00 I 17482.47 
I 9 I 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 I 0.36 I 11.30 I 26300.00 I 4257.29 I 550.00 I 17095.70 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 
5 111110111101 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 1 17482.47 1 
1 Generation 6 
I Individual 1 String 1 LOTe I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost 1 Weight 1 Fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10 1 I 1.28 1 12.80 1 25550.00 I 7022.96 1 400.00 1 13595.86 1 
I 1 1 1010000101 1 1.67 1 13.80 I 24050.00 I 7298.57 1 425.00 I 11017.72 1 
r 2 I 1 1 1 1 1 11 000 I 1.71 1 17.00 I 26300.00 I 7538.56 1 615.00 I 7830.02 1 
r 3 I 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 I 17482.47 1 
I 4 I 1 0 1 10 00 I 0.36 1 11.60 1 26000.00 1 4189.81 I 575.00 I 16171.51 1 
I 5 I 01 001 11 I 1.44 1 13.40 124650.00 1 6780.161 430.00 I 12460.03 I 
I 6 I 0 01 1 I 0.331 10.90126600.001 4024.761 580.001 17360.69 I 
I 7 1 1 00 1 I 1.41 1 12.90 1 25250.00 I 7400.55 1 370.00 I 12839.12 I 
I 8 I' 1 0 1 0 I 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 I 17482.47 I 
1 9 1 1 ci I 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 I 3795.42 1 610.00 I 17475.34 I 
1 Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 3 
111110111101 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 I 17482.47 t 
1 Generation 7 
1 Individual 1 String I LOTe 1 Delays 1 Revenue 1 Mt Cost 1 Weight I fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 101 1 I 0.33 1 11.10 1 26300.00 1 3943.82 1 605.00 1 16469.49 I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 0 1 I 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 I 17482.47 I 
I 2 I 1 1010111111 I 0.33 1 10.90 126600.00 1 4024.761 580.00 1 17360.69 I 
I 3 I 1 1 1 10 1 I 1 I 1 1 I 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 I' 3795.42 1 610.00 I 17475.34 I 
I 4 111110110111 1 1.731 17.10126000.001 7554.301 585.001 8071.41 I 
I 5 1 0 1 1 10 1 1 1 I 2.31 1 9.64 1 26000.00 1 9349.21 1 590.00 1 12134.47 1 
1 6 1 1 000 1 00 01 1 1.58 1 14.10 1 24050.00 1 7045.02 1 425.00 I 11025.90 1 
I 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 0.28 I 10.50 1 27200.00 1 3809.51 1 640.00 I 17136,82 I 
1 8 1.1 0 001 1 1 1 1.44 I 13.40 I 24650.00 1 6780.16 1 430.00 1 12460.03 1 
I 1 001 01 I 1.43 I 13.10 I 24950.00 1 7335.18 1 395.00 1 12445.44 1 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in .Generation 3 
1 1 1 1 101 1 1 101 0.28 I 10,60 I 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 I 17482.47 I 
1 Generation 8 
1 Individual 1 String 1 LOTe 1 Delays I Revenue 1 Mt Cost 1 Weight I Fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 101011011111 1 2.59 I 10.70124350.001 9587.161 350.001 11431.061 
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Genetic Algorithm Results File 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.Z8 10.90 26300.00 3695.07 605.00 16866.25 
2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.28 10.60 26900.00 3795.42 610.00 17475.34 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.28 10.60 26900.00 3795.42 610.00 17475.34 
4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.36 11. 70 25700.00 4166.33 545,00 16371.39 
5 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.52 13.40 24950.00 7740.11 340.00 11800.09 
6 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 9.45 12.00 25100.00 31791.94 565.00 -15823.62 
7 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.33 10.90 26600.00 4024.76 580.00 17360.69 , 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.33 11.20 26000.00 3919.41 575,00 16742.74 
9 0 1 0 0.28 10.60 26900.00 3788.29 610.00 17482.47 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 3 
-----------------------------------------.-----_.------------------------------------------------------
5 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 101 0.28 1 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3788.29 1 610.00 1 17482.47 1 
1 Generation 9 
1 Individual I String 1 LOTC 1 Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost 1 Weight I fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
rOt 0 1011011111 r 2.59 1 10.70 1 24350.00 1 9587.16 I 350.00 J 11431.06 I 
I 1 I 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 I 0.28 I 10.60 1 26900.00 I 3788.29 I 610.00 1 17482.47 r 
1 2 I 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 3.52 I 8.63 I 24300.00 I 12798.92 1 440.00! 9605.62 I 
I 3 I 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.28 I 10.60 1 26900.00 1 3795.42 1 610.00 1 17475.34 1 
I 4 I 1 0001.00 ° 1 3.63 I 9.70 I 24050.00 I 12952.52 1 315.00 I 8479.57 I 
1 5 r 1 0010 1 00 1 0.32 I 11.50 I 25700.00 I 3962.71 1 545.00 I 16726.59 I 
I 6 I 1 001 01 1 1 I 0.32 1 11.20 I 26000.00 1 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
I 7 I 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 I 10.10 r 6.13 I 23450.00 I 31731.00 I 325.00 I -14730.63 I 
1 8 I 0 100 00 1 2.18 1 10.00 I 25400.00 I 8656.15 I 585.00 I 12078.30 I 
I 9 I 1 0 1 0 01 I 0.36 1 11.70 1 25700,00 1 4166,33 I 545,00 I 16371.39 I 
I Overall fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 111100101111 0,32 I 11.20 1 26000,00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 11584.06 I 
I Generation 10 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost 1 Weight I fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 1 1 001 0 1 1 1 1 I 0,32 I 11.20 I 26000,00 I 4028,98 1 520,00 I 11584.06 I 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,28 I 10,60 I 26900,00 1 3195,42 I 610,00 I 17415.34 I 
I 2 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 I 0,28 I 10.90 1 26600,00 I 3711.10 I 635.00 I 16463.26 I 
I 3 I 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 ° I 1.50 J 13,20 I 24950,00 I 7563,51 1 395.00 I 12137.21 I 
I 4 I 1 0000 1 ° ° I 0,38 1 11,50 1 25400,00 I 3482.39 1 635.00 1 15044.30 I 
1 5 I 001 1 ° 1 1 I 0.40 I 11.60 I 25100,00 I 3811.46 r 610.00 I 15516.30 1 
r 6 I 1 1 1 ° 1 0.28 I 10,60 I 26900.00 1 3195,42 I 610.00 I 11415.34 I 
1 1 I 1 1 000 I 1.63 I 13,10 I 24950,00 I 8036,25 I 340.00 I 11744,31 I 
I 8 I 1 1 100 I 1.41 I 12,90 I 25250.00 I 7400.55 I 310.00 I 12839.12 I 
I 9 I ° 1 0 0 1 1 2.21 1 9.73 I 25100.00 I 9080.01 I 560.00 I 12629.90 I 
I Overall fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 11110010"1111 0,32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 1 
I Generation 11 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost 1 Weight I fitness I 
------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
o I 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.48 I 13.00 I 25250.00 I 7641.06 1 310.00 I 12519.21 I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ° 0 0 1 1 1 0 I 10.10 I 8.31 1 23350.00 I 32455.49 1 255.00 I -16841.69 I 
2 I 1 1 1 001 1 0 1 I 1 1.43 I 13,10 I 24950.00 I 7335,18 I 395.00 I 12445.44 1 
3 I 1 1 00001 1 1 1 1.63 I 13.10 1 24950.00 I 8036.25 1 340.00 1 11144.31 I 
4 I 1 1001 1 01 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 1 7414.05 I 310.00 I 12825.62 1 
5 I 1 1 0 1 1 00 I 3,59 I 8.35 I 24450,00 I 13143.29 I 415.00 I 9592,21 I 
6 I 1 00 0 1 1 I 0,32 I 11.20 1 26000,00 1 4028.98 1 520,00 I 11584.06 I 
1 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 I 0,28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 1 3195.42 I 610.00 1 11475.34 1 
8 1 0 00 00 1 0 1 0 1 8,89 I 8.45 I 23050,00 I 21621.81 1 315,00 I -8073.95 1 
9 1 11 0000 0 I 10.90 I 8,48 I 23150.00 1 34310.44 I 235.00 I -23234.01 I 
I Overall fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 111100101111 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.001 11584.06 I 
I Generation 12 
I Individual I String I LOTe 1 Delays I Revenue 1 Mt Cost I Weight I fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 I 1 1100001111 I 1.63 I 13,10 I 24950,00 1 8036.25 I 340,00 1 11144,31 I 
I 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 111 1 2,09 I 10.10 I 24900.00 1 8246.51 I 540,00 1 12321.71 I 
I 2 I 1 100011 011 I 0.33 1 11.20 I 26000.00 1 3919.41 I 515.00 1 16742.14 1 
I 3 I 0 0 1 1 000 1 1 1 I 2.41 I 10,60 I 24150.00 I 8742.63 I 390.00 I 12148,49 I 
1 4 I 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 2.30 1 9.61 1 26000.00 I 9283.89 I 590.00 I 12178.95 I 
I 5 I 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 I 1.43 I 13.10 I 24950.00 I 1335.18! 395.00 I 12445.44 I 
I 6 I 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.28 1 10.60 I 26900,00 1 3795,42 I 610.00 I 11475,34 I 
I 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.36 I 11.40 I 26000,00 1 4252.64 I 520.00 I 11210.56 I 
I 8 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 I 3,55 I 8.31 I 24650,00 I 13134.99 1 435.00 I 9826.05 1 
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9 100101101101 I 2.11 I 10.60 I 25200.00 I 6420.82 I 570.00 I 11980.70 I 
j Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 111100101111 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
I Generation 13 
I Individual [ String I LOTe I Delays I Revenue I Ht Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------\------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 100 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 I 0.33 I 11.20 I 26300.00 I 3934.21 I 605.00 I 16404.63 I 
I 1 I 1 1010 01011 I 0.36 I 11.70 I 25700.00 I 4166.33 I 545.00 I 16371.39 I 
I 2 I 1 1010 01111 I 0.36 I 11.40 I 26000.00 I 4252.64 I 520.00 I 17210.56 I 
I 3 I 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 I 0.28 I 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3795.42 I 610.00 I 17475.34 I 
I 4 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 I 3.55 I 8.31 I 24650.00 I 13134.99 I 435.00 I 9826.05 I 
I 5 I 0 00001 01 I 2.82 I 11.30 I 234S0.00 I 9876.S0 I 315.00 I 9797.71 I 
I 6 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0.31 I 11.40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
I 7 I 0 01 1 0 1 I 1.97 I 17.80 I 25700.00 I 8369.08 I 555.00 I 6911.84 I 
I 8 I 0001 0 I 0.33 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 3919.41 I 575.00 I 16742.74 I 
I 9 I 0001 0 I 0.33 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 3919.41 I 575.00 I 16742.74 I 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
111100101111 0.32 I 11. 20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584. 06 I 
I Generation 14 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 I 1.43 I 13.10 I 24950.00 J 7335.18 I 395.00 I 12445.44 I 
I 1 I 1 1000 1 0 1 1 I 0.37 I 11.50 I 25700.00 I 4234.85 I 490.00 I 17242.64 I 
I 2 I 0 0 0 0 I 0.36 I 11.70 I 25700.00 I 4166.33 I 545.00 I 16371.39 I 
I 3 I 1 0 0 0 I 0.31 I 11.40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
I 4 I 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 0.33 I 10.80 I 26900.00 I 4036.21 I 610.00 I 17088.41 
I 5 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 4.32 I 8.99 I 23850.00 I 15248.52 I 355.00 I 6468.20 
I 6 I 1001 1 1 0 1 I 0.33 I 11.20 I 26300.00 I 3934.21 I 605.00 I 16404.63 
I 7 I 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 I 0.41 I 11.70 I 25400.00 I 3803.26 I 580.00 I 15782.93 
I 8 I 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 I 0.34 I 11.00 I 26300.00 I 4005.17 I 550.00 I 17571.22 
I 9 I 01101 1 I 0.32 I 10.90 126300.00 I 3343.78 I 670.00 I 15655.85 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
111100101111 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
I Generation 15 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 I 2.54 I 19.30 I 25100.00 I 10151.48 I 495.00 I 4075.29 I 
I 1 I 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 I 2.66 I 19.70 I 24500.00 I 10003.18 I 555.00 I 2347.90 I 
I 2 I 1 1 0 000 1 1 0 I 1.69 13.80 I 24350.00 I 8084.16 I 335.00 I 10532.12 I 
I 3 I 0 101 0 1 0 1 I 2.64 10.40 I 25100.00 I 10280.32 I 500.00 I 11291.55 I 
I 4 11011011 1 I 0.32 10.90 I 26300.00 I 3343.78 I 670.00 I 15655.85 I 
I 5 I 0 10 000 1 1 1 I 2.82 11.00 I 23750.00 I 10053.43 I 290.00 I 10144.17 I 
I 6 I 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0.31 11.40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
I 7 I 0 10001 1 0 1 I 9.56 12.20 I 24500.00 I 31357.86 I 505.00 I -15569.36 I 
I 8 10001000 0 I 2.72 11.30 I 23550.00 I 9477.42 I 385.00 I 10296.79 I 
I 9 I 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 0.28 10.60 I 26900.00 I 3790.59 I 610.00 I 17480.16 I 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 I 1 1 1 0 0 101 1 1 1 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
-------------------,..----------------------'-------------------------------------------------------------
I Generation 16 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue r Mt Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
I 0 I 1 0010111111 I 0.38 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 3593.71 I 640.00 I 15637.89 I 
I 1 I 0 01 0 0 1 1 1 1 I 2.64 I 10.40 I 25100.00 I 10280.32 I 500.00 I 11291.55 I 
I 2 I 1 101 11110 I 3.601 8.37 I 24450.00 I 13170.95 I 415.00 I 9551.74 I 
I 3 I 1 0 01 01 1 I 0.31 I 11.40 J 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
I 4 I 0 0 1 001 1 I 1.82 I 17.40 I 25400.00 I 7360.28 I 645.00 I 6047.90 I 
I 5 I 1 101 0 01 I 0.31 I 11.40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
I 6 I 01 0 1 0 1 1 I 0.35 I 11.40 I 25700.00 I 3569.11 I 610.00 I 15909.67 I 
I 7 I 01 1 001 01 I 1.46 I 13.60 I 24350.00 I 6690.94 I 455.00 I 12074.68 I 
I 8 I 100010 01 I 0.37 I 11.70 I 25400.00 I 4169.21 I 515.00 I 16539.22 I 
I 9 I 11 100 1 0 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 I 7414.05 I 370.00 I 12825.62 I 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 111100101111 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 J 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------'-------------------
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I Generation 17 
1 Individual 1 String I LOTe I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I fitness I 
------------1------------------------)---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
o I 1 0 1 1 001 0 1 1 1 I 3.42 I 10.00 I 23750.00 I 11846.03 I 405.00 I 9075.54 1 
1 I 1 1 1 101 0 1 1 0 1 I 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4039.23 I 550.00 I 17462.99 I 
2 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 I 0.31 I 11.40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 1 16552.87 I 
3 I 1111010111 I 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.86 I 550.00 I 17467.36 I 
4 I 0110010101 I 2.02 I 10.70 I 24600.00 I 6065.92 I 525.00 I 12621.56 I 
5 I 11010101011 I 0,36 I 11.70 I 25700.00 I 4166.33 I 545.00 I 16371.39 I 
6 I 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 I 1.65 I 13.60 I 24350.00 I 7358.83 I 400.00 I 11419.86 I 
'7 I 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 I 4.28 I 9.05 1 23450.00 1 14531.21 1 395.00 1 6745.33 1 
8 1 0001 0 1 0 1 4.65 1 9.21 r 23450.00 1 15682.40 1 395.00 1 5486.28 1 
9 1 01 0 0 0 1 0.35 1 11.60 1 25400.00 I 3490.63 1 635.00 1 14960.41 1 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 I 1 1 1 001 011 1 1 0.32 1 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
1 Generation 18 
1 Individual 1 String I LOTC 1 Delays 1 Revenue 1 Mt Cost 1 Weight 1 Fitness 1 
1------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.31 I 11.10 1 26300.00 1 4039.23 1 550.00 1 17462.99 1 
1 1 1 11110101111 1 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.86 1 550.00 1 17467.36 1 
I 2 1 1 010111111 1 0.33 1 10.90 1 26600.00 I 4024.76 1 580.00 1 17360.69 1 
1 3 1 1 111101011 1 0.31 I 11.30 I 26300.00 1 3964.54 1 605.00 1 16299.54 1 
I 4 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2.22 I 9.91 I 25700.00 1 8886.12 1 615.00 1 11566.60 1 
I 5 101 00 0 011 I 2.02 I 10.70124800.001 8085.921 525.001 12621.581 
I 6 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 01 1 I 0.31 I 11.10 1 26000.00 1 3260.45 1 695.00 1 14621.55 1 
1 7 1 1 1000 100 1 10.10 I 8.37 1 23350.00 1 32413.58 1 255.00 1 -16799.77 1 
1 8 I 1 01 0 01 1 0.31 1 11.40 1 26000.00 1 3959.45 1 575.00 1 16552.87 1 
1 9 I 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.31 I 11.10 I 26000.00 I 3260.45 1 695.00 1 14621.55 1 
1 Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.32 1 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4028.98 1 520.00 1 17584.06 I 
1 Generation 19 
I Individual I String I LOTC I Delays I Revenue I Mt Cost I Weight I Fitness I 
------------1------------------------1---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
0 I 1 1 1 1 0 1 001 0 1 I 2.26 I 18.60 I 25400.00 I 9260.97 I 525.00 I 5498.32 I 
1 I 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 I 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.86 I 550.00 I 17467.36 I 
2 I 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 I 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4039.23 I 550.00 I 17462.99 I 
3 I 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 I 7400.55 I 370.00 I 12839.12 I 
4 I 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 I 1.41 I 12.90 I 25250.00 I 7414.05 I 370.00 I 12825.62 I 
5 I 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 I 0.32 I 11. 20 I 26000.00 I 4036.98 I 520.00 I 17576.06 I 
6 I 1 0 0 1 0 0 I 0.32 I 11. 50 I 25700.00 I 3969.08 I 545.00 I 16720.22 I 
7 I 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 I 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.86 I 550.00 I 17467.36 I 
B I 1 1 1 1 o 1 0 0 I 0.31 I 11. 40 I 26000.00 I 3959.45 I 575.00 I 16552.87 I 
9 I 0 1 0 1 o 1 1 1 I 2.89 I 9.77 I 25700.00 I 11188.47 I 560.00 I 10493.58 I 
1 Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 011 1 1 0.32 1 11.20 r 26000.00 r 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
I Generation 20 
1 Individual I String I LOTC 1 Oelays 1 Revenue I Mt Cost 1 Weight I Fitness 1 
------------1------------------------ ---------1---------1----------1----------1---------1-----------1 
o 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.32 1 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4036.98 I 520.00 I 17576.06 1 
1 1 0 1 10000 1 0 1 3.42 1 10.00 I 23750.00 1 11860.62 I 405.00 I 9060.95 1 
1 1 1 1 0 01 1 1 1 0.31 I" 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.66 I 550.00 1 17467.36 I 
3 1 1 10 001 1 1 2.25 1 18.60 I 25400.00 I 9233.33 1 525.00 1 5525.96 1 
4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2.08 I 10.40 I 25100.00 r 8426.85 1 500.00 1 13145.02 r 
5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.31 I 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4039.23 1 550.00 1 17462.99 J 
6 1 1 0 0 1 0.31 r 11.10 I 26300.00 I 4034.86 1 550.00 1 17467.36 I 
7 1 0 01 0 1 0.36 r 11.40 r 26000.00 I 4252.64 I 520.00 1 17210.56 I 
8 1 001 0 0 0.32 I 11.20 I 26000.00 I 4036.98 1 520.00 I 17576.06 J 
9 1 0000 0 1.63 I 13.10 I 24950.00 r 8064.11 1 340.00 1 11716.51 r 
I Overall Fittest Individual Occurred in Generation 9 
6 1 1 1 1 001 011 1 1 0.32 I 11.20 t 26000.00 I 4028.98 I 520.00 I 17584.06 I 
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